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Rights of Passage: An Aesthetic Cultivation of Contingency
Trevor Mowchun
The connections between creativity, contingency and necessity, loosely with
respect to modernism, have a peculiar ifnot puzzling way of hinging on the nature of
moving images and the experience of being still while beholding them, one after another.
If we accept, after TJ. Clark, that contingency "is an issue of representation [and] not
empirical life-chances," then contingency can emerge as a historical process in which
representation can be seen to adapt to various crises of meaning by becoming more and
more susceptible to meaninglessness. The medium of the moving image along with the
passive position required of its spectators is here understood as offering a kind of formal
invitation to contingency, giving it a permanent place in the realm of hermeneutics in the
form of a symbolic threat against the powers of human agency. The primary objective of
this thesis is to raise the stakes of contingency within modern aesthetics and demonstrate
some ways in which the plight of contingency can become the purpose of subjectivity and
hence the very medium of self-realization.
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"What is the idea behind the idea?" Jacques Derrida, in a documentary on the
philosopher/professor, very casually puts this question to a student struggling to
articulate, in a few simple sentences, the original seeds of her research. Her inability to
respond, quickly and sincerely, and the sight of her distress over not knowing where to
begin as if she had completely forgotten her reasons for beginning, got me wondering
about why it is such tricky business to think or write or act in accordance with our
deepest motivations. Why is the concept of motive localized somewhere beneath
intention, visualized perhaps as the motor or fuel of intention, and consequently veiled by
the concept of human action when it remains the very cause of what we do and why and
to what end? Is it the case that the commencing of some action necessarily conceals an
awareness of the motive it is meant to carry out? And if so, does it become the
"conspiracy" of action that motivation is to be completely swallowed up and forgotten by
the time the fruits of our labor are ready to be reaped? Such questions began to fill and
even cloud my mind as I started to realize that what little basis I had for acknowledging
the idea behind the ideas in the following essays was primarily by way of a direct appeal
to the ideas comprising them, swimming on the surface of thought as it were. This
underlying idea seems for precisely this reason - this limitation of action - to be all the
more important to uncover and constitute through a process of critical backtracking
because I only started writing with a bigger picture in mind after each part - each fact of
an unbeknownst whole - had been more or less sketched out, with identities as opposed
2to destinies more or less determined. My task, as I saw it close to a year ago by now, was
not to hatch new ideas but rather to take care of those I already had by following a
sneaking suspicion that these three essays composed in this particular order brought to
fruition an idea "behind" ideas I was too busy working through - as if living and
breathing - to tap the root of my own motivation.
I have yet to read a single book by Derrida, but I suspect that my reaction to his
question at least points in the direction of what I take him to mean when he takes writing,
or a specific mode and mood of it, as the work of mourning (for departed friends and
times and causes alike). It was my first instinct to set the stage here by looking down as if
I had reached the end of a journey whose tracks lay safely behind me and, from a vantage
so high and a stance so still, could only then begin to account for the logic of my chosen
path. But, as I weigh the consequences of having begun on three separate occasions an
investigation whose logic I was only half aware, it seems presumptuous, even unruly, to
cast myself here as all-knowing from the outset or as someone who had consciously set
out with a neatly arranged itinerary of questions (or theses) and plans for possible
solutions. Since I did not properly or conventionally begin, I feel I can't in good
conscience create the impression in this introduction that I did (through, say, succinct
declarations of introductory signatures such as topic, scope, prevailing discourses and
cultural import). For what it's worth, I did, however, begin at the end, in the quiet wake
of a reprieve (when the work was more or less over, more or less set in stone, hence more
or less abandoned to its particular fate), which I took as an occasion to consolidate my
investigations by looking back instead of down - back being the only direction with a
3view I could actually take without succumbing to a belated, self-fulfilling type of
authority.
A big part of what this thesis is about is therefore tied to how its parts came to
appear in the light of a whole. Retracing steps, going back for the full answer, is to shine
such a light. But remarks like the following remain worrisome as mandates for
articulation: "How can I know what I think until I've seen what I've said?" sounds a bit
like an excuse, depending on the degree of rhetoric reached, and certainly can be used to
excuse oneself from taking responsibility over one's choice of expression. But it can also
come as an honest confession that serves to remind all us listeners that those who speak
are always a bit ahead of themselves as if sped up and separated by the moving vehicle of
language. A real question then emerges from this predicament of a possibility: "How can
I know what I think so as to see, foresee, what I will say?" If saying does in fact run the
risk of outrunning thinking, then perhaps one way for our thinking to catch up and grab
the reigns of our speech is by choosing to speak about something already said. That is
what I am going to try here by documenting a train of thought I'm no longer on,
sketching the succession of conceptual landscapes (or fields) through which I passed,
gradually and near seamlessly it seems, so that no transition will appear "in order"
(causally and necessarily) in accordance with some preconceived logical design. Which
isn't to say the path lacks logic altogether - indeed I'm surprised to find just how much
logic is actually binding - only that it was not administered upon the inquiry until after
the fact, which is now, and hence too late to determine the structure of the investigation.
Because ofthat (facts coming after the fact) it is never too late (for it is also our right) to
interpret the logic of events and appropriate them as our own through storytelling.
4Indeed, telling stories is how we reconcile ourselves with events in which our
participation was so full on, sometimes to the point of blinding, that they may as well
have been entirely out of our own hands. And matters of the mind, I wish to stress, are no
less "out of our hands" just because they seem to unfold within us, as if "the within" were
the place or the point from which matters of life are most within our power to control.
Methodologically suspect? Perhaps, but not unsound. For all this could turn out to
be ideal, and constructive in more ways than one, because it could prove to be an
effective way to start acknowledging that what we say, regardless of the context, is (more
than amounts to) what we think, on the simple condition that we come to as full a
knowledge as possible of what exactly was said (despite all paradoxical efforts to take
care of our ideas while in the process of having them, and then, if that weren't enough of
a challenge, figuring to what extent they have actually come from us). Just as writers,
who cannot hope one day to make a clean break from what has been published in their
name only, must be, at least in spirit, perpetual rewriters - the tellers of their own telling
of tales.
When I first started to take up thinking with some thrill of seriousness, I would
write down most of what came to me, no less the thoughts I tracked down, on tidily
inconspicuous index cards fit for recipes, which I then with tremendous haste (perhaps in
the form of an exhale) tossed into a shuffled nest of notes rising high (and collecting dust)
in a shoebox. This fragmentary and highly elliptical approach to writing strikes me now
as being so extreme for denying the various instances of thought any access to their very
own context, each entry making a premature appeal to its own autonomy as if seduced by
the glamour of the quotation. It has been almost two years since I scribbled my last card,
the cause of which is just as traceable to the time and attention I now grant the "full"
sheet of paper (with its vain but humbling spaciousness and successiveness). Now if any
good has come from this newfound unwillingness to relish and feel satisfied with the very
fast and small, it is having the pleasure (often at the expense of my great embarrassment)
to fish down into these depths and feed on those thoughts that somehow managed to
survive the famine. Slightly condensed, I include here the fragment which, I suppose,
started my interest in and concern for beginnings, marking not only my first reflection on
the idea of the beginning but constituting as good an exemplification of how I used to
begin:
A strange view. Upright in a chair, eyes down and stiff as rock, and a frame of
mind sequestering my immediacy like a perimeter. Is it little more than a
coincidence while trying to put one's mind to work and think of something
relevant to write to stumble upon such a frequently glossed familiarity: frame of
mind? Where is the sense in such an outlandish personification that compels such
confidence, indeed which leads me to believe that it is more or less accurate? In
the style of Cartesian introspection, let us take this one here, this mind that has
turned to itself for its picture. A practical but conventional and hence somewhat
arbitrary period of cognitive stoppage and substitution - where "mind" and "I"
align and become identical, where the full body of the self resurfaces and starts to
dry - is a fair approximation of this impact of the "I" on my "me," so to speak. In
this way the mind is thrust back on itself to consider its powers of framing: we
6can be seen from our own point of view angling out, protruding, standing on end,
backs against the door, adjusting and focusing ourselves in relation to particulars
internal and external and in between. But I cannot quite determine now whether
I'm framing contemplation or contemplating framing. Which one is the metaphor
or less metaphorical? Perhaps the reason for this wild indiscernibility is that both
get framed as the metaphors multiply and start to meld, creating out of thinnest air
a peculiarly mental and paradoxically expanding claustrophobia as I encroach
upon what it is to begin.
The digression closed as quickly and sharply as its sudden arrival. I would never have
expected that this passing thought about the gesture of the mind's posture of framing
would return in the form of a clue, as potential guidance for the urgency to find a way to
backtrack from the end for the sake of reclaiming the shifting ground on which acts of
beginning can go either way - that is, any number of ways - while still being their own
essentially unique and fixed way "in."
Who begins, why, and from where? We could say that everyone begins at least
once and does so (each to their own) because time doesn't, time being the word for that
which never has, for people and places preceding us immeasurably, and upon which our
manifold myths of origin are projected. We all officially began once (it is true), but we
can't remember. Right now we are not the same person who once began and who began
as of there. We, in our present moment, are without a beginning, stranded with the
knowledge that we began without meaning to. So who is "beginning" all the time; who
are the beginners who aspire to rebirth themselves - consciously, carefully, perhaps
conscientiously - on their own terms? Those who come to mind are the positively and
7strategically dissatisfied. Anyone with the will (even if it should disguise the need) to
constitute their existence as an alternative to the one dealt out: existence held as the
advantage of having been dealt an unfinished enigma whose fixed parameters of birth and
death are merely practical and conditioned and contingent in their moments, leaving open
the creative possibility of beginning and ending. The beginning is therefore a happy time
because that is what it promises, that is what it is on the verge of. But this time is not
necessarily the sort that ticks: when a beginning is at last initiated, the complex promise
is fulfilled to the best of the abilities of the aspirant in defiance. One is supposed to be
happy in the comfort of this private here-and-now, but to begin anew, on top of beginning
at the bottom, is also to begin alone.
In the history of aesthetics, the concept of the beginning, to say nothing of the
experience of beginning, is inseparable from the expropriation of art from its service to
the divine, particularly during the time of early Greek civilization. Now that art has
gradually lost (or found) its way within its own emancipation, the artist can no longer
receive from art and audience that destiny of representation to build for the divine (or a
metaphysical absolute) an architecture of the human. Thus Giorgio Agamben can speak
of the modern artist as "the man without content,"1 in acknowledgment of the
disappearance (or death) of any aesthetic content whose nature is intrinsic (vital) to the
nature of art as Man's primary dimensional form. The arbitrariness of content - what I
will soon be calling the contingency of content - stemming from the newfound
questioning of content (and the consequent possibility of ever new and incommensurate
contents) results in a kind of paradigmatic shift across the ontological hierarchy of
1 See Giorgio Agamben, The Man Without Content, trans. Georgia Albert (Stanford,
California: Tanford University Press, 1999).
8aesthetics from content to form, and from objectivity to subjectivity within the hierarchy
of consciousness, withform emerging as the only "content" capable of constituting
unanimous criteria for artistic production and, theoretically speaking, justifying art. But
since this content is nothing but form, a form defined precisely by the lack of any
intrinsic (again vital) content to modern consciousness, the artist is without an impetus, or
calling, that is not the unmistakable sound of his or her own secret appeal to be
summoned to the task of inspiration (and for reasons as potentially wide-ranging as the
subject matter chosen). The blank slate (canvas) of thought - the beginning of artistic
creation as the chance to venture independently and simultaneously with the help or
guidance of the most secular deity in chance itself- becomes the most succinct image
and monolithic testament of the death of the absolute. Because there is absolutely nothing
that the artist ought to put there in the name of art, everything that has been put there
before, including everything that he has put there himself, including all that entered his
consciousness within a culture that can disseminate information much faster than it can
proliferate it, is in some sense built into the very fabric of possibility, rendering
possibility into a structure of the infinitely meaningful and chance into the possibility of
discovering or stumbling upon structures of significance untouched by any established
system of signs or recognizable modes of consciousness. There is then nothing inherently
at stake in the work of art except those raised in honor of work itself, that is, of
production (Agamben uses the more formal concept ofpraxis). But there is no way to
create those stakes - stakes which shadow the work itself and not what it is a work of-
except by beginning the work by getting to work, for the ontological absence of stakes
triggers the subjective but also practical ordering of them. The very act of beginning,
then, is the creation or forging of those absent stakes at the moment that the work's
content, founded on aprinciple of nothingness, is helpless to escape from them. In this
sense we can say, albeit reservedly, that the work of art depends on its beginning rather
than stems from it, which is why it is a fundamental ambition of artists to contend and
overcome the beginning (a great departure from their prior power/burden to cultivate it in
a dignified servitude) so that they can pursue this fascinating residual known as "limits"
(endless and errant in the absence of any objectively authoritative measure). And it is this
sense of the coinciding of endlessness and error into a destiny of drift that is peculiar to
the "foundationlessness" of art as a second or alternate world - call it a banished world or
the banishing of the world - a "world" that we have, according to Nietzsche, so that we
do not go under on account of truth.2 The modern subject, particularly and most blatantly
in the role of the artist, can thus often be found standing atop the highest peak within the
wide range of truth, too high to discern the difference between those which are necessary
from those which are contingent, contingency taken in its traditional philosophical sense
as that which is possible but ultimately unnecessary.
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale,
ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), #822, p. 435.
3 Nietzsche's aphoristic style (or flourish) is a poetic expression of this freedom to hover
over all things potentially integral to life. Though the stakes raised by the potentiality of
such things (as potential truths) has the unpredictable power of wielding a special gravity
over the speculative soul because there is no way to know how deep they go - the extent
of their necessity - until one has honed in and touched down. The lightness which allows
consciousness to take flight when it pleases and hover in speculation leaves it ironically
quite vulnerable to the trappings of doctrine (traps Nietzsche perhaps sets for himself so
as to skirt all the more in stride). It would appear, then, that the real danger with being
lured or taken down by the "business" of truth is that one might end up becoming
passionate about only those things which require unbridled devotion, however fleetingly
felt. The artist, Nietzsche might say, requires utmost devotion, but only with respect to
the truth of his art and not art as truth (assuming he knows and believes in the difference)
10
My retrospective understanding of this somewhat reawakened interest in
beginnings is thus of a perceived intuition of a potentially significant link with the
concept of contingency. The more I thought about beginnings, read with a mind to
beginnings, and remembered my own experiences trying to begin (some of which strike
me now as almost desperate attempts to overstep it), the more I came to see that
beginners who acknowledge the force of contingency within the beginning - taking in the
air of immanent and impending chance - increase the stakes of the beginning, the easier
but more costly it is to begin and, in turn, the harder but more critical it is to reach an end.
It appeared that the only factor greater than these stakes is the odds, and whether or not
there is even a game. It also struck me that since the desire to speak or show can, very
often, precede having something to say or reveal, the will to do so is closer to a mood -
being in the mood to have will. And if the point of departure is selected through little
more than a desire to depart, it is as though a dead end were already visible through the
entrance to the maze, peculiarly obstructing the path to the first turn (after which the
many divergences are sure to branch and tier and compete for priority). And this without
changing the fact that the creative process is the best means of countering universal
contingency at the same time as it proceeds (at the beginning) to affirm it.
The drama of modern art is in many ways describable as a battle against "the
elements" of contingency or a battle fought on the field or "state" of contingency. The
disorientation of a creative process lacking metaphysical roots is such that although it
pursues a goal (perhaps more goals than it could ever keep track of, let alone achieve) it
is nevertheless primed to set whatever mandate aside, or go so far as to abandon one
altogether, for the sake of welcoming the guest of chance. Thus the sincerity of any goal-
11
oriented pursuit becomes a questionable motivation and phenomenon in artistic
production because the stray autonomy of any medium, symptomatic we could say of the
self-consciousness of art, obstructs or intercepts the fruition of the goal as a result of a
radical shift in emphasis from product io process. The making of the work becomes not
only more important than the work itself but the most defining characterization of the
work, as if the process of making managed to switch places with the product made as a
result of the modern conception of art finding its essence entirely within itself. What then
is to prevent us from saying that what the artist is calling the "goal," or what the work
states as its "subject" or "underlying symbolic significance," is nothing more than a front
or an excuse, attempts to compensate for the negative or absent or contradictory criteria
of art? If chance has replaced fate (or become fated) as the reigning criterion for the new
(anti)absolute in an age where the devaluation of all values has left only that which is
deemed necessary unscathed and hence invaluable, how could it wind up being inverted,
that is, aesthetically set up and logically principled, and, pending that possibility, to what
extent would it then function as a loophole back to the work of art's privileged
relationship to metaphysics? (Are we to understand the hyper-empirical sense of the
metaphysical or a metaphysical vision in, say, the films of Andrei Tarkovsky, Robert
Bresson, Michelangelo Antonioni and, more recently, Terrence Malick, Béla Tarr or
Abbas Kiarostami in a negative light, the light of negation, so that the paradox of the pure
necessity of contingency is resolved in their films through a committed deferral, at once
both humble and proud, to a world (very often a natural world) that is resonantly true
only on the condition ofits total lack ofconditions! The "disenchantment of nature"
(which I take to refer to the historical moment when the necessity of nature became
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perceptible as such, without the need for appeals to the super-sensory) does not appear to
acquire any re-enchantment through the necessitation of contingency, but rather just the
opposite seems to occur: the enchantment of contingency by way of necessitation,
illuminating the fullness ofthat which is empty or overfull, by wiring it to the concept of
fatefrom the inside.)
In The Gay Science (who familiar readers will have figured I have learned from
and, in times of weakness, borrowed from) Nietzsche writes:
I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then
I shall be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor Fati: Let that be my love
henceforth!
The possibility of this connection between the discovery of beauty in necessity and the
power to create beauty in the world is a significantly decisive albeit paradoxical one for
the modern artist stuck with disenchantment. How can necessity, which commands
reaction or even passivity towards itself as a fate, give way to creation, which commands
necessity into an obedience to the will? This question, I believe, is at the heart of the
thesis, literally and figuratively. Figuratively because it detects a secret tie or meeting
place between necessity and contingency within the aesthetic; literally insofar as it comes
up in the middle, halfway through the second chapter, marking a drastic turning point as
contingency is released from the scene of the material world - extrapolated from the
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random
House, Inc., 1974), p. 223. He says this in the spirit of resolution on the opening day of
the newest year, in January 1882, when he begins the fourth book of The Gay Science
"Sanctus Januarius." Amor Fati means "love of fate," a concept vital to an understanding
ofhis redemptive vision of nihilism.
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facticity of cinematic representation - before turning in the direction of the modern
subject. A starting hypothesis for the shift would go something like this: Necessity is
stripped of its brutal command as the great sentencing-power of fate as soon as one sees
that necessity is fundamentally contradicted the second one places a divine will (on old
fate) at the helm of contingent circumstance, upon which necessity - all that comes to
pass - "bends" to the will of he who opposes it by anthropomorphizing it. When
necessity is made the object of revenge and fate taken hopelessly to task, the person who
exacts it has typically cast himself in the role of victim, but only because he feels more
victimized by his given humanity than by his very own struggle. Human limitation is as
necessary as anything else that is bound to its particular and no less peculiar position -
fixed into a form of life as Wittgenstein might say. A human being, despite the limits that
form a life, is nevertheless a special case insofar as he can regard himself as an exception
to them, that is, over and above and hence opposed to his existence as an effect. That a
human being is a historical being means, among other things, that he has the double-
edged freedom to reject or repress or praise and preserve so as to ultimately choose the
history that he has no choice but to effectively embody.
A few words regarding the sharp polar fork of nihilism will allow me to pave the
way for this reversal of necessity and creativity and provide some conceptual shape to its
irrevocable aftermath. Strictly defined as the devaluation of all values, nihilism can have
the power in the proper hands to ignite the opportunity for the réévaluation of value itself.
The instructive ideal of it, to my understanding, is that we must come to value for itself
everything that has been devalued out of refusal to value for what things are as opposed
to what they are not. By directing our values away from necessity, hence away from
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attitudes like acknowledgement and affirmation (Nietzsche wishes one day to be only a
"Yes-sayer"5), we avoid crossing the sea of our greatest disappointment with human
limitation and so remain at the edge of our very own waters of finitude. It is the secret
mission of nihilism to discover necessity as ruthlessly as an archeologist would pursue a
vestige regardless if it ennobles or degrades his or her image of the past civilization to
which it belonged (and now represents). (That nihilism must start from scratch to
discover what is the case is also the irony of nihilism - where have we been livingfor so
long until now? - and the source of its volatility and self-destructiveness.) It seeks to
accomplish this by questioning the values that have obscured necessity like layers of
time, all values valued on the basis of the necessity unconditionally granted them, all
values regarded and exploited as facts for one reason or another - in the unspoken name
of compensation. But after it has completed its work, exposing the heart of all errancy, it
discovers that it has ruined absolutely nothing or nothing absolutely, that the values
brought down were only built out of air (out of, say, the narrative contents of a particular
and no less given culture) and hence were indestructible because unquestionable or
questionable at the catastrophic risk of exposing all facts as the fictions they more or less
are. All that remains (so the argument goes) becomes all that there is, was, and will be,
everything, all that there is to gain and to lose - nothing but the possibility of all things to
be. Even chance becomes necessary according to the same principle as fate, because no
principle is necessary anymore to distinguish them. Everything turns out (happily) to
have value in itself prior to the valuing of one thing over another, of fantasy over reality
and reality over fantasy; and since the discovery of necessity commits us metaphysically
5 Ibid.
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to the indiscriminate valuing of all things, to the wild abandon of total affirmation, the act
of knowing will take the form of an acknowledgement and hence, perhaps, also of an
aesthetics. What this entails, at least in part, is that beyond not being able to value more
than one thing at a time one way at a time, we also cannot cross the threshold of the thing
valued, regardless of the way. Investigation, instantiation, argumentation . . . speculation,
skepticism, loving affirmation . . . each in their own way, and with varying poignancy,
will reinforce the very distance they span. But this is nothing to get too worried about.
The value of something (a moral of the argument) should never be measured by its
appearance of hiding or withholding or denying it, for the more it looks that way, giving
the impression that its truth resides in hiding and is truthful because hidden, the more
there is in and not behind the surface.
I mentioned film and some filmmakers earlier almost in passing. The connections
I've been describing or narrating between creativity, contingency and necessity, loosely
with respect to modernism, have a peculiar ifnot puzzling way of hinging on the
ontology of moving images and the phenomenology of being still while beholding them,
one after another, despite all sorts of efforts on behalf of maker and viewer alike to place
them into meaningful succession and successions into blocks of seamless continuity. This
part of the story is the hardest to tell without making a stretch, or to render convincing
without being too insistent, but the substance of the claim I think is rather quite simple: If
we accept, after TJ. Clark, that contingency "is an issue of representation [and] not
empirical life-chances,"6 then contingency can emerge, first, as a historical process in
which representation can be seen to adapt to various crises of meaning by becoming more
6 T.J. Clark, Farewell to an Idea: Episodesfrom a History ofModernism (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 1 1 .
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and more susceptible to meaninglessness and, second, as the last step representation had
to take to reach its destination (destiny?) of totalization through an effacing
amalgamation with the world represented. When film reached a point where it could
"open its doors" to the world more widely (through automatic cameras and colour and the
synchronization of sound) such that the world upon release (through various modes of
projection) would not "know" where it is or if it had even "left" where it was - what it
went through to appear again in the light of its own image - contingency in essence was
offered a kind of formal and permanent invitation into the realm of hermeneutics in the
form of a symbolic threat against the powers of human agency, which is to say that the
non-human and the human became indistinguishable for the first time. As for a
significant reference point for my own sense of this highly unique, perhaps grotesque
aspect of film, I would look no further than a short passage from Stanley Cavell's
immeasurably resonant book on the ontology of film, The World Viewed:
Film takes our very distance and powerlessness over the world as the condition of
the world's natural appearance. It promises the exhibition of the world in itself.
This is its promise of candor: that what it reveals is entirely what is revealed to it,
that nothing revealed by the world in its presence is lost.
7 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed, enlarged edition (Cambridge, Mass., and London:
Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 1 19. These remarks were written in the early 70' s,
before movie cameras could be completely replaced by digital software on computers. I
imagine that some people working exclusively within the field of film studies will take
this fact to antiquate the philosophical consequences (and their fertile possibilities for the
art of film) that Cavell unearths from a concept like "the world viewed" - viewing it from
behind a camera, projecting it as light on a screen, screening it from viewers who find
themselves on an opposite but similar side as those who filmed the world itself in all its
glory. But I am not so convinced that the consequent claims are less relevant now than
they were when they were put forth, that they have fallen out of synch with cinema
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That film follows through on its promise not just perfectly but ontologically (assuming,
of course, that it addresses enough of the world - existent or constructed or generated -
for viewers to sense an invisible camera or some other invisibly mediating or "world-
opening" device) is the sort of condition that makes the experience of film on the whole,
all told, too much to bear. From the simplest one-take to the most complex narrative or
avant-garde epic, moving images bear too much of the world - the one from which we
are distant and over which we are powerless and about which we find overbearing - the
world as we sometimes refuse to know it - and shows us what such distance and
powerlessness as they occur in our everyday lives actually look like. Nowhere do I go so
far as to claim that the viewer facing the screen is facing the world in the sense of
simply because celluloid has fallen out of fashion, and so wish to pause for a moment to
evaluate the logic of this potentially devastating argument. Do Cavell's claims, here and
elsewhere, really hinge on what film theory has called the photographic indexicality of
the moving image? Granted he could not have anticipated while writing The World
Viewed that this so-called indexical bond was on the verge of being ruptured, nor that the
rupturing would fail to result in such images being severed from their belonging to
cinema and, in turn, cinema's belonging to media in general. But is it not also the case
that everything Cavell says about film and in the name of philosophy was said in the light
of television? By the time of Cavell's first writings on film the initial shock of
television's arrival had long since come and gone. Perhaps he even experienced some
relief, in broaching this new and strange and burgeoning field of study, to not have to
worry about anticipating what seems to me a significantly greater turning point in the
ontology of the medium with the fragmented persistence of the world in the home and
across homes. The gravity of the sort of tyrannical domestication applied to the world
during the dissemination of television can be gauged in something as obvious and
effortlessly observable as the majority of people with televisions staying home, staying
in, to watch the world, as if the conditions of "outside" could be satisfied "inside" to such
an extent that to turn to the world on the TV screen was (and still is) at the same time to
turn away from it - from the one measly and continuous world just beyond one's
windows and doors. The desire, if you will, is to see what is on as opposed to what is
there, what is on instead of behind the screen, and, moreover, who is behind what is on it,
watching us watch it, and on the basis of all that adjusting the information on the set, or if
one station seems as cryptic as another - inside and outside or private and public seeming
hopelessly alien to one another - turning the entire set off or, more often than not, falling
asleep to the hypnotic droning and clamor.
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meeting it head-on or rising to its occasion; but I am nevertheless quite sympathetic to the
experience of being forced to face that screen in a way that comes far less naturally, even
dangerously, in the world itself, and which nature has repeatedly corrected for the sake of
our persistence, that is, with staticfearlessness in the face of constant movement and
surprise and irreversibility.
The thesis is spread into three parts, each one its own whole, internally coherent
and practically self-sufficient, despite this push for a philosophical narrative informing
the gaps. As such, perhaps they are best described as episodes: what links them is less a
linear course of inquiry than the running disquiet of a highly elusive idea (what I'm
calling the idea behind the ideas), which triggers different rallying and trial-and-error-like
strategies of intellectual homeostasis. Stronger, safer, cooler ways of relieving a deep-
seeded itch were no doubt possible, but that was not for me to know when I was
consumed by the problems and took to writing as a way through as opposed to around
them.
It went, and now goes, like this. Beginning with the particularity of a film
explicitly about painting and implicitly about filmmaking, fit the way through with
images of and as making; moves to the particularity of film in general - moving images
of or about the world - whose automatic indulgence in contingency a priori to the
creative manipulation and "narrativization" of the medium is valuable as a demonstration
of its necessity in the world; and ends with the conditions under which the self can
become its own medium in a world replete with apparatuses of influence and undergo
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transformation or a process of psychic adaptation through the act of interpreting works of
art. In the first chapter, contingency is debated within the site of creativity where two
distinct mediums of expression (painting and cinema) call for very different and
sometimes contradictory strategies of appropriation (i.e. domination and acquiescence).
In the second, the exemplary reification of contingency in the moving image into
something of a model form (what I found myself wanting to call an anthropomorphism)
offers the relatively passive viewer the chance to reconcile temptations to both dominate
and defer through an act of acknowledgement. The presence/absence of the screened
world (in which nothing and everything is lost) is conceptualized as a "reflective wall of
glass" against which the finite extent of the will's reach to alter the world in its own
image, or as per its want, is potentially put back into proportion with the subject. In the
third, the passionate and conscientious act of reading and writing old and new texts
(interpreting texts) reveals that the more the self exposes itself to solidified or finished
acts of creation, the more it will be able to create itself by giving itself up for
interpretation - at first despite its contingent condition and then, perhaps, as a natural
consequence of it: as the prize for the victory over nihilism with the help of a Nietzschean
redemption of nihilism.
"Contingency," again according to T.J. Clark, and again on the subject or theme
of modernism, "was a fate to be suffered, and partly to be taken advantage of, but only in
order to conjure back out of it - out of the false regularities and indiscriminate free flow -
a new pictorial unity. Out of the flux of visual particles would come the body again (says
Cezanne) - naked, in Nature, carrying the fixed weaponry of sex. Out of the shifts and
transparencies of virtual space (says Picasso) would come the violin and the mandolin
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player. Tokens of art and life."8 Every art form will have its own specific relationship to
contingency, its own means for practitioners to navigate and solve their own means of
breaking down representation by, say, harnessing or using or ceding chance or, more
unsuspectingly, by doubling-up conventional necessities through strategies of irony.
Film, on the other hand, was without a choice in the matter, for the medium "embodied"
contingency from the moment it first appeared, establishing it in the realm of
representation in such a way as not to undermine or even destroy representation but rather
to objectify and totalize it once and for all (or so it would appear). While all the other arts
took contingency as permission and pressure to experiment with conventional methods of
representation through a variety of attempts to transcend them by deconstructing them so
as to found a new pictorial unity (perhaps this time with its structure visible and thus
available right on the surface for future critique and appropriation), film seemed to begin
T.J. Clark, Farewell to an Idea, p. 1 1 .
9 I wish to double stress the fact that film (the spatio-temporal projection of reality) did
not literally embody contingency upon its first appearance at the turn of the century (for
being colourless and soundless its representation stood quite far from how reality itself
appeared), nor prior to the arrival of video and digital imaging in the early 1950's (for
significant improvements in lens technology and stock sensitivity and density, including
further developments in colour and sound, could not render the entirety of the world
equally fumable nor surpass what Mary Ann Doane has called "the brake of the film
frame"), nor upon this current rapid and somewhat relief-filled institutionalization of
digital production and post-production methods (for the freedom to record the world with
unsurpassed efficacy and ease, even in extremely low-light or previously unreachable
situations, and add or subtract virtually any amount of visual information through the use
of highly sophisticated computer programming, for the most part has had the effect of
turning filmmakers into painters confined to a fully-wrought perceptual picture of the
world or, if starting from scratch in a purely virtual (canvas-like) landscape, turning
painters into filmmakers who then proceed to confine themselves to a fully-wrought
world-picture of cinema). So when I say that cinema marked the first representational
embodiment of contingency I am referring to it in a manner derived from Andre Bazin' s
notion that cinema is always the medium yet to be invented. See "The Myth of Total
Cinema" in What is Cinema? Vol. 1, trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:
University of California Press, 1967), p. 17-22.
paradoxically as though the medium itself were an experiment on representation the
result of which was not Cezanne's color patches or Seurat's dots operating
simultaneously with figurative elements but rather a machine's first glimpse in time and
space. What it "saw" is everything there was to be revealed to sight without seme, and
what that went on to reveal upon projection came in the form of a revelation that we
ordained be carried out without us, upon our command and in our name, while we sit
back and watch our wish for the world-as-such unfold. Cavell very appropriately
categorizes this act, or moment of an act, as one of "letting our actions go out of our
hands"10 and, as it were, doing nothing.
The second chapter on the value of cinematic contingency is anomalous, even
within this context of a whole made up of autonomous parts, because it is composed of
parts or fragments presented more or less as I found them and, on top ofthat, operates
transitionally insofar as it phases out the subject of film during a gradual (non-
argumentative) movement from an ontology of contingency to conditions for its
appropriation and redemption. It seemed to me that film's revolutionary leap towards a
mythic embodiment of contingency, so overwhelming upon its arrival at the end of the
19th century, was in turn overwhelmed not only by the responses of makers and viewers
and critics to counteract, domesticate and in some significant sense repress the very
miracle of representational totalization, but by an appeal amidst an early 20l century
cohort of underground enthusiasts to sort themselves out into "makers" and "viewers"
and "critics." The reasoning behind such a war waged against cinematic contingency is
both historically and psychologically complex. Perhaps the sort of situation
Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed, p. 159.
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representation was getting itself into was not sufficiently or accurately anticipated.
Perhaps no one thought that the moving image on its own would turn out after all to be so
disappointingly uneventful, that the possibility of a fresh encounter with the familiar or
everyday world would be met before long with disinterest and hostility. Or perhaps the
contingent event was simply regarded as being beyond description, beyond interpretation,
bouncing back all conscious and unconscious acts of aesthetic anthropomorphisms like
an immaculately polished mirror. Or perhaps audiences were simply reluctant to sit back
and be still, especially with cinema arriving at a time when so much attractive stimuli
competed for the shrinking attention of the average city person, where wherever one
turned there lurked the potential for something new to see, a reason to stand up and shift
positions and ultimately to turn away. If anyone managed to recognize nothing more or
less than the full weight of what was shown on the screen at a given moment, what was
there obviously wasn't enough, and was soon after subject to all sorts of methods - on
top of the medium's own ontological restrictions upon contingency - for shaping and
directing - structuring - what was there, as if the best of both worlds (the world-as-such
and the world as we know it) had been seized simultaneously as one and the same. A
sense of both greed and anxiety appear to be equally significant albeit separate
motivations for cultivating cinema in the foreign lands of the preceding arts; and by
indulging the former as a defense against the latter, "the human" is believed to be
triumphantly reaffirmed by the successful attempts to claim the art of film from the
medium's complete dependency on a technology that functions not only mechanically but
automatically, that is, self-sufficiently - a characteristic that conspicuously encroaches
upon criteria for agency many take to be sacredly specific to consciousness and the will.
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It is more a phenomenological experiment to take the irreversibility and
irrevocability of this "perfectly meaningless truth" of cinematic contingency to signal the
limit of the human will, in the face of what exists, to alter what once existed. Film catches
contingency in its nature as intractable plentitude and thereby sets up this very important
moral: the will is the power to affect our lives, our relationship to life and the lives in it,
and not life itself. In film, life itself, bare life, characterized by the presence of the world
as such, is the barrier that the will, in directing its power, cannot cross without slipping
into unconscious desire and/or a nihilism bent on destruction. As though from film's
promise of candor the stage is set for every swing of deceit, every variety of
transgression, every trick or game or spectacle of illusion under the guise of
representation that has had to remain in and between minds, projected out of frustration
or disappointment or boredom with the deceptive simplicity (call it the overexposure) of
unbridled faithfulness. (Actions are difficult if not impossible to let go of without being
able to trust them in the hands of the other at the precise moment in which they can be
entrusted to the other as a receiver. If one of the underlying ideals of film is to let our
actions go out of our hands and know, as Cavell would say, by way of acknowledgment,
then it is only natural for makers and viewers and critics of film to make for the ideal and,
by doing so, reach a full knowledge of as opposed to through acknowledgment. This
might seem like a terrible cop-out, compromise and failure of a contradiction to settle for
having what must by nature be undergone, but is that for us to say who strive to know
differently or to be otherwise in knowledge yet can go no further without experiencing
the required loss of consciousness or lowering of the subject as a loss, the loss?)
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Does cinema, for reasons outlined above, breed excessive or even aggressive
methods of interpretation, whereby conceptual and semantic "reinforcements" across the
many disciplines of the humanities (and occasionally beyond) are summoned
indiscriminately and irrespectively of the limits of interpretation? Is it possible that the
impulse to interpret a film in, let us say, a disproportionate manner, is the same as the
impulse to use the medium for primarily or even purely narrative purposes by directly
importing the more "proven" possibilities of painting, literature and theater? If so, if such
a comparison is valid if not true, can we then describe this impulse as reactionary instead
of responsive, or as responding to a threat within the very nature of the new medium?
Contingency and cinema for me converge precisely within the tensions and tenseness and
obssessiveness of our need to interpret works of art in the midst of life's work, a need
which seems to be easily provoked by the extreme disconnect between the form of art
and the content of life that emerges as a result of the narrative rationalization of the
irrationality of cinematic contingency. One way of reasoning the logic of this outcome (a
historical approach I do not explicitly take up) is to say that the institutional and
theoretical cultivation of cinema developed too fast, perhaps as fast as - or in response to
the speed of- film absorbing photography by providing it all at once with the logistical
solution to the stasis of its representation. I would not say, however, even if I could know
all the reasons, that it developed in the wrong direction or that the development has not
been most fruitful or even progressive, rather only that what was seen to be specific to the
medium (the capture and projection of reality) must have been generally regarded as
being grossly unspecific to serve as the fundament of an art unless the contingent
appearance of reality could be made to matter to a gathered audience, that is, to people
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who show up at the same time and the same place and for a price (one's time, one's
space, one's dollars and cents). This desire to make the screening of reality matter in a
manner uncharacteristic of reality itself- by anthropomorphizing reality through intense
and invasive structures of dramatic emphasis, through all sorts of liberties taken with the
"raw innocence" of the world-as-such - resulted, it seems to me, not only in the
concealment or repression of cinematic contingency via narrative convention but, more
importantly I think, in the consequent manifestation of the contingency of our spectatorial
and interpretive procedures - that what viewers and critics think and say about what they
see and hear onscreen is just as much on or about what is there as against it - extending
the exile of contingency and with it its tremendous value for an ethics of criticism.
The primary objective of this thesis is to raise the stakes of contingency within
modern aesthetics and demonstrate some ways in which the plight of contingency can
become the purpose of subjectivity and hence the very medium of self-realization. By the
end, or perhaps throughout the course of the final chapter, the self can be seen to emerge
as the only contingency over which the will has any real determining power, but that
power is not self-sufficient or internal to a process of self-determination. Rather it is
contingent upon whether or not it has been empowered by a sense of profound
powerlessness in the hold of certain artistic achievements (those experienced as
exemplary realizations of will) that seem to provide just the right conditions - the key -
for our own self-cultivation. It's not that an interpretation says more about an interpreter,
or a thought in fact says more about who thought it (and why), or stories arejust stories
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because they are too contingent upon their committed tellers, but rather that these
interpretations and thoughts and stories about things both outside and other than
ourselves are, at the same time, and in fact, interpretations and thoughts and stories about
us. They hold for a world which, not being ours, cannot do without our being, our being
human in it, that is, so far as we are able to be concerned with it - gathering everything
(all this) into the status of the world (this world). The picture of the world that emerges is
therefore not one that is strictly inside or outside us as in between us and others and what
we call "the world," creating the possibility of the coming together and moving apart of
inside and outside realities. But the world cannot do this, only language can, and what we
do in language stays in language, affecting those who speak the same language and
influencing what can be said - interpreted, thought, told - by way of language. Lastly, it
is important to remember as language asserts its authority over our consciousness that
what we do in language is not merely the sum of what we say, for during those
experiences where words seem most pressing and superfluous, real and illusory,
necessary and contingent, the only form of truth and lie there is to be had, we are either
silent or wish we could stay so.
One last set of preliminaries regarding this final connection between interpretation
and self-creation. Artists and critics have been traditionally viewed as inhabiting opposite
sides of the work of art, standing on each other's receiving end. It is thought, still, that the
artist is the one responsible for creating the work while the role of the critic is to interpret
its meaning (to find out what and why it means and what its creator could not have dared
to guess). Criticism, in this old picture, is second in line to artistic creation, the dusk to
the artwork' s dawn, as it were. But just how stable and successive and near causal is this
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trajectory and dynamic? To what extent can we say upon scrupulous reflection of texts
we call "art" and those we call "criticism" - texts equally burdened with the power and
responsibility to entertain and enlighten and sometimes compel our most uncharacteristic
reactions - that the work of a "creator" is inherently interpretive and the work of an
"interpreter" inherently creative! What is the substance of the difference, indeed what
remains of the difference, if it is no longer based on the absurd idea that to create is to
create from nothing and to interpret is to create nothing at all? It is a running theme of
this thesis to experiment with such a reversal so as to test the hypothesis that what truly
separates artists and critics (perhaps in our own minds as readers) has less to do with the
differences between works of art and criticism (as significant as those differences are)
than the audiences they each have in mind (creeping in from below or supervising from
above), even in the absence of conscious efforts to make contact with the "outside world"
from which artists and critics and spectators alike must periodically withdraw as the path
to membership. And if, generally speaking, artists appeal to readers (in the broad sense)
and critics to writers (in the strict sense), then perhaps a reason why creation is ascribed
solely to the artist and interpretation solely to the critic (and nowhere near vice versa) is
because there is no one but the critic, no work but criticism, to write out the interpretation
(call it the underlying bond) governing any given act of creation.
11 If I were to experiment with this distinction using the criterion of creation, I would
limit it to opposing views towards the possibility and value of the "new": Artists believe,
rightly and wrongly, that the only thing new under the sun is their own self-
consciousness, one that they will not be able to get past no matter how far the creative
process ventures to take them beyond the scope of their being, for self-consciousness is
one if not the most essential priming forces of artistic creation. Critics believe, rightly and
wrongly, that there is nothing new under the sun, that the new is as worthless as it is
impossible, because they see that the only thing that can truly bring them to self-
consciousness (and create the conditions for creation) is consciousness of other selves
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What if we were to reposition ourselves within this picture by looking at it from
the perspective of the work of art and ask: What's the difference, or the meaning of the
difference, between an art for artists and an art for spectators? Nietzsche's idea of an "art
for artists"12 contains a clue for the joining of artist and spectator on the common ground
of the will to power. Both artist and spectator are in the position (opposite but mutual
positions) to attend to the claim of the work of art: the artist undergoes a process of
creation (riddled with repetition) while the spectator undergoes a process of passage
(troubled by identification). A painter or writer or filmmaker, I assume we can agree, is
not an artist by virtue of creation alone, in the same way that a spectator of a painting or
novel or film is not an artist by virtue of subjecting himself to, and putting himself wholly
in the service of, the fiction out in front. The title of "artist" seems to me applicable only
to those who seek their virtue in the act (art) of transformation. Transformation refers to
something greater, more significant, perhaps significantly strategic, than merely
changing. Change, after all, is constant, whether we go along with it or not, and is marked
by a retrospective awareness of a change having occurred, at which point all one can do
is accept or reject the lot that has been dealt as a permanent consequence. To transform,
on the other hand, means quite literally to change forms, to become someone else - the
next self- in the continuum of one's life, and entering the next self is the equivalent to
beginning the next and newest phase ofthat life. Only a concept such as adaptation - fuel
for new chapters in the odyssey of life on earth - is fit to account for the kind of change
on which both survival and perfection are at stake (and at odds). In terms of the evolution
(other creations) to such a point where consciousness must be lost or temporarily
suspended or thrust off its tracks in order to interpret anew its own latest reflection.
12 See The Gay Science, p. 37.
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of the human, where criteria for survival and perfection are no longer writ large nor
clearly differentiated in nature, transformations that occur in total seclusion so that only
the transformer can take stock of the difference are not legitimate adaptations. If no one
else can perceive and thus confirm that one has indeed taken place it is because its design
is incomprehensible, confirming the fact that what is unreadable for all is precisely what
stays written for one. An art for artists is in danger of being solipsistic or "monological"
(Nietzsche's word) unless the artist can afford to oppose the tyranny of art by resisting
substituting his or her most cherished work with the dialogical foundation of his or her
essential character. So it is that an art of life becomes an anfor life, otherwise it is just
art; and works of art, be it paintings or persons, are totally inadequate substitutes for what
are truly the most important works - examples. Interpretation as a medium of self-
realization is meant as a step in this direction.
I'm quite sure that what I've been referring to as the idea behind the idea belongs
to the following line of resolute question and tentative answer: Why is contingency - an
apparently neutral concept - perceived as a threat? Why does it come as a threat? What
does it threaten? Why does the word conjure something absent in the world and as a
consequence of our beingpresent in the world? What do we actually mean by it or want
to mean by it? I think one of two things: either history, "the heart of history," has stopped
beating a tune we can recognize and resume, or the beating ofthat heart is finally being
heard more clearly than ever as that of our own. If the two are seen as opposite sides of
the same coin, or perhaps close enough to being one and the same, then perhaps the goal
underlying our notion of contingency is to perceive its threat as a symptom of the infancy
of our metaphysical freedom and therefore as a sign that a spirit so freed (to the bone, as
30
it were) is officially mortal: sentenced not to death but to the flesh that dies. Despite the
sacrifice, despite the death of a certain God in Man, there is nothing more that the spirit
could want - its dream - than to one day possess its form so as to begin its actual life, our
life of the body, biologically.
While moves from film to philosophy and back seem to me natural enough and
more or less justifiable, my coming to philosophy from film (incidentally the opposite
direction taken by Cavell) also has something of a story behind it, one whose brief telling
might shed some light on my decision to look outside a discipline as a means of reaching
the dark and inner depths of questions held in common. It seems clear enough today that
any irreconcilable difference between one discipline and another, and between various
modes of thought and their disciplining, is due less to the ways they pursue answers to
the same questions than the discourses used by "proponents" to possess as intellectual
property one answer over another, whereby the sealing off of intellectual contributions
from neighboring disciplines, not to mention the culture as a whole, has become one of
the most accepted measures of contribution itself.
The truth of the matter is that philosophy has always been the mode through
which I've studied the medium and art of film and come to know it best. I could also say,
or confess, in trying to trace the root of my interest in philosophy, that film, at least until
very recently, has actually stood in the way of my investigations into the very thing that
excited me most about it: experience and the everyday. As a young adolescent student
overwhelmed by philosophers with complex and ambivalent relationships to everyday
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experience (i.e. Heidegger and Nietzsche), I persisted to try to reconcile what I took to be
the most profound ideas with what repeatedly struck me as their most vital enactments in
film. In more attempts than I care to recall, the intimacy and sometimes even the
dependency I perceived between film and philosophy would result in essays that for the
most part failed to put to use the tools that each seemed to provide as a means for both
understanding and being understood by its other. Perhaps by misinterpreting philosophy
as the art of thought as opposed to something more on the lines of the practice of insight,
I would often begin my work back then with philosophy cast as a way into the
concreteness of film, say as the framing of the film(s) to be thought about, only to
discover soon after a sense of helplessness to escape from its perch, a feeling I now
understand as simply not having known how to use it. Trapped in thought, thought
became its own language, and as such it propagated itself faster than I knew how to think,
which is to say it moved in circles (around me); and when the time came to own up to my
best intentions and bring it all back to film, I was reluctant, because I became fearful,
shocked to discover that what had seemed so pregnant with meaning during those late
night screenings had become during those late night writings all but foreign.
With a passion for philosophy as unwavering as ever, things started to change in
terms of my intellectual relationship with film when I came upon the work of Cavell. I
needed a philosopher above all to show me a fruitful way from philosophy to film, which
actually turned out to be a means of moving from words to images. The World Viewed, to
take nothing away from its extraordinary treasury of ideas, inspired more than instructed
me to build up a confidence to see (rather than merely think) that the kinds of
philosophical problems that actually pose problems or result in problems for our human
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existence can have a kind of quotidian correlate in both the conditions and possibilities of
the medium of film. Philosophy, when refracted through the prism of film, could
transcend the walls of its disciplinary containment by returning to its source in our
everyday experience. Cavell's work is still instrumental, still useful, in my ability to
believe in the potential of the cinema to make legible both the dramatic and casual
undergoing - would he ever want to call it the immanence! - of what is called
"philosophy." His deep commitment to finding the epiphanic banalities of onscreen
occurrences has led me to reinterpret a claim he made at the beginning of his grand
philosophical work The Claim ofReason regarding his choice to understand philosophy
"not as a set of problems but as a set of texts."13 Those texts, it seems to me Cavell has
shown, can no longer be confined merely to those of philosophy if philosophy is to avoid
being confined merely to the possession of its own texts. And film has already shown
philosophy to have avoided this with certain films functioning as texts in their own right,
where philosophical problems can be apprehended as opposed to comprehended and
made sensible only insofar as they appear recognizable. The experience of recognizing in
a film an aspect of or a contradiction within the human condition is, first and foremost, a
response to finitude, hence an act of solidarity before an attempt at a solution, and
solidarity emerges as a means of solving the philosophical predicaments of isolation or
solipsism or skepticism.
Much of what follows proceeds by way of the field of aesthetics, turning around
this most crucial point of intersection between film and philosophy. It is within
aesthetics, I believe, that philosophy can illuminate the logic of a film's means of
13 Stanley Cavell, The Claim ofReason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy
(New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1979), p. 3.
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knowing the world, thus perhaps learning to teach the film its own language and
meaning; while film, on the other hand, and as a sort of constructive counterpoint to the
arrogation of philosophy, marks the precise moment where the word loses out to the
image and the will to know confronts the unknowable. I am especially interested in how
philosophy can help film show that part of what it means to know the world is to know
the meaning of being disappointed with mere knowledge of it. While the limits of
knowledge in philosophy will continue to manifest as the errors of contradiction or the
follies ofparadox or the graceful avoidances of silence or, most commonly, through
intense performances of rhetorical certitude, the same limits in film inspire points of
departure into various forms of experiential knowing and the chance to demonstrate the
rehabilitation of experience as knowledge. My interest, ultimately, in this kind of
knowing is that its criteria do not hinge on certainty whatsoever, but rather upon the
capacity to cope with the inevitability of uncertainty. Such knowledge amounts to
something significantly greater than the power to devise systems of thought: the power
not only to survive but also subsist upon their reconfiguration and collapse.
Chapter 1
At the Drawing Board ofthe World:
Reading the Filmmaking of Victor Erice 's Dream of Light
"Cinema might be young, but it was born when
humanity was very old." Antonio Lopez Garcia
At the end of the film Dream ofLight (Spain, 1992, also known as The Quince
Tree Sun), a movie camera, the one that's been filming the entire time on top of a tripod,
the one filming right now as we view its surrogate onscreen, is shown in place of a
canvas and easel at the precise spot that the Spanish painter Antonio Lopez stood, day
after day, month after month, painting a little quince tree growing in his studio backyard
in Madrid. This camera onscreen, this camera actor or impersonator, in a gesture that
hearkens all the way back to the kino-eye aesthetics of Vertov's Man With A Movie
Camera (1929), turns on by itself to film some fallen quinces beneath a tungsten light
that is under the same spell as the camera, fading in and out without any human
intervention. From this privileged perspective of film artifice at work, what the camera
films and the light lights turns out to be a staging of the painter's dream-memory of
rotting quinces illuminated by the rays of a setting sun that he witnessed as a child.
Though delayed until the conclusion, the scene constitutes the introspective climax of the
patiently observed film; and as strange as it is for a film persistent in its blatant disregard
for conventional hierarchies of emphasis to climax at all, stranger still is one that strikes
from "outside" or "underneath" the diegesis into the very heart or root of it like a bolt of
lightning. Reflecting on its origins instead of referring back to its beginnings, the scene
belongs to the smallest group of reflexive enactments that contribute to the myth of the
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medium's peculiarly animate nature with respect to the mechanical automatism of the
camera. As such, it can't help arouse wonder over how the events of this particular film
came to reach the point, the limit, where a forceful folding-back occurs as if it were the
most natural thing, the most naturally inevitable way for a documentary that so quietly
and implicitly unfolds as the documentation of its own making to "end."
I am envisioning that this chapter will amount to the sort of reading I wish for it if
pursued more as an attempt to answer for this last set of quotation marks surrounding -
cross-examining - the idea of completion than through approaches typically taken
towards what we take completed works of art to be. The most obvious explanation for the
neglect of this kind of approach to film (and perhaps also to texts in general) is that the
great majority of films, in common with most works of art, are made to assume a more or
less conventional state of resolute completion for audiences who have come to
instinctively expect a sense of completeness or coherency or professionalism while
intuitively wishing for some form ofperfection. For those who choose to think and write
about the films they see, the instinct is just as strong to conceptualize a given film as
unambiguously finished and, if deemed masterful, as constituting an enhanced
crystallization or transcendence of its process of construction. It is possible, although far
from profitable, to approach a film purely as a palimpsest of the forces that produced it,
but any attempt to betray an end for a beginning - text for its own inherent context -
would have to come at the expense of the film's identity by working against the grain of
its contribution. There do exist films (few and far between) that find ways of
incorporating the process of their own making without explicitly making it their subject,
making it their mission to document that very process into diary-like narratives.
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Dream ofLight by Victor Erice is the only film I know whose practice of looking
at the artistic process of a realist painter opens the way for a dialogue between similar
sets of aesthetic values filtered through, and hence conditioned by, different mediums. By
dialogue I refer to a process of exchange between painting and filming, between one form
of representing the world and another distinct but compatible form, which takes place at
the level of the film itself and works through irreconcilable disagreement and kindred
like-mindedness simultaneously. The difficulty in reading a film that has managed to
both document and demonstrate the creative process is that its discourse, lucid as it is,
ends up being less an overt realization of intentions than a covert accumulation of
continuous and parallel intentionality. In other words, Erice and Lopez, filmmaker and
painter, are not strictly identifiable with the individual creative agencies of "painter" and
"filmmaker" in the film, for as representations of themselves onscreen (or offscreen in
Erice's case) their actual "intending" existence is not only mediated but quite constituted
by their roles as the main protagonists in a film that to a large extent undergoes and
contains - and is never properly about - its own making. (If the logic of the documentary
requires sorting out over and above the questions raised by its events, then it is only
because its logic is such that it comes up against and thereby discovers - can ask without
putting - those very questions.) The traces of creation leading up to the sudden disclosure
of the camera itself are thus not limited to the incidental, accidental or even the arbitrary,
but can be seen to function when they do as decisive and significant instances of an
autonomous aesthetic process whose reflexive dimension gradually builds to a kind of
first-person characterization of conventional third-person narrativity. Dream ofLight, in
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this way, survives without having to surrender the "death mask" that Walter Benjamin
described as concealing and preserving the original conception of the work of art.
Before becoming too steeped in how a finished film can be so intimately tied to
its own making (to the extent that the making crosses the line of the made), it might be
helpful for the reader to know where this type of documentary receives its impetus or
calling.2 One day, some time during the transition from summer to fall, Erice gets word
1 Walter Benjamin, "One-Way Street," in Selected Writings: Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed.
Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Mass., and London: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 459. The kinds of aesthetic instances I wish
to treat in good conscience as traces (cracks in the death mask) are tied both to the
medium of film and an approach to filmmaking premised on the potential for discovery
opened by the filming process itself. They are discoverable as textual through a
sensitivity to contradiction, transformation, ambiguity, digression, and even destruction,
as aspects of an aesthetic that function to open and expand and multiply rather than
wholly determine or see-through the meanings of the film. There nevertheless remain
many films (perhaps the majority, perhaps even the strongest) that aspire to entomb ideas
into forms, perspectives into realities, more or less deterministically. The films of Sergei
Eisenstein and Alfred Hitchcock come immediately to mind. I do not have very high
hopes for these to yield the sort of structural openings and gaping contingencies
necessary in enabling the strict causality of a narrative to loosen and become more
exploratory. Instead I look to those which circumvent their own power to hold reality in
check while still holding to reality; films whose faith in the closure of representation and
in seamless causal continuities of representations has been shattered by the 20 century's
profusion of epistemological paradigms, by a modem (postmodern?) milieu that copes in
both collaborative and reactionary ways with a prevailing absolutism of uncertainty due
in large measure to an obstinately groundless and resigned relativity.
2 It might also be helpful to remember, first, that documentaries, at least insofar as the
filming aspect is concerned, require, very often, and as a bare minimum, a justification of
intent and not an entire enterprise or artifice of intentions to begin a process of
discriminate collecting. Another way of putting the blurry distinction between
documentary and fiction, or using the distinction despite its gross limitations, is to say
that documentary filmmakers can find or even put themselves in the position to film
material and not scenes, or if the scene is an invention to film it as material, that is, as
raw - in the flesh of the real. The documentary cinematographer's principle to keep open
at all times the spare eye that is free of the circumscription of the camera's viewfinder is
based on the conviction - although the proponents of a more cinéma vérité approach
might want to call it the belief- that reality can't be processed technologically,
appropriated phenomenologically, and examined intellectually and affectively, until it is
captured the way it unfolded.
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of Lopez's intention to begin a painting of a quince tree with sun. (The two, it is worth
mentioning, had no prior contact except through an appreciation of each other's work and
some visual sketches shot by Erice of Lopez painting in different locations throughout
Madrid.) The effect of natural light upon the ripening quinces at this special time of year3
is regarded by Lopez as singular and ineffable, one that proceeds to destroy the quinces
nourished during the spring by continuing to grow life beyond the form epitomizing it - a
deeply inciting representational paradox for a realist painter. But time is scarce for Lopez
to render the spirit of this most ephemeral light and likewise for Erice to document the
spirit ofthat effort. So Erice, upon hearing of Lopez's intention (fatal ambition) to paint
the tree, has little time to locate a camera and gather up some crew to begin a film
without a script, few preconceptions, not having undergone the sort of depth of
preparation that a filmmaker who leaves ten year gaps between features - having
completed ("completed"4) only three to date - is perhaps accustomed to descending. And
here he is outside the painter's studio on September 29th, 1990, just as Lopez is arriving
3 Vernillo del Membrillo as it is called in Spain, meaning "little summer of the quince,"
for which the North American equivalent would be Indian Summer.
4 The word is encased in quotations because Erice's second feature El Sur (1983) is
lacking his intended conclusion. The protagonist Estrella, an adolescent girl, was
supposed to have traveled to the south at the end to fulfill the unrealized destiny of her
father. Due to financial difficulties, the sort which tend to bog down and compromise
even the most secure productions, Erice was not able to film the necessary scenes.
Notwithstanding the generous sense-making aspirations of critics who read the exclusion
of the south of the film's title as a comment on the fundamental unattainability of a future
free of the disappointments of the past, Erice himself has stated that the film is (and not
just for him) fundamentally incomplete without an end that marks a new beginning for
Estrella in the form of a new experience of time as a mature adult. A shift in time, in the
way time moves and feels as it passes just the same, is the director's signature criterion
for the articulation of real, permanent, or traumatic changes in consciousness. The device
is also aesthetically logical as opposed to excessive because the properties of time and
space are vital in picturing changes in consciousness when the stuff in "the room" of
consciousness happens to remain, as is so often the case, unchanged, or just as one left it.
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bearing materials for the construction of his latest canvas. The beginning of the film,
focused as it is on the beginning of a painting, also marks the beginning of the
filmmaking.
I am leaning towards reading the film chronologically for no other reason than
that the circumstances of its making were the primary principle for the organization and
structure of its finished circumstances. This is evidenced not in the history of the film's
making but for us to see in the film itself. Marked throughout with precise calendar dates
(day, date and month) that appear as captions onscreen, charting the fictional passage of
real time, the events of the film can thus be said to unfold in sequence (a fact which does
not depend on whether or not the content of a specific scene or shot occurred when it
occurs in the film or was intended during filming to occur that way.) Erice' s distribution
of dates over the course of the entire film - keeping track of the passing of time while
deciding when to acknowledge that enough of it has passed to warrant breaking it - gives
it the gentle rhythm, rigor and density of a diary. It is, perhaps, a diary film, which of
course does not necessarily make it a film diary, for that would reduce it to a complex
albeit random stream of thoughts (or observations) riding, securing and resisting,
simultaneously, the inexorable current of the everyday. Lopez the painter, whose subject
this time around is the quince tree, is the unquestioned subject of the film; his presence in
5 And yet there could be nothing within the beginning of this film, or any text for that
matter, that could testify to the encounter with the beginning itself, with the way it was
reached and announced and successfully or unsuccessfully surpassed. What I have just
put forth is merely a hypothesis that can mean nothing outside of our own participation
with a certain measure of paradox and which I must dispense with, or work towards
dispensing, for the sake of participating with thefull amount of the film, the film as
indeedfinished, in order for it to constitute (if it does) but a fragment or acknowledge
itself to be without end as a result of not having "properly" begun - having extended the
beginning into the process of its execution in both senses of the word and hence in a
contradictory sense.
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front of the tree, his everyday surroundings, along with the inevitable encroachment of
those surroundings upon his most insular privacy, constitute the spine of its continuity
from start to finish; and Erice appears to keep a purely "cinematic diary" of it all, keeping
a promise to himself to film each and every day regardless ofhow disappointingly
uneventful and stranded and insular a single given day might be, without rhyme or
reason, both for an insider like Lopez and the people around him as much as for an
outsider like Erice and his crew.
This picture of a cinematic diary is still too convenient to go uncriticized: two
pictures, in fact, have been rather obviously, perhaps seductively superimposed one on
top of the other, and I think I ought to straighten it, to understand so as to correct the
intuition behind it, before proceeding to read this particular film with the help of it. For
starters, the writing of a diary entry is the kind of work typically scheduled for the night,
after the fact of the day, in the wake of the affairs of the world or whenever one feels free
from one's own affairs. What gets written, theoretically, - for I do not pretend to know
all the forms this writing could take - gets written in recollective and resonant response
to something (event, observation, encounter, feeling, thought, face) which will
necessarily exclude the activity of writing from the intimate duration of a particular
experience. Even if the tools of writing are on hand and reached for, the act of writing
begins always as an afterward - in response to, in reflection of, in compensationfor, over
and above "the thing." That thing, however, is precisely what the tool of the camera
registers unconditionally, over and above the response. Of all the characteristics that
distinguish these two mediums of picturing, the most decisive for clarifying the diaristic
conditions of filming is the prior presence of the world instead of the blank page (or the
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presence of a prior absence). Erice, as long as he films what he has framed to see, cannot
therefore materialize within the material duration of the shot his passing thoughts about
it, for he is not in the position to withdraw from the object's "time of day" that the
camera commits him to record (and defer response). "[W]hen working properly," writes
Malcolm Turvey, "a camera records, in the form of a photograph, what is in front of it,
regardless of what the camera operator thinks or believes is in front of it." Hence the part
of the world that Erice observes from behind the camera can be said to exactly coincide
with the mechanical transcription of the observation. The filming creates or, let us say,
factualizes it, after which a response in the form of a form of writing is possible and, with
respect to the art of film, necessary. Editing here enters the picture, after the fact of the
recorded pictures, as film's specific form of writing (an idea I hope to enlarge once we're
well immersed and involved in the film's "thought").7 Even though I have reached the
conclusion that the entries in Erice' s cinematic diary of Lopez's process of painting and
living and those of everyday life are fundamentally inseparable from the events that they
document (because they are comprised of those very events), I do not doubt for a moment
that Erice did not think and come to partially understand the meaning of what he was
documenting in terms of its potential relations to other documents: thoughts to be
6 Malcolm Turvey, Doubting Vision: Film and the Revelationist Tradition (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 5.
7 Few films, I should mention, are credited for being as thoughtful - full of thinking and
space for thinking - as Dream ofLight, and even fewer enjoy critics who believe that its
"thoughts" are there for the taking (as they were for the having) as long as the viewer is
willing to slow the train of his or her own thought to the pace of patience exemplified by
the film. See, in particular, Jonathan Romney, "The Quince Tree Sun (El Sol de
Membrillo)," in Short Orders: Film Writing (London: Serpent's Tail, 1997), p. 41-45;
Linda C. Ehrlich, "Interior Gardens: Dream ofLight and the Bodegón Tradition," in The
Cinema of Victor Erice: An Open Window, ed. Linda C. Ehrlich (Lanham, Toronto,
Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007), p. 192-205; and Laurence Giavarini,
"Projected Shadow," in The Cinema of Victor Erice: An Open Window, p. 188-191.
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redeemed once in the (postposition - scanning through the hours of footage like pages -
to finally write the text of the film.8
The film begins, as I already mentioned, with Lopez walking towards the camera
down a residential street in Madrid, carrying under his arm some thin planks of wood and
a rolled up sheet of plastic (probably a tarp to protect the canvas paper) that he takes
through a gate and into a yard where a friendly Husky springs up to greet him. His walk
down the street is steady and purposive, betraying that unmistakable aura of allegiance to
some awaiting and familiar chore. His intention at this point to paint, beginning with the
construction of a canvas on which to do so, is clear to the extent that it is freely unspoken,
legible in what I wish to call the focus or urgency of his bearing. These gestures of
immanent praxis, banal as they are, call to mind the image of a small, somewhat
complacent fire surrounded by cement, in this case a street with two rows of parked cars
flanking both sides of the approaching figure. Despite the fact that Lopez is an actual
8 The rhythm, organization and balanced distribution of images in Dream ofLight is
about as scrupulously (economically) precise as it gets in the history of film. And yet the
precision ofthat writing with images, as though the relative positions between one image
and the next were as determinable and therefore irrevocable as words, still (although far
from regrettably) does nothing to alter the imprecise, ungovernable "mongrel" condition
of film, which viewers and critics alike are able to defend and value without hesitation as
the power (or magic) of film. The vocabulary, semantics and syntax of the "language"
onscreen compels like a language through a gestalt effect of all the stages and mediums
and modes of expression starting from as early as the script (particularly if the writer is
not also the director), but it is ultimately imprecise according to the criteria of language
as such because, for one thing, the absorptive power of moving images and sounds is so
often used to construct (conjure) a reality that looks to be already as meaningful, though
nowhere near as readily understandable, as any language brought to describe or relate or
understand it. All this to say that it will not do to speak of the "linguistic" content of a
given shot or juxtaposition or sequence in a film independently of or prior to the radical
sense of pure "givenness" to which shots, juxtapositions and sequences, especially of the
world, owe their near automatic affinity with one another. From an infinity of givens, as
it were, a film relates the world, from within the world, before we have the chance to
bring our language to bear and refer to its world as "one."
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painter in real life (and the film confirms this during the opening shot by acknowledging
that it has been inspired by one of his paintings), what makes the film more documentary
than fiction has to do with the more fictional fact that his air of intentionality or "genius"
is not dramatized through any expressionistic appropriation of time and space in the
aesthetic. (The aesthetic, as we shall see, has spatio-temporal designs of its own that are
specifically cinematic and, as it turns out, peculiarly self-referential.) In his day to day
life, revealed one shot at a time by Erice, and beginning most emphatically with the
film's first, Lopez is often not a painter at all; and the notion that he might not even be a
painter in the sense of not being solely or even primarily identifiable with his work, and
have no interest or conception or purpose as a painter, say, at this particular moment of
routine transition, are hypotheses - human contingencies - that can well up from the
sense (as aloof as a smell) of a whirling cacophony of surrounding activities - active
existences - that fill the soundtrack and possess the image from the outside in. Fact for
fact sake, I suppose, is the spirit of this sense of immanent surround, which can seem to
lead the filmed reality beyond the location Lopez inhabits towards what I can only
describe as a condition of habitation bounding all beings between beings, and with it all
the forms or faces maintained in any "single" being. Lopez is such a being whose
approach towards the brink of a new beginning in the start of another painting establishes
him, rooting him all the more deeply within the ambient resonance of the already-begun -
the present state of history - or at least what's left of history before entering and
becoming the property of the past. The documentary image, the image as document,
never complete of course without a corresponding soundtrack, accepts an unbridled
measure of contingency unto the limit of interference, bearing the receding accumulation
ofperipheral events occurring at this particular time and place, which regardless of their
exact positions - beginning or ending, trailing off or calling out, next door or in the
distance, withdrawing or thinning or punctuating - are synchronized in the continuity of
the virtual and stripped of their coordinates as particulars. As a result, I would like to
suggest that Erice opens the film twice: Once with Lopez walking down a street,
presumably from his home or a supplies store and on route to his studio, and again by
establishing the "virtual" context of an extended continuum9 of hypothetical off-screen
space, similar in scope to the proposition with which Wittgenstein begins The Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus: "The world is all that is the case,"10 except for Erice (or for film)
the sum of all cases gather piece by piece, particular by particular, within the duration of
perception as opposed to the grammatical jurisdiction of language.
After carefully constructing a canvas from scratch, after creating - starting and
finishing - a formal place to begin painting, Lopez is shown opening a tall set of blue
doors connecting the studio to the courtyard. The courtyard is a rather narrow rectangle
of space running alongside the small building. Trees healthy in appearance are lined up,
in blocks of green, around the fence, while a short quince tree surrounded by seemingly
infertile ground stands by itself near the center, its heavy and plentiful yellow fruits
taxing a trunk that looks too thin for the task. (We find out later on that Lopez himself
had planted the tree some years ago out of a special fondness for its fruit - the dingy,
sapped, sand-like earth could never have yielded such concentrated plenitude.) Normally,
9 See the section entitled "The Extensive Continuum" in Alfred North Whitehead,
Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York and Cambridge, UK: The
Macmillan Company, 1929), p. 95-126.
10 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F.
McGuinness (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2002), p. 5.
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the tree grows and dies "in peace," but today, after spending the previous day building
the canvas, Lopez approaches the courtyard where the tree stands not as the person who
once planted it but as a person who will try to make a painting of it, choosing the quince
tree with autumn sun as an aspect or "idea" of the world to wonder about, over, and with,
that is, the tree as a self-sufficient subject for consideration, as a whole whose
participation in a whole ever larger called "the world" is temporarily suspended.
On the threshold, Lopez waits - seeming to stall - before deciding where to
position his body and the canvas in relation to the quince tree. There is something
awkwardly full - brimming and overbearing - about his pausing at the very edge of this
decision, which feels like an open question embodied on behalf and because of the
structured openness of the blank canvas.11 It is significant, I think, that Lopez's smallness
as a person is apparent to us prior to the expanding concentration of his consciousness as
a painter, for it is a sign (the quietest testament) of the extreme, almost voluptuous
11 The openness of the canvas is described as "structured" because its blankness is merely
something apparent, deceptive upon closer inspection of its spectacle of possibility, and
ensnaring for seeming so perfectly untouched - for luring the painter to begin by a
reckless heedlessness that can easily be mistaken for the path to freedom (paved by the
deadly song of the deadliest muse - the Sirens). The criticism is indebted to Gilles
Deleuze's examination of the cliché in his book on the art of Francis Bacon, particularly
when he writes that "It is a mistake to think that the painter works on a white surface. . .
The painter has many things in his head, or around him, or in his studio. Now everything
he has in his head or around him is already in the canvas, more or less virtually, more or
less actually, before he begins his work. They are all present in the canvas as so many
images, actual or virtual, so that the painter does not have to cover a blank surface, but
rather would have to empty it out, clear it, clean it." Francis Bacon: The Logic of
Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (London and New York: Continuum, 2003), p. 86. It
will pay to keep these thoughts in mind as we move to a discussion of Lopez's methods
of preparation and structuring, whether they constitute a set ofprecautions against cliché
infection by functioning as a trap set by the painter for the capturing of the model, which
cannot be captured on canvas, according to Deleuze, unless the canvas functions in the
end to successfully and permanently "reverse the relations between model and
copy."(Ibid.)
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finitude of a human being alert at the edge of a desire not to be confined to his being, that
is, a desire not to be as he has been before or as he is alone by himself. But what does one
do while motionless on the threshold, fixed on the verge, inside the way from house to
yard and back again?12 Lopez lingers in indecision or hesitation or anticipation because
those heavenly blue doors don't actually lead (for him) to the courtyard but rather (as
painter) to the quince tree, which seems to cast into shadow by throwing into the distance
the entire space surrounding the emanation of its perfectly centered and hence somewhat
stage-like placement, one that is further picked out by the power of the canvas to reflect
this living object in the sensibility of a painter who will perceive not just beauty and
significance but also - although I am merely speculating - a sense of potential utility in
the persistence of the mundane.
No object that we choose to remain with, after whatever function has been
extracted and exhausted, can any longer just be what it is, even if nothing more than that
12 In his book Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1975), it
is Edward Said's preference (not hypothesis) to situate even the beginner's experience of
silence-at-the-threshold somewhat paradoxically at the threshold of language where
beginning intentions, however unformulated or half-formed or outright inscrutable, are
always already in some form of dialogue with potential means of expression. "Beginning
is doing - intending - a whole set of particular things primarily in writing or because of
writing" (Said's emphases, 19) While language is certainly not the be-all-end-all of
beginnings, the approach is not necessarily a problematic one (despite the critic's labors
to point some of them out), but what it omits from the beginning-intention, it seems to
me, is precisely the source of a fallacy endemic to the "doing" of a beginning, namely,
that the part of us that is reluctant to begin is not also the same part that balks to resume,
feeling as far away from where we left offas from the possibility of actually starting off
Clearing one's desk, centering the page, selecting a pen or wetting a quill or dusting off a
keyboard, opening and closing certain books, cueing certain films, tailoring the light or
changing locations ... all these are tasks performed in silence before the thinking,
finding and laying down of words seems possible and in certain privileged cases,
perhaps, comes naturally. There is no standard way, and hence no guarantee, for a writer
(or any maker) to secure a territory of forms prior to the occupation of territories of
expression. Each and every beginning must build from scratch (and yet again) its own
geography of admittance.
47
is all that's expected and asked of it. For when it becomes clear to ourselves that we've
been overlooking something, particularly within the most immediate and familiar of
surroundings, a natural impulse might be to overlook, to make up for lost time by starting
over with the object from the root of its existence and at the center of our own, afresh, as
though we were laying our eyes for the first time upon it, not to remove them until this
time is also fit to stand for the last - when it is believed possible, finally, to relinquish in
peace for knowing to have attributed more weight to the object than the being of it could
hope to bear, or weigh, as if that object had its only set of roots in the realm of
appreciation.
In admiring the quince tree, in being ravished by the force of its presence, in
searching for a way to return, reply, show courtesy, and meet it where it is, is to
invariably intrude on the terrain of its fundamental otherness, its distance and difference
as a form of life which does not return, reply, curtsy, meet halfway. When approached in
a spirit of servitude, a tree, being what it is, is still no less in service to itself. It is the
approach, then, that is costly, for it holds the object to an otherness it cannot by nature
declare, declaring "otherness" as evidence that there is always more of it, more fullness at
stake within the depths of its essence to manifest, going deeper than the constant yielding
of its darkest and most inscrutable depth. Lopez's approach honors the tree/or what it is,
proceeds for and because of the tree. He wants to see it, see all he can see, and moves
accordingly. But the whole process will turn out a painting of and about something more,
something extraneous to existence as laid out before us, to the tree's existence in space
time and even the painter's passage through a separate human consciousness of time -
more than is perceptible and presentable. Whatever presence awakens in an observer the
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desire to represent it must in some sense appear awake to that person, an appearance
which requires, in some sense, an awakening, or, in a deeper sense, an
anthropomorphizing.
The poignancy of the artistic approach stems from its sense that something
indeterminable is to be lost in the gain of the birth of the work of art. The gain, no doubt,
is obviously additive. The sense, also, is precisely a product of this gain; the object of
interest and desire appears, but so does the desire and the interest within the object -
object and desire blur indistinguishably. Lopez, then, will lose the tree, or many of its
most constitutive aspects despite his proximity - much of what it is that he is not and
which he cannot hope to accurately translate. When does he lose it though? When he
begins on it, turns on it for a beginning. How is the loss of the gain registered as
poignancy? By knowing of no other way, other than by ways of knowing, to know. It is
significant then that Lopez, in first approaching the tree from his standstill behind the
blue doors, hides his hands, tucking one behind his back underneath his belt while
holding a glass with the other. From this point on - point of no return - the tree will be
developed into an entity, released into the apex of its singularity, through a golden rule of
Lopez's method that he will not touch it, affect it, nor permit anyone else to touch or
affect it, unless it is relevant to his method of representing it. In this way the tree is taken
out of its element, laid down and reposed and appropriated within the ideal vantage of a
new purpose. Now that he will not touch it the way he once planted it, now that he means
to paint it by standing directly beside it, the tree is brought to bear that original species of
man-made fruit: mimesis.
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Let's now see how the business of creating from reality, or rather in direct
adherence to what one perceives as reality, is worked out through the logistics of painting
and from the perspective of cinema. I don't think viewers of film have ever been on the
receiving end of such a generous step-by-step scrutiny of, and participation with, the
rigorous preparation of a painter before painting and, no less, a filmmaker in the act of
filming a painter to whom he is indebted and the art form his art has no less inherited.
Lopez's approach to painting is based on the somewhat antiquated (hence
somewhat unfashionable) realist principle of representing the world as perceived with
absolute faithfulness through mimesis. The principle of realism in the case of Lopez and
the tree is met through a subjective following of the lead, a listening to, and in the end a
value-based approximating of the already created and continually recreating quince tree.
His first step is to frame the tree in a manner paralleling the dimensions of the canvas. He
achieves this by plotting in the ground two long poles on either side of the tree. A length
of string is then tied between them to mark the precise height of the view. From the
center of this horizontal line a second piece of string is hung with a triangular weight
(known as a plumb) tied to the end for the purpose of stabilizing the vertical line, which
bisects the space of perspective into two equal parts. Lopez then shovels the patch of
ground on which he means to stand in front of the canvas so as to slightly lower and level
his own perspective, and drives into it two long nails right at the toes of both his shoes,
effectively immobilizing himself as steadily and helplessly as the tree itself. We see him
wriggle into this anchored stance the way a golfer settles his body into a balanced
equation between the ball and its intended destination. From here decisions will be made
- irrevocably followed through - and others avoided - irrevocably closed off. Not just the
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coordinates marked by the nails but the entire Cartesian setup places Lopez, with each
new day, back into the same position at the apex of a triangle where a relation with the
canvas and the tree is preserved at all costs. His feet in perfect line with the trunk and
square in front of the canvas, Lopez's perception is channeled through two angles of
vision, discontinuous yet symmetrical, which can therefore only open one at a time
depending on his focus: at the canvas or at the tree - the representation on the one hand
and the passive resistance of the model on the other. Next he consolidates the vertical
axis by drawing it on the canvas, after which he lays a thick white line of paint, straight
from the tube, along the midpoint of the brick wall encompassing the entire courtyard,
forming a makeshift horizon used to draw the horizontal axis. Lastly, just when it appears
that Lopez has taken every conceivable measure to ensure that his chosen position
remains fixed in accordance with the principles of symmetry and perspective, before
applying paint to the canvas for the first time, standing on the threshold or now the
precipice of the beginning itself, he turns the brush unexpectedly towards the tree to
vertically bisect a sample of leaves and its trunk with white lines of paint.
There is much that can be made of the significance of all these preparatory
movements and measurements and marks (as the setting up or coordination of
significance). There is perhaps an entire drama detailing some very revealing (and some
very modern) aesthetic criteria for the sanctioning of meaning and justification of value
via representation within a disenchanted, that is, "meaningfully meaningless" or
"contingency-ridden," world of an age. But to go ahead and explore the narrative ofthat
drama, extrapolating it from its specific treatment in the film, would be to leave the
language of the film behind, forgoing the film's own dramatic process, its matrix of
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revelation and expression, which interprets at the same time as it appears to document
events "out of its control." Whatever interpretation I might be after thus cannot be had or
even justifiably known without working with a film that is working itself out in terms of
its very own and which I am to learn not in place of my own terms of understanding but
as additions to and criticisms of them. In referring again to the "language" of the film, I
begin to try to make good on a promise to do better than refer to the moments of
participation or paralleling between the film's process and that of the painter's - as if
simply making these connections constituted a discovery of what they are in connection
about - by reading the style and structure as organically investigative, amounting over
time to a critique of the painter's realist approach, and ofpainting's claim to realism
itself, that emerges, in a way that strikes me as survivalist, from a set of seemingly
neutral observations of painting's more discreetly "parodie" critique of cinema's
ontological propensity for realism as such. Cinema and painting, which normally proceed
in accordance with their own technical and historical configurations of space and time,
when put face to face cease to look the other way and so reflect each other's distortions;
and in this self-conscious frenzy, this symbiotic scrutiny and interrogation, one finds its
beginning where the other loses out to its ending and vice versa, keeping a piece of the
other's dream of aesthetic totalization while still having to coincide and collaborate and
conflict but on opposite sides of the same dream to represent the unrepresentable in an
age where artistic creation is far too conscious of its own mediation to support an
absolute. When the subject of a work of art is such that an encounter with the essence of
another art is documented, the essence so encountered is raised to the surface of its own
otherness, and stares the most penetrating stare as the object that stares back. In Dream of
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Light, cinema, on the receiving end of painting's near inward stare, and in the light of its
own incessant outward staring or exposing, is exposed as it is, which in the end can only
turn out to befor what it is: a model face with nothing behind it, an autonomous
automatism or "spiritual automaton,"13 or just the lens of an eye with everything out in
front of it - everything ahead of it and to look forward to - and hence nothing in the
world that could turn away from it except the moving images produced as a result of the
world's vigilant "stand" - images from which the camera must turn, as though on a
hinge, in order to be able to receive the revelation that is the world itself.
I do not mean to give the impression, however, that the subject of cinema in
Dream ofLight has the same overt presence as the subject ofpainting, nor that the
filmmaker is as much a flesh and blood protagonist as the painter. Though I am just as
reluctant to relegate the role of film and the presence of the filmmaker to the "dark cell"
of implicit or latent intentionality just because the film waits until the end to explicitly
refer to itself or finds that it can end only by way of exhibiting self-reference. It is firmly
within the evidence of this film that the autonomous presence of the medium manifests as
the aesthetic gestures to which it is put to use for the sake of thought, or the narrating of
thought, or "thinking," and not only the narrating of events in a story that could only
personify thought. Despite his comparatively "hands-off' labor, the feeling of the
filmmaker's intimate proximity to the individual shots and juxtapositions of shots and,
though less intimately, certain overarching sounds, is as much a reminder of how
fundamentally integral a medium is to any given artistic manifestation (be it content or
form) no matter how little its maker appears to have physically done to actualize the
13 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), p. 156, including footnote #1.
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medium in terms of the manifestation. In our case, the self-conscious appearance of film
due to its open confrontation with painting reveals not the presence of the director but
rather that the presence of "the director" is inseparable from the presence of the medium
being directed. Hence, when a work of art is left, say, to the devices of convention or to
its own inherent devices (methods representative, although hardly exhaustive, of
mainstream and avant-garde camps), "the creator" is either nowhere to be found or
everywhere lost as long as we remain committed to such a concept as existing "outside"
and "before" and "independently" of the creation itself.
The first incident between medium and manifestation (Cinema and "painting")
that struck me as being impossibly or nonsensically coincidental (hence more or less
intentional) occurs during the sequence I already described of Lopez's extremely
methodical process of preparation. Erice films this process in such a way as to establish a
symmetry, or the look of an affinity, between Lopez's method of securing the coordinates
of his composition before proceeding to paint and the act of fitting photographic frames
to individual yet interconnected elements of the world. Just as Lopez used some basic
principles of symmetry to construct the canvas at the beginning of the film, so he
enforces similar principles upon his perception of the quince tree by placing it at the very
center of what he sees. Erice, while sharply and steadily observing Lopez throughout
these procedures, frames the painter's use of symmetry with the same principle of and
tendency towards symmetry in his own compositions. For example, when Lopez marks
the center of his view of the tree with the vertical plumb line, Erice sets up a frame that
will end up placing the plumb itself at the center of the image as soon as Lopez leaves it
to rest, as if he were receiving it in the spirit in which it will be put to use - a striking,
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almost obsessively deliberate spatially timed gesture that surely suggests a similarly
methodical if not an analogous method of preparation on behalf of the filmmaker.
Another instance comes immediately after when Lopez uses a ruler to trace the vertical
axis on the canvas. Even though this action occurs within a fundamentally different,
smaller and more limited dimension, Erice still ensures that the drawing ofthat line is
positioned directly at the center of the moving image. As Erice continues to visually
parallel Lopez's use of symmetry in what amounts to a kind of reinforcement or
indulgence of each other's artistic methods and habits and tastes, the film begins to make
apparent that two people in charge of their respective mediums can move stride for stride
towards contradictory ends - ends, not goals, that will ultimately characterize the
necessary conditions of entirely self-sufficient albeit succeeding art forms. What I mean
to suggest is that regardless of which art came first, despite the fact that painting precedes
and thus helps shape cinema in great measure, cinema and painting along with the other
arts all possess conditions whose potentialities invariably sentence them to limitations
rarely experienced by artists as the limits they are unless another art form (perhaps one
not yet born) is found and felt and then properly acknowledged to possess as conditions
those very limits.
The question that immediately comes to mind after pointing out this type of
association or convergence between content and form, as it were, is whether the equality
conveyed between artistic methodologies is an act of aesthetic characterization, perhaps
miming on Erice' s part, or if, somewhat on the other hand, it is a more natural instance of
reciprocal identification internal to the two art forms at work in the film. In defense of the
latter, I wish to point out that Lopez's employment of the principle of symmetry
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throughout his preparations - and which I have singled out in two of the more exemplary
occasions - is the first aesthetic value towards which the film's images show their
unabashed support.14 His use of symmetry in relation to a staunchly realist form of
painting seems to function in this scene both to cue and corroborate the cinematic
participation in the purely aesthetic dimensions of the principle. Symmetry, therefore, is
more the occasion than the cause of the film's first instance of a decisive reconciliation of
content and form over a particular issue (a point of potential disagreement), as opposed to
a mere mirroring (or symmetry) between the two. By enacting the depiction on a formal
level, by replying to as opposed to repeating Lopez's methodological designs, Erice is
able to reflect upon, or rather open a way for us to reflect upon, the integrity and viability
of symmetry as a contemporary artistic choice. Why, indeed, has so much stress and trust
been placed on the shoulders of symmetry in aesthetics in general across the arts,
particularly the visual arts? Is it because our sense of the beautiful, what strikes us as
beautiful right off the bat, is conditioned, for whatever reasons, by orderliness? Do we
14 This form of demonstrative support or agreement is to be distinguished from the more
conventional device commonly found in the biopic genre (of which Dream ofLight is by
no means a member, save through counterexample) of representing the perspective and
inner world of the artist through the lens or guise of his or her aesthetics. What this
convention seems to do is personify the external world as the reflection of a protagonist's
internal world as a way to both exteriorize the internal and interiorize the external,
configuring reality beyond recognition by bringing the concerns of narrative to bear
excessively upon the visual, resulting all too often in a bastardization of expressionism.
This sort of approach, more importantly, reveals very little about the stance or opinion of
the film towards the artist's life and work and the costs on each, unless it is of the opinion
that the life of the artist is best explored through the art of film by merely conflating life
and art, which can be rather easily and even effectively achieved (or rendered
convincing) by remaining oblivious to all the tensions between them - to the world
standing in between and neverfor either one. Not to mention all the neglected tension and
telltale incommensurability there is between film as art and film's peculiarly submissive
attraction to famous artists (few of which, incidentally, have been filmmakers
fictionalized in their own form).
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continue to comfortably reify semblances of perfection because no mere artifice could
ever make any serious or urgent claims upon the organic and oftentimes inextricable
messiness of a life? Or is symmetry less about fantasizing the perfection of the world - as
a result, say, of imperfections unleashed by our being-in-the-world - than of finding ways
of balancing the chaos that threatens our appreciation of the balance - indeed the
symmetry, the perfection - between order and chaos? One thing Dream ofLight helps to
illuminate about such questions is that the start of answering them might turn out to
depend on which artform in which age has been taken to the task of art and whether or
not a particular artist is able and willing to admit the particular history of his or her
chosen art - full of triumphs and failures and the triumph of compromise and the failure
of the masterpiece to trump its day and age - to join him on the brink of what only
appears to be a new beginning in the face of new work and dull his sense of taste,
particularly for what satisfies the senses alone.
In conversation with a Japanese admirer or critic, Lopez responds to her fondness
for the refined compactness of his compositions by confessing to an unconditional
adoption of the principle of symmetry. He hints at the reasons for imposing such a rigid
frame of reference upon his creative freedom in the following way: "Here and in general,
I like the order created by symmetry. I centered the tree on the paper. The heart of the
vision is the center of the paper." His objective, I gather, is to make the object of his
perception not only the focus or center of the painting but also the painting itself. It seems
to me that the most compelling reason for why he would want to commit himself to such
an aggressively head-on approach is, despite all odds, to clear the dimension of form in
such a way that the content can pass through it and show up in it and thus appear, as it
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were, in its own form. After receiving the explanation from her translator, the woman
responds by noting, "A lot of artists avoid doing this because people don't seem to like
it." "That may be," Lopez retorts, "but doing it this way the tree, in my opinion, has
presence. By centering it, by avoiding all aesthetic games on paper with space, the object
is shown in an ordered way in relation to symmetry." To this I wish to ask: Is Lopez's
method ofpainting, particularly his elaborate method ofpreparing to paint, a form, a
physical formation, of skepticism? (I am recalling the comment a colleague of his makes
while taking in all the tactics of Cartesianesque constraint surrounding the poor
unassuming quince tree: "It seems mistrustful.") What could Lopez have doubts about?
The existence of the tree as a part of the external world, standing apart from his own
consciousness of it, thus "existing" only within his consciousness? Probably not, for the
idea of realism is based less on the need to prove that something exists than a desire to
show that it exists. Perhaps he might doubt that the quince tree is actually the subject of
the painting, or that the painting which stands in between him and his own natural
relation to the tree is actual - doubts not over the existence of the tree itself or the
painting itself but rather the tree's existence in and as a painting that is to reveal nothing
except "the quince tree" in an age where painting has been lead to reveal nothing except
the power of revelation, or form, to make content out of consciousness. The tree as
content may have been known long in advance to the point where even the method for its
measured realization was thoroughly put into place, but that does not mean such content
is certain, nor that the method is anything more than a futile attempt to objectify such
certainty.15
15 Throughout the entire preparation scene (whose duration Erice in essence shortens but
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Lopez's idea ofjustifying an aesthetic approach by avoiding what he calls
aesthetic games marks a potentially self-defeating ambition, fueled perhaps by nothing
more than the humblest wish, to return to the essence of artistic content by way of the
concept of content or even the form of content, perhaps to redeem the force of content
itself in an age of aesthetic games, by pitting form against itself and in doing so dodging
any formal strategy whose value is present and applied a priori to content - all as a
means ofrealizing an image of absolute content. This method of cleansing form, of
rendering form transparent through the logic of symmetry, is inspired, according to
Lopez, by a certain moral subservience to the tree itself as a form of life. With a calm air
of conviction reminiscent of final words or of words repeated one too many times, Lopez
says to the admirer/critic that his entire process of preparation (the horizontal and vertical
lines, the two nails in the ground, the white marks on the quinces . . .) is designed only to
ensure that he remain parallel at all times with the tree's development and death over
time. Both the woman and the translator seem satisfied, even impressed with this
explanation. But is such patient servility to the tree honorable in the end to the
responsibilities of painting if Lopez's primary interest and profoundest pleasure is to be
with it throughout the course of its picture perfect autumn death? Only the painting itself,
in effect lengthens through the use of dissolves within the same continuous wide shot)
Lopez takes steps that would appear to have been taken as precautions against the silent
and reposing yet inevitable and always immanent forces of contingency alive within the
object of the representation. And yet, despite all that, it also seems that none of Lopez's
many constraining preparations can make him make the first stroke, which is the opening
decision - and conviction - of the painting. His preparations - and this is the secret we
keep from ourselves while preparing for anything - make him into the one who must
make it, alone (more alone the more you prepare). But there can be no way to know, at
the beginning of knowing, when and where and on what grounds to set limits for the
process of coming-to-know (and know when enough is enough), because the when and
where and grounds ofthat beginning were just as uncertain (no less spontaneous and
arbitrary and unstable).
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left standing by itself, can rise or fall to the occasion of its "completion," accepting or
rejecting the responsibility it has to function first and foremost as a picture and not as a
trace of or testament to some personal, deeply phenomenological and ultimately
unrepresentable quest. But the deeper question as to whether or not it is possible (not to
mention logical and desirable) at the close of the 20th century for an artist to completely
bypass or override the ancient, perhaps unconscious lure of the aesthetic to negotiate the
most difficult and pervasive and enduring of differences by sharpening their similarities,
is one that the moving images in Dream ofLight work to confront through the
"perceptual irony" of their heightened transparency. This degree of transparency reaches
irony in relation to moving images of still-life intensity, revealing the opacity internal to
any image by showing how obvious but invisible - difficult and illogical and sometimes
undesirable - the difference is between an image and the world, regardless how seamless
or persuasive or pure the quality of transparency in a painting or photograph or film or
conscious and unconscious states - all represented in one way or another in the film -
maybe.16
16 So Lopez's realism as a painter lies in a responsibility to the particularity of the quince
tree in his perception, while Erice' s realism as a filmmaker is evident in a responsibility
to his perception of the particularity of reality itself in all its changing and recurrent
manifestations. But let's stop ourselves if we haven't done so already by raising the
questions of this genuinely puzzled critic: "Why paint this way? Why make a film this
way?" (William Johnson, "Dream ofLight," in The Cinema of Victor Erice: An Open
Window, p. 178-179) Why use art to present the reality in which we live? Do we not live
there? Do we not face it? Let's assume for now that for the most part we don't live there
nor face it, how can this type of art show us where to look if it asks us to look in the
opposite direction, that is, at an image - our image (as Nietzsche would no doubt hammer
home)? What is our relationship to reality if it is more common today than ever before
that we look to experience it - and experience it best - through the eyes of others?
(Whether or not it is useful and wise to relate to reality "artistically" in reality itself
would be the next (bigger) question.) If we consider the sort of relationship that a visual
artist of today might have with the subject of reality, the assertion of reality as idea or
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Two moments from the preparation sequence are worth mentioning here. While
the first occurs in a single image and the other across a juxtaposition, both establish an
impression of reality that, despite the illusion of being as concrete as reality itself, refers
back to the mode of perception and means of construction that made it an image of the
world in the first place. Fm thinking of the close-up of Lopez's feet as he hammers the
nails at the toes of his shoes so as to mark his position in front of the canvas. The shot is
as discreet and unpunctuated as all the visual documents that came before it; it is also as
luminously clear as the daylight that exposed it, receiving the same even distribution of
light that allows us to see before us exactly what we are doing. And yet Lopez's action in
the shot (which he does, it would appear, for the sake of his own work and not that of the
film's) reveals not only a trait of Erice's action at the time of filming but also an aspect of
his method as a filmmaker, and which may have only been vaguely felt by the viewer as
an arbitrary quality of the film's handling of reality: the constant use of static
compositions. Both artists, in turns out, commit themselves decisively and no less
repeatedly to a fixed point from which to either record or depict a perceptual relationship,
almost as though the relationship that is perception depended for them on the stillness of
the perceiver to receive intact the object ofperception, say, by tracking the point at which
subject becomes object and object becomes subject. What unfolds here as a simple view
dream or social utopia would seem to require something of a blind assertion, a total faith,
a profound appeal to of reality "itself to take hold of an image or in the very least take
part in one. This would be the case, I think, because the disenchantment of nature (as a
cultural and intellectual event, what Nietzsche called a "de-deification") has reached a
point in our collective consciousness where the desire for re-enchantment, of our
relationship to nature or our own human nature, will depend on sharp states of
consciousness letting down their guard by emerging from behind the screen of
intellectual conscience - "Beware! Beware!" - to do everything left in their power to
allow reality to show just how powerful (or not) it is.
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of Lopez deciding where he is going to stand for the duration of the painting process,
folds back into a two-way image of identification between the filmmaker's stance and
that ofthe painter's. For the harsh task of representing reality, both artists will station the
body so that the eye can gather up as much of the material world as it can within a single
viewpoint. This is perhaps how the eye attains power of primacy within the artistic
decision of Lopez and Erice, receiving the most confidence and hence pressure from
them; and yet it would appear that it does so under a false pretext, for as much as the eye
affirms the presence of the world beyond it through the act of seeing it affords, in order
for that act to give way to the world it must lose sight of the eye that it never stops seeing
with. The secret opacity of sight has a kind of confidant in the capacity for a moving
image of the world to stare at itself, or to direct attention towards its surface, by
exhibiting the many mirror images (call them metaphors for imaging) proffered in the
world. Such an image as the one I described, beyond revealing itself within what it
shows, has also revealed precisely what it has done, and what images have to do, to be
able to do just that. In doing so there is the sense, hotter than a trace, of a missing
perceiver (somewhere behind, left behind, casting a faint and even shadow over
everything) that the flush transparency of the image failed to factor, that is, lest the entire
image turn inwards and perception introspect, both against the grain of their naturally
forward and open orientation.
The second moment in question continues this mode of "outward reflection" upon
the stillness of the body as a sort of gateway to a totality of vision not unlike Emerson's
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dream of becoming but a single transparent eye.17 The juxtaposition I referred to earlier
begins when Lopez, after rooting himself in front of the canvas, finally turns to face the
quince tree from the spot from which he will paint it in the coming months, and closes
one eye, his left eye, leaving his right eye open wide. The following shot registers as a
point-of-view shot of the midpoint of the horizontal piece of string bent by the weight of
the plumb dangling below. We seem to be all but obliged to perceive this shot as an
extension of Lopez's point of view, almost as if a reflex had been triggered by the force
of convention (or consensus) surrounding the logic of a cut, in this case from perceiver to
perceived to draw a linear connection across the disparate times and spaces of two
distinct images. But the true logic of a cut, however, dictates that the next shot depicting
the next moment in Lopez's process of preparation is always at the same time the next
point in Erice's process of filming him. Thus Lopez's one-eyed view of the midpoint of
his perspectival grid is paralleled, once again, by Erice's view, which is also a one-eyed
view, as all film images are, of the camera lens. The experience of filming the world
becomes, very suddenly, and near imperceptibly (perhaps because unintentionally)
interestingly and insightfully referenced during this rudimentary exchange of shots as one
in which the perceptual powers of depth of field and peripheral expansiveness are
sacrificed for the desire to contain or stabilize the porous nature of perception through the
power to precisely frame and focus perception telescopically. The camera, we are
reminded, enables the filmmaker behind it - not to mention everyone else who works
from behind to wrought what the camera alone can record - to shut an eye and view as a
whole what remains still a piece.
17 Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature," in The Portable Emerson, ed. Carl Bode in
collaboration with Malcolm Cowley (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1981), p. 11.
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At this point I hope it is safe to say that Dream ofLight, through a shot-by-shot
reciprocation of the painter's extremely rigorous preparatory procedure, has begun to
introduce the medium of film on some sort of even par with that of painting, at least with
respect to the perceptual tasks of realism. With Lopez as ready as can be to finally start
painting, and with Erice having used the methodological characteristics ofthat elaborate
beginning as a measure of his own method of documentation, I find myself in the position
to pose a question that has been weighing on me and which nearly fell from the tip of my
tongue a bit earlier: Could the fact that Erice begins Dream ofLight with the beginning of
a creative process suggest that the medium of film in relation to painting somehow
managed to exempt Erice (still a figment of the film's imagination) from having to
confront (as Lopez did in the reality of the film) the mercilessly high and pressure-filled
demand of those determinant opening stages of preparation and planning - the
beginning? How can the documentary filmmaker in particular hope to take, so as to pass,
the same self-imposed test as Lopez's beginning, which can be said (without hesitation)
to test the integrity of the pact between endurance of will and sincerity of intent before
going ahead into the battle for truth? The question as to whether or not the filmmaker is
obliged to begin under the same excruciating, seemingly ex-nihilo circumstances as the
painter, is one that must somehow rattle "the conscience" of the film itself.
18 Erice's frequent use of dissolves to pure white screens (call them canvases of light)
between segments (seeming to break up the film into chapters) can open the debate by
helping us pose the next logical question: On what grounds can Erice "claim" by way of
these non-images of light that the film frame is as blank at the beginning as the painter's
canvas? One way in which such a claim could be true of the film would be to say that the
editing of the shots, as opposed to their specific contents, models and invariably contends
with the blankness specific to the threshold ofwriting. (Of course this is not to say -
going more or less without saying - that language is something entirely blank on which
our thoughts find their first and strongest expression.) Lopez begins the painting by
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But what can one mean by conscience in relation to a work of art, in this case a
work of the cinema? The prospect here is hard to make out, and no easier to discern in art
than to measure and authentically demonstrate in life. The idea of conscience, that is, of
having a conscience, places it discreetly below the surface of consciousness, or high up
on a mantle at the apex of ethics, or way off in the most distant corners of the imagination
where we're often at our best - somewhere beside ourselves however much in tandem.
But as long as we're trying it on for size, perhaps a clue to the feeling of it fitting can be
found in the film's many solitary and precarious digressions away from Lopez's painting
process towards other people, other practices and pastimes, an entire city day and night,
which flood the open door of the camera while held firmly at bay by the brick wall of the
canvas. I'm quite comfortable calling these digressions circles ofacknowledgement after
the best of intentions working behind them, but allow me to come back to this intuition to
attribute conscientiousness to the acts of digression in Dream ofLight until I've set the
stage for them and thought through some of them in the hopes of gaining some criteria
for a type of agency - film? filmmaker? filmmaking? cinema itself? - that any case for
such an act will ultimately depend on.
Lopez is the undisputed "main character" and "protagonist" of Erice's film
despite the fact that he walks in his own shoes, is who the character is, and stars in a
"documentary" on him. Because ofthat, we might look to Lopez - as much as
scriptwriters and directors can be said in general to rely on characters like Lopez - to
starting to paint directly in the middle of the canvas, unlike Erice who must write with
images one after another in the editing room. The tool of the dissolve, deployed across
and within shots, can then be read as a way of resisting following one shot with the next
and being led by one moment to the next according to the custom of linear/causal
narrative structures, drawing more from the associations of poetry and the simultaneities
of painting than, say, the successiveness of literature.
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fulfill a fundamental requirement of fictional paradigms: to serve as an anchoring device
that stabilizes the narrative fabric by winding it tight around a root consciousness or
perspective so that all the surrounding directions or detours in which individual threads
split off never quite run off the map. But this image of a human being singled out above
all others, placed at the center of a story and functioning in a film as an anchor to reality,
is only partly accurate, for the act of "dropping anchor" through the introduction of a
character or human being - and Lopez is an ideal example because he is so clearly both -
simultaneously introduces a complex set or network of circumstances to which they
belong and participate in constituting. The narrative convention of selecting this human
being to experience the experience of others existing in relation creates an impact on the
reality of the narrative as a whole, one whose resonance has the power to undercut the
ultimate function of this basic convention to maintain focus on the source. In other words,
the circumstances in which someone, real or not, is found or made to exist as a primary
character (significant in defining and even determining potential circumstances), are as
much the subject of the characterization as who he or she is and becomes, which
essentially means that the circumstances themselves are implicated long before the
identity and trajectory of the character hit the bottom to steady the ship of the narrative,
as it were, because nothing less than a relationship with those immanent circumstances is
required to identify them. Implication of circumstance, in the case of Lopez, is the logical
outcome of casting a human being in the role of a main character even if he is to play
himself. But what form of authorship would hold those circumstances, immediate and
distant alike, revealing and irrelevant all the same, to be as important - as relevant and
revealing on their own terms - as the characters they all help to characterize? Why give
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priority to the ripples - the contingent effects - in place of their cause? Who - what
authorial perspective - is concerned with their roll out to sea, following them fizzle out or
crash into another current, instead of officially commencing duty on deck by plotting a
specific course? Perhaps we are talking about the sort of author who operates by casting
stones instead of dropping anchors, or who sets his course to the North Star so that he
will not be tempted to venture deep into the gale of an unchecked intuition.
In what follows I am going to try to come to terms with such an approach to
documentary film narration that is as embracing of the surrounding and continuous forms
of human, natural and technological existence - lived existence - as a river whose
crawling pace winding through the land is perfectly steady and unchanging and self-
directed. Acknowledging the same contingencies of perception gathered by the recording
devices of camera and microphone, the approach investigates in a manner Fm tempted to
call "epistemological" a thoroughly conscious (and potentially conscientious) form of
being in the world afforded by the experience of what is commonly referred to as the
production or shooting stage of the filmmaking process.
19 The stage where scripted or unscripted material is filmed on real locations or
constructed sets or combinations thereof has been dramatically influenced and in many
cases altogether replaced by the digitization of the image. Here is a medium that
essentially enables the painterly manipulation, composite construction and synthetic
generation of moving images through the use of computer software alone. Although I
shall not argue here for the value of directly filming the world currently under threat by
the capacity to artificially "film" (except by first admitting the validity of the
counterargument that the future possibilities of an art always depend more on the use of
its present conditions - whatever they are - than a persistent seeking of an elusive or past
essence), I wish to make known some convictions of mine regarding the possibilities
available to film specifically through the actual filming (on film or video) of images and
which the purely digital creation stands to lose, convictions I bring to the rest of my
discussion of a film that goes a long way in demonstrating grounds for having them
(although cannot be said to have first awakened them in my thinking). The act of
shooting a film somewhere in the world before taking it "out" of the world to edit occurs
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Sometimes the best way to begin taking awareness of what a work of art is doing
differently is to ask ourselves what it is not doing that it could be doing had it failed to
overcome the formulas or clichés which so often dictate artistic decisions. Aside from an
interestingly revealing formal strategy, we have until this point seen Dream ofLight
following the straightest of lines, beginning with Lopez building the canvas, followed by
his preparations prior to painting and culminating with the beginning of the painting
itself. After Lopez wraps up the opening session of painting, he is shown cleaning a
bundle of brushes in a room that is by far the drabbest in the film. This is one of those
chores that every painter, no matter how high his head in the clouds (or deep in his
dreams), must descend to the ground of the everyday to toil in the mud of time's never-
ending reprieve. These moments of extreme mundaneness so prone to boredom will,
however, soon pass, like those of wildest intensity, as though they never were, and will
be relinquished perhaps for an event that better fulfills our criteria for what we call
in the world, which essentially allows for all the possibilities that come with being in the
world, or through being in a world of possibilities, to come. Most of the time these
possibilities are neither here nor there with respect to the filmmaker's artistic intentions,
though the triviality and apparent impotency of these possibilities can sometimes present
problems for or even solutions to the practical realization of complex preconceptions. But
the meddling of contingency in the affairs of intentionality is only half the story. The
other half starts when filmmakers find themselves stranded without a plan or skeptical
about their plans or accountable for the lack of a plan, but where something can
nevertheless be staged or caught in concert with things as they appear "on the day." By
beginning again, this time in a world that is all there, that is "finished," the experience of
beginning/or thefirst time - "for real" - strikes every time a decision is to be made. And
if chance is used instead of opposed or ignored or unconditionally ceded, then nothing is
actually "left to chance" that is not in some sense reclaimed as necessary at the time and,
perhaps, as deliberate in retrospect. What proves vital "after the fact" (when all facts have
been put to the test) is thisfact here, which the filmmaker could not have known to be
worth proving and so did not know was to be so true. (Erice consolidates the point for me
when he goes so far as to declare the following conviction in an interview: "I believe
there is more art in the shooting of images than in the images themselves." Laurence
Giavarini et Thierry Jousse, "Entretien avec Victor Erice et Antonio Lopez," Cahiers du
Cinema (no. 457): 34. Translation courtesy of Giovanna Masella.)
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"fiction," and the film will move on. If this film were steady on the path of traditional
documentary film structure, from which point would it take its cue to proceed via the
heavily trafficked course through, let us say, a mystery that lies exposed on the surface to
a solution pulled out of the depths of time where all the floating pieces of events are
found in the end to be part of the same puzzle? My thought here is that when the events
of a narrative appear to be going more or less according to plan, we do not sincerely ask
ourselves or anyone else (unless we mean to reassure ourselves) where the story is going,
because the empowered feeling of being in the hold of a fixed set of reliable hypotheses
for the outcome of events is precisely the point of our participation, or indulgence, in the
"mystery" of those outcomes. The question becomes not so much what is going to
happen next but rather whether or not what comes to pass is what was expected, for or
against one's wishes. A disinterested uncertainty, on the other hand, the kind that simply
follows a film that has managed to find its own way through the gaze, can't ask (with any
sincerity) any questions at all about the future, nor of the past as a way of anticipating it,
as long as the film is the kind that exposes naked the very mystery - wordless idea - that
sentences both it and us to wakefulness.
Using (and indulging) the metaphor I proposed earlier of Erice approaching the
centrality of Lopez like a stone (as opposed to an anchor) dropped in water, what follows
can be seen as a circle by circle as opposed to a shot by shot (though sometimes a circle
lasts no longer than a shot) description of the concentric as opposed to causal
development of the ensuing digressions. Such a sketch, however, will probably be the
most useful for a reader who hasn't seen the film, although in lieu of its disappointing
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availability in North America (on film or digital forms) a reader whose position I am all
too eager to respect and, perhaps also for my own pleasure, to vicariously re-inhabit.
• Three men arrive through the familiar gate that leads to the yard and enter the
studio building. They proceed to a dark lit room where they change into work
clothes.
• Lopez returns to the courtyard where the quince tree stands and takes his post in
front of the canvas. - The sound of heavy hammering.
• A young man asleep in a room in the studio house is awakened by the sound. He
gets up, walks past a group of paintings leaning against a wall and opens a
window. - The sound of a man announcing through a megaphone attached to a
car of his interest in buying whatever his neighbors might be eager to sell streams
into the room.
• A middle-aged woman arrives through the gate and crosses paths with the
young man on her way to the studio house. They have a brief conversation.
• The woman sees two of the laborers on her way upstairs and asks each a
question about the progress of some renovations.
• A close-up through a magnifying glass of the woman's hand engraving floral
designs, followed by a medium shot and a wide shot of the same action occurring
in a studio.
• Lopez sings a song while painting some white marks on a leaf and a quince.
• A train passes in between a cluster of apartment buildings.
• Lopez continues to sing and paint. - "Many painters come from Madrid . . ."
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• The train passes by a boy playing with a ball in a semi-open space. A female
voice tells him to go check on the baby. The camera follows him to a small house
where a woman in a blue dress is folding clothes. - The sound of Lopez singing.
• In the distance someone hangs clothes to dry on the porch of a small house. -
Lopez sings.
• A nondescript brick building with boarded-up windows. - Lopez sings.
• A dog lies on a sidewalk in the sun in front of a small house where a television
glows inside a dark room. - Lopez sings.
• The camera pans from the train moving through an underpass to a wall with
graffiti on it that reads "death's spark" below a drawing of a needle. - The singing
stops.
• Lopez explains to the woman in a warm and easy manner his hopes for the
painting, revealing the few brief times during the day where the sun shines the
desired light.
• Five still life shots of Lopez's empty workspace and the courtyard at dusk.
• Two of the workers look at Lopez's painting in its infancy and wonder about the
white marks painted directly on the tree.
• A dog barks in a shed or gazebo.
• The three workers who converse in Polish practice their Spanish in the dim
sitting room.
• The room is now empty except for a few things left behind by the workers.
• The young man from before works on three different paintings and then sits
down to look at them without appearing to turn his head from one to another.
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• Two young women examine Lopez's canvas before fitting him with new jacket
and shoes. The shoes are one size too small.
• Lopez resumes painting while a news broadcast begins on a radio placed on the
ground nearby.
• The news broadcast continues over shots of dark clouds rolling in across the
skyline.
• Madrid at night. A train moves in between apartment buildings. Many
apartment windows flicker with TV illumination.
• The quince tree and empty easel stand side by side under the moonlit night.
• The canvas stands against an abstract black background.
• A man of about the same age as Lopez arrives at the studio house for a visit.
My question is still, very simply, why it is that Erice chose to follow up the
beginning of his documentary on Lopez's artistic process this way - through a concentric
series of existences running parallel with the painter's "core" existence - and which is so
strikingly different from any other way I had encountered before in both documentary
and fiction film. What is the purpose, not to mention the potential significance, of
digressing from the central object of attention and identification and investigation
(especially only a short time after embracing it) towards the nearest available ring of
everyday human existence, and then, again after only a short time, towards the next and
nearest ring, and onward, getting further and further away from the onset? Why turn
away from what stands singled out in front to whatever is beside, regardless of what it is
and whether it would have stood out in the first place? And what, in the context of a
72
narrative, could be the intention or the mentality behind this act of digressing or turning-
away so as to stand-forth and gather-up?
In a film whose wide array of images nevertheless gravitate toward, and even
make a vigil upon, the painter at work on the same image, these digressions, particularly
those that stretch beyond the immediate vicinity of the studio house, amount to far more
than "still life" interludes of time's incessant and languorous flow to which they might on
a first viewing appear reducible. Throughout subsequent viewings, the more I reflected
on the peculiarly detached, almost Brechtian intensification of my own experience of
these sequences, the more I came to see in nearly each of the individual shots or views
comprising them an acknowledgement of the surrounding urban, social and quotidian
world that the painter had no choice but to exclude - and perhaps felt the exclusion pang
- in concentrating so undividedly and faithfully on his chosen subject. They are thus
readable, to my mind, as conscientious attempts at recovering that which the attention of
the painter, especially through the concrete exertions of sight, entails he go blind to as a
sacrifice for striving to see as much of the little he can. If we cared to extrapolate a mini
parable from the logic of this trade-off, these circles of acknowledgement could be
understood as redeeming the blindness we're forced to assume - to thrive on - in order to
see at all, and through the same principle psychology uses to redeem forgetting and
account for repression as rich aspects of our human survival. But in doing so, such a
parable must also present in action the moral that the harder and longer one sees, for the
sake of succeeding to see just one thing perhaps no greater than a tree, the more one must
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risk going completely deaf even to the belief that there is a world ongoing.20 If our desire
to concentrate on something, to fully attend to the demands of the particular, escalates to
the point where it yields such consequences, such a symptom the kind of which is
actually agreeable to the sufferer, then it seems that the sacrifice of "the rest" - an ocean
of particulars which we navigate with the help of generalizations like "the particular" -
must end up compromising part of what is so precious about the detail. Of course, losses
suffered for the sake of the detail, in honor of the one thing still too multiple to handle,
are not only inevitable but also necessary, for otherwise everything is lost, everything
there is to gain from attention to the thing, that seemingly single singularity, which marks
the difference between experiencing something in the world for itself and merely
pretending to (perhaps for the sake of a generalization). Another danger arises when
passion for one's own experience becomes protective, sealing oneself inside one's own
interests rather than using its power to challenge and upset and attempt to break through
those interests, where the losses as opposed to the gains of experience become the main
21purpose behind passion.
20 This is especially the case if one is not careful amidst states of deep absorption and
high concentration to now and then check the tendency for the smallest part - what and
that we perceive and attend to in our consciousness - to appear representative and
exhaustive and sometimes even superior to the larger "whole" of other parts and others
partial to other parts: all that we don 't perceive in a given perception and that we are not
(and so cannot be) any other perceiving person.
21 If turned into a habit this motive can become threateningly disease-like, corrupting
one's standards of self-worth, wasting the soul of a life that, say, lives only to work, and
thus has nothing to do and nowhere to turn while "off the line" except to the wall for
sleep, almost as if what such a soul does in or with life has next to no bearing upon its
own life that is its to burn, another case where quantity fails to add up to anything
resembling quality in the end. A tangible measure of accomplishment can remain but a
trophy on the mantelpiece, an object presiding above and beyond the reach of its earner,
if the plan for life is to accumulate material for an epitaph a feeble shelter against the
While the concept of digression is about as slippery as the events it refers to, one
thing the sequences described above help make clear about their own digressions is to
effortlessly rule out the possibility of attributing them to the sort of sensorially
bombarded and hence easily distracted condition characteristic of so-called modern
consciousness or modernity. Inviting as it is to read these digressions as expressions or
vehicles of a fundamentally digressive art form, one whose deeply modern plight is
thrown into even sharper relief by painting's comparatively premodern propensity for
strict contemplation, there is nevertheless nothing jarring or spontaneous or overtly
random about the casual introduction of the Polish workers. I want to say with respect to
this decision that Erice does not appear to "drop" Lopez as a result of being drawn away
by the lure of these fresh new faces arriving on the scene. Rather, it's as though he can't
bring himself to avoid or plain accepts the fact of their arrival as human beings from that
out-of-sight-out-of-mind "darkness" just beyond the narrow periphery of his own human
existence. And that familiar darkness, home of the other, is not impenetrable for the
camera in the way of a canvas. AU this darkness holds and comes darting through is
technically in bounds for the filmmaker, negotiable despite being off topic, thus having
the power to dislocate and sometimes altogether undercut whatever the topic is taken to
be. (We might in turn want to ask, in the wake of topics overtaken - Is there such thing as
a topic?) While Lopez can perhaps take a certain comfort in the knowledge that the
canvas ends where the world begins (flowing instead into the history and virtual present
of pictures); Erice, on the other hand, must recognize, in its contrast with a canvas, that
the camera's automatic reproduction of the world on film holds whoever holds (dear) a
sweeping storms of historical obscurity or, should it hold, a shelter fit only for one and
for one's name only.
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camera to an affirmation of the world itself in the form of sòme sort of faith or stake in its
sheer power of presence. That affirmation, if accepted as a condition of the camera,
witnesses the power of reality over fantasy, and by extension life over art, by deferring to
the realm of contingency a certain ontological precedence over any and all aesthetic
epistemologies (or claims to the contrary of what comes to pass), resulting in images
which, despite their degree of depth in the world, are emphatically ephemeral - as lasting
as their actual duration. In other words, while Lopez sets out to counter contingency by
trying to capture it, Erice, by accepting contingency as having already "captured" the
image, uses it - following it? - to investigate the potential for cinema to be poetically
resigned to the world, as it were. But the filmmaker who accepts contingency also
releases contingency, and is fated - blessed and cursed - to the paradox of having to
follow the life that dwells just to the left or to the right but always outside the camera's
frame. The moment Erice turns away from Lopez to face the existence of the Polish
workers who are definitely not painters, he puts the film into the position where the next
view that he decides to show (or his character decides to film) will foreground something
that films on the whole do so well to repress: the value judgment inherent in the act of
cutting, performed by starting and stopping recorded shots, which starts by starting and
stopping the camera, and before that by placing the camera - to cut offone view of the
world for another view to which the camera is just as capable of holding fast, or
affirming, and hence records indiscriminately.
In claiming that Erice approaches the cinematic cut as a digression mobilized by
an inescapable act of value, I am not suggesting that there exist (or ought to exist) any
criteria in which one cut could be found more superior or sound or justified than any
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other. What a film shows next, what it does to show what for it comes next, is not
perceivable as an act per se for the simple reason that a film is a finite set of expressive
forms and modes of expressivity that amount more to a "language" than a constellation of
actions amounting to something resembling a "moral character" (even though most films
indeed rely upon "bits and pieces" of the world in which human actions do in fact occur,
and through its own rules of syntax can construct from them a world so convincingly
unified that its own construction - a full constellation of choices fully acted upon in the
world itself- ends up all but masked). A cut to this shot or that shot from this shot might
not meet any criteria, nor satisfy any intuition we might have, for decisive, impacting and
accountable human action; and yet despite the crude simplicity and linguistic character of
the cut I would still want to say that for every cut that is visible, that has been explicitly
foregrounded in defiance of the convention of continuity editing or not completely erased
by its total acceptance, so too is the impression of an agency22 which has put forth not a
statement but an association (not between statements but across forms or notations of
perspective). In a film like Dream ofLight, where discrete images of the world are not
bound together to form a seamless narrative continuum nor forced apart to prevent such a
continuum from forming at all, a sense of agency (call it the gaze) is what holds them in
place and is responsible for holding themjust so one after another. Such a gaze, I want to
say, can survive the cuts it performs by literally performing those cuts, so that a given cut
can point back to an action that is as specific to - albeit not necessarily characteristic of-
22 Some have gone so far as to call this a "film mind," granting aspects of a film or an
entire film with real agency or a sense of "real" agency. Aside from being reluctant to
proceed head first down such a treacherous path, I am not interested in going in this
direction period, for it seems to take us away from the fact (fundamental to all art
regardless of how immediate or life-like the experience) that whatever agency a film
might have or posture is a voice from the past doomed to repeat itself.
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the character of the filmmaker as any action performed by a character in the world of the
film. A cinematic cut, in other words, attests, albeit only attests, to a decision that is
either expressed through the subjective association of discrete parts as individual wholes
or unexpressed (although by no means undecided) through the folding of such parts into
the expressed whole of the film. I will not say that the former approach is necessarily
more responsible or conscientious or more interesting or generative than the latter; I will
say (or wish to say) that a style premised on the acknowledgement of its own fragments,
to the point where it is forced to subsist on them for its means of expression, does
constitute, at least to my thinking, a step forward in the articulacy and humanization of
aesthetic imperfection. (Although if the style should become a style like any other, I see
no reason why it should be valued more highly than any other, for as a style there is
nothing to stop someone from using it to stylize - dehumanize and perfect - aesthetic
processes of imperfection in the end.)
It is now worth considering Erice's own recollection of the circumstances under
which the Polish workers inspired his interest and attention:
[. . .] They were there, that is where I met them. I vaguely knew about them before
we started shooting, but I did not really know what they were doing On the
first day, the sound engineer told me: "There are terrible sounds in the house.
Somebody is hammering non-stop. Why don't you tell them to go away? They are
really bothering us, and they might disturb the dialogue." But I insisted that it was
78
more important to respect reality, to keep going That is how we met the
Polish workers. They were right away integrated into the film
23
Erice' s precariously bold digression to the three Polish workers, while an
acknowledgement of their right to be there, is also an acknowledgement of cinema's right
to be in the world, to document it from deep inside of it where those behind the camera
continue to inhabit and belong to it - to partake in it - on the same grounds (albeit on
different terms) as those out in front. That is how a meeting, perhaps to survive the
duration of shooting, was struck with these people - by refusing to waive this right to
continue living, to keep going. Bearing a certain pressure to respect whatever
contingencies reality might dish out, he opts to be artistically conscientious by not getting
in the way of them, which forces him to be somewhat artistically experimental by
proceeding to integrate them into the film without much delay. As a consequence, his
filmmaking becomes "experimental" here less through a desire to thwart convention than
through the admittedly unconventional nature of his criteria for what he considers to be
problems and solutions to intentions. And since his intentions seem to be as significantly
attuned to the nature - some call it the "beast" - of filmmaking as to the film itself,
problems with and solutions to their execution - the time and space of their realization -
will reside equally beyond the reach and desire of intention. What I am referring to as his
experimentation thus becomes a naturally skeptical as opposed to an artificially avoidant
or destructive process towards the conventions or common solutions available within the
genre of documentary (i.e. transforming an open location into a closed set) without
23 Tomas Perez Turrent, "Entretien avec Victor Erice: La possibilité de reproduire les
apparences," Positif(May 1993): 10. Translation by Martine Thibonnier.
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necessarily having to explicitly question those conventions and solutions purely (and
perhaps senselessly) in the name of experimentation. In this sense it is possible to stretch
a reading of Erice' s digression away from Lopez to the workers as (the consequences of)
afilli acknowledgement of the intractable and contractual bond (faith in the idea of the
index) between the spatio-temporal document and the world so documented, the very
bond which comes to underlie and support in a self-effacing (or sacrificial) manner the
appropriations of narrative conventions to symbolically structure that world. For even the
making of a purely fictional and fictionalized world on film requires that the realities in
the world (assuming the world itself was filmed) be simultaneously withheld and upheld
for the sake of a plan (call it a script) for the world. Except in Dream ofLight the
inseparability of documentary and fiction as film's most fundamental modes is as if
ontologically affirmed.
It is not faith in convention (for the most tried-and-true have no doubt earned our
trust) but rather a lack of awareness that conventions are indeed constructions that
permits possibilities inherent in the medium of film, or any art, to escape without alarm.
It is a possibility of the mechanical nature of the camera, for instance, for Erice to show
up on the day unprepared, or prepared to negotiate his preparations, or unwilling to
execute any imagined preconceptions in order to be able to make concrete decisions on
the spot. I already mentioned that Erice did not know in advance of filming the film he
was going to make, though perhaps on this occasion he understood the practical reasons
for not knowing anything too soon, that is, anything prior to being knowable, by
recognizing that the act of looking through a camera at a painter dedicated to looking
both unto and at the limits of looking can not only reward but also heal uncertainty over
80
where and what and how to look, proving certainty not so much wrong in this case as
blind (or blinding). In his book Sculpting in Time, Andrei Tarkovsky wrote of his method
for the complexly autobiographical film Mirror (1974) that "We made it a deliberate
point of principle not to have the picture worked out and arranged in advance, before the
material had been filmed. It was important to see how, under what conditions, the film
could take shape, as it were, by itself."24 At first glance, this notion of letting a film take
shape by itself seems rather typical of an artist's reticence, sometimes genuinely fearful,
to scrutinize the "inexplicable mysteries" or "unaccountable contingencies" of the
creative process; and yet if we break that silence only the slightest bit and start to unpack
(and indulge) the experience by which one thing leads to another (and, as it were, through
the dark), I am confident that the conditions about which Tarkovsky speaks are still more
or less none other than the conditions of film left to its own devices - devices brought to
bear down, limit, and thus continually readjust or "calibrate" the creative will of the
filmmaker who learns, as a result and invaluably, to be patient with his will. The
filmmaker who aspires to begin the process of making a film with filming, even if such a
method requires that he begin again by rejecting so much preparation as so much blind
anticipation, has nowhere to turn except to the primary apparatus of the medium, to the
mediation of the world - persons, places, things - by the camera; and upon looking
through that lens, uncertain as to the eventual place and ultimate significance of this
particular fragment of the world, this "time-sculpture" in Tarkovsky' s words, can see,
almost as separate from the object of perception, the path of perception. But since the
filmmaker can get no further than the threshold ofthat path, blocked by the camera as a
24 Andrei Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, trans. Kitty Hunter-Blair (Austin: University of
Texas Press Printing, 2000), p. 132.
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sort of external marker of the point (virtually the tip of the nose) where human
subjectivity must cease to be its own object, the prospect of catching a pure or absolute
reflection of the concrete simultaneity of self and world is realized as a dream and thus
stripped of its stake and replaced with the real chance to be contemplative with the
medium of the moving image, to be precise in thought and feeling, in consciousness,
through sight and sound and time and space, to become, for itself, and now in filmmaker
Robert Bresson's words, a "precision instrument."25
I'm glad to have hit on the writing of Robert Bresson, for at the beginning of his
short (and very strict) book of notes detailing his own principles and practices of
filmmaking, he declares something that sits at the heart, I think, of the entire resonant
nexus of digressions constituting the aesthetic liberty (I will soon call it the autonomy) of
Dream ofLight: "The point is not to direct someone, but to direct oneself." Such a
formulation goes a long way to turn the classic stereotype of the film director on its head
from someone who tells others (usually actors) what to do, to someone who must first tell
himself what to do (and do it) before telling anyone anything, that is, before having the
right to direct others with any authority. Telling someone else what to do before having
done it, tested it, yourself, is essentially the same as telling someone to do itfor you,
25 Robert Bresson, Notes on Cinematography, trans. Jonathan Griffin (New York: Urizen
Books, Inc., 1975). p. 1.
26 Ibid. I cannot resist appending the fact that Bresson was an experienced painter before
turning to filmmaking, for it confirms an intuition I've always had about the peculiar
ambivalence between hard reality and soft impression in his films (a tension I now
recognize as characteristic of Erice's body of work as well, small as it is, culminating in
Dream ofLight where this ambivalence is aesthetically (physically) played out). On top
of this biographical fact, I cannot resist adding the belief that the perceptual precision and
internal self-direction to which he not only subscribes in writing but successfully
demonstrates in his best work are, perhaps, further signs of having in spirit remained a
painter.
82
ultimately as they see fit, for directions given purely as intentions lack instructions -
knowledge - for how to realize them no matter how worthwhile they might seem (or
sound), and so, on these grounds, are fundamentally undirected. Film directors who find
themselves surrounded by a cast and crew of highly specialized professionals and
technicians - craftspeople - are faced every day with the mystery of their own singular
craft - what do directors do? - and, before long, can end up deferring or, before that, lose
their authority to others better equipped to back it up, who can envision and execute what
they have failed or avoided to articulate in the appropriate language (as if decisiveness
were a perfect substitute for dialogue). Perhaps this is why there exists two titles for the
work of creating a film, "director" and "filmmaker," which not only have little in
common but, even in their common use, might nearly cancel each other out. The best way
I can think of distinguishing them on behalf of a filmmaker like Bresson, who is tireless
in his efforts to distinguish the creative use of film (the cinematography of his book of
notes) from the presence of theater in the guise of film, is by claiming that the filmmaker
who directs by directing himself is really an actor who acts behind the camera.
Where can we begin to seek out and follow a filmmaker's "performance"? In
Dream ofLight, at least, this idea, reminiscent perhaps of an Emersonian conception of
self-reliance, manifests most strikingly in a consistent and therefore elevated attention to
the detail of form (giving form to the details the more detailed it is). Such consistency in
formal intensity seems at least partially indebted to Erice's desire in this film not so much
to assert himself through film, but rather to assertfilm as an art which inherits and no
longer depends on the much older art of painting. The resolute conviction of this sense of
consistency, I feel, is the most striking quality of the images and juxtapositions and
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transitions in the film because it is what holds all these fragmentary elements within a
single autonomous - 1 now want to say "thinking" - continuity of form, stressing as it
does the time and space - the details - of the form as such: the distinct spatial continuity
of discrete and discontinuous shots. The autonomy ofthat continuity is thus made
perceptible and recognizable as cinema's "self-reliance" through a force of consideration
towards all things contingent to teleology, to tasks set by narrative convention (and no
less our own expectations of those conventions and their traditions) to hold fast to a
subject or character or story or genre as readymade through-lines for cinema to adopt and
adhere.27
For example, by filming the labor of the workers with the same degree of
patience, intensity of attentiveness and distribution of emphasis across the frame as the
painter's spectacular display of craft, Erice is able to avoid raising labor to the "height" of
craft or lowering craft to the "ground" of labor through a decisive acknowledgement of
what reality itself makes perfectly plain regarding the similarities and differences
between repairing a wall and painting a tree. Indeed there are differences, profound
differences, between the two practices, but at no point during their mutual documentation
are those differences found to be the sort that could justify elevating the idea of craft over
labor, or setting up a dialectical binary between the two, as long as the passionately
indiscriminate act of observing the painter's efforts through a camera continues to
document as evidence thefact that the possibility of inspiration, the necessity of
27 1 seem to be describing something fundamentally irreducible here, as if metaphysical to
the film's aesthetic, something that isn't ever specific to a particular part of it due to a
cinematic specificity of all its parts, which is why we have to look for examples in
between the parts. Hence my insistence on digression as a description (of the logic) of
parts "in between." No longer contradictory, the difficulty and obscurity of the example
remains, almost necessarily, and as precisely what I mean by a whole ofparts.
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communication and the potential for their convergence in the realm of artistic craft
inevitably and absolutely depend on the power of labor, that is, on actions as recalcitrant
to albeit responsible for so-called "best intentions" as any map or piece of instruction or
routine habit or rhythm we might follow in our everyday lives.
What if we were to move past mere temptation and actually call this form of
directorial performance a "working vehicle of knowledge"? What would that be as
opposed to look like, given what any given film has to work with "to know"? A
transparent subject, in our case, tracks the forever-expanding continuum of the everyday
(within and between days) through the omnipresent possibility or pull of digression,
facilitating the immanent flow of various and varying acts of repetition through a
poetically contemplative processing of images and sounds in metaphorical or resonant
relation with each other. The criteria of the everyday - what counts as the cycling and
blurring of days - will appear in terms of the reclusive pressure of the multiple passages
of time, not from one event to another but from one time to another: irrespectively of any
consecutive and hierarchical ordering of events in of themselves. But this singling out of
the autonomous workings of a cinematic continuum and then taking yet another step by
endowing what seems to work itselfout with a sort of mindful agency, points to the
obscuration of the evidence of two consequences of a cinematic acknowledgement of the
everyday: individuals who are invited by Erice to be as they are because they were
already there as part of the environment before the arrival of camera and crew; and
people in general living in a city - a city living day in and day out - sought out by crew
with camera and involved unawares in their images. The difference between them seems
to me to revolve around the difference between a person who is asked to be as he or she
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is while conscious of being filmed, and people behind doors or in plain sight who have
most likely not been asked to be filmed and in some cases were perhaps not aware of
being filmed and hence are really as they are, that is, doing what they would normally be
doing or not doing, without having to appear to be so, to appear natural, and as a result
strangely sidestep criteria for characters who are the fictional or fictionalized individuals
of almost any time-based narrative while, stranger still, "starring" in the shots that are
definitely about them before being dropped by the very next cut.28 In both cases,
however, each shot is a view that the person(s) being viewed, aware or unaware, cannot
see. That each shot is also a view that the people viewed in the other shots do not know is
actually seeable adds even more weight to the separateness of the individual figures in the
film. Both forms of evidence are ordinary facts of documentary film images, and perhaps
of moving images in general in the context of montage, that the continuous impression of
reality across images works to distort, if not deny. The medium of film as it is used (and
performed) in Dream ofLight is thus not in a position to identify with or do justice to the
object(s) of a moving image (human or otherwise), rather only to the spatial relationships
between objects and the temporal relationships between images; and it can get away with
cutting from one image to another after a short stay with a new particular object or set of
objects because it is never in the position (despite each and every digression) to cut away
from the world as a whole. A moving image of the world is still the only image whose
power to show a fragment infull actually depends upon remaining completely contingent
upon what it must just as fully exclude. As a result, one of documentary cinema's more
28 These figures also fail to meet our criteria for extras who are the individuals of
fictional or fictionalized groups, or of actual groups in fictional paradigms, which are
liable to break if used to turn extras into characters at the expense of its own.
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philosophical discoveries is that there is nothing discoverable in the world that does not
enter our shared belief in "the world" as amounting to nothing less than an
insurmountable, ungraspable totality; and, by extension, there is no part of it that is more
worthy of belonging to an invisible whole that is the world itself than any other. Now, if
we still want to say that Erice, as the invisible protagonist in his documentary on Lopez's
artistic process, begins his own artistic process, that is, his own method of interaction
with the possibilities and limits ofhis chosen art, by digressing towards the myriad
surfaces of the world-as-such after having observed and intimately aligned himself with
Lopez's staunchly realist approach, sooner or later we are going to want to attach Erice's
act of directing the medium of film away from the specific circumstances of painting to
Erice himself, the director of a film that is finished, a film whose specific circumstances
of construction are over and done with. In referring to the dramatic acts of digression by
which Erice begins the film on terms set by the medium of film as opposed to those of
painting (which amounts in my view to a second beginning), I do not mean to suggest
that such acts transpire in the film in paradoxical separation from the film itself. The
filmmaking I'm trying to account for here is describable only as an interpretation or
reading ??Dream ofLight's struggle, caught within the documentation of fiction, to take
hold of the medium of film so as to wield it on par with the painter's taking hold of the
brush so as to reach the surface of the world or the canvas or a feeling (perhaps in a vain
attempt to surpass surface altogether). But as soon as Erice starts to break free of the core
subject of painting, painter and the geme of documentary which holds (obligates?) him to
both, film appears to gain a more precise grounding from the "looseness" or
"flexibleness" of its possibilities, and hence from its susceptibility to remote
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contingencies, than any inherent conditions, for it has always been a possibility of cinema
to accept and even steal new creative combinations ofpotential conditions in the interest
of learning what it can do and when it might do that again and, pending some show of
promise, make it an official part of what cinema is.
Any question over what something is, whose criteria for an answer is whatever
makes that thing fundamentally different from everything else, is at some deeper level a
fundamental questioning of its existence. The question as to what cinema is lead a
theorist like Andre Bazin to an answer that seems to question the reference or the very
sense of the question - that cinema, for all its examples and history, is something of a
myth. His idea is that cinema, having been completely envisioned prior to its technical
invention, develops in reverse towards its origins where a total representation of reality -
perhaps marking the end of anything recognizable as cinema - awaits in Platonic store
for it.29 Bazin' s explanation for cinema's lack of an essence by concluding that it has yet
to be invented, yet to be logically definable, nevertheless strikes me as a definition in
disguise and an accurate one at that. It is obvious enough that critics and theorists thrive,
if not depend, on the ambiguity or malleability or total mystery of their objects of study;
but what is the position of those committed to the creation of those objects, working
inside the object itself- inside the mystery of cinema - while fully aware that the
incompleteness or absence or impurity of the object determines all (perhaps too much)
29 Andre Bazin, "The Myth of Total Cinema," in What is Cinema?, trans. Hugh Gray
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1967), p. 17-22.
30 See Part 1 in D.N. Rodowick, The Virtual Life ofFilm (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2007), p. 1-24.
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that can or even ought to be done with it?31 It's a question that Erice provides an answer
for at the end ?? Dream ofLight, in mythological terms similar to those proposed by
Bazin; and perhaps it is far from an overstatement to say that the film as a whole asks the
question of cinema in the light of painting, which questioned itself in light of
photography's spontaneous rule of the real and brilliantly won its own rule with
Surrealism and Abstract Expressionism (to name only two declarations of independence).
Photography, however, and for reasons too complex to explore here, struggles to
rediscover or reassert itself in response to the challenge posed by cinema, although
perhaps this reveals as much or more about the nature of cinema than it does about the
plight of photography: that cinema is the purity of photography exposed to "the ways of
the world" by time and experienced via the most vicarious relationships with all the other
arts on earth. The question before us is whether or not the success or health or generative
capability of cinema depends upon whether or not it can withstand purification through
subjection to the same potentially destructive questioning as painting endured in the face
of photography. If the answer is yes, it must do so in the absence of a single stable
essence in which to be reconstituted and a competitor or successor against which to
justify such reconstitution and without which no essence could hope to awaken.
31 "We are still uncertain," writes Andrei Tarkovsky, "about the 'material' in which a
film image is to be modeled, unlike the painter, who knows he will work in colours, or
the writer, who knows that he will affect his readers with words. Cinema as a whole is
still looking for what determines it."(173) This leads me to wonder whether or not the
absence of an ontological determinant for cinema leads the curious filmmaker to a form
of investigation or experimentation that is more scientific than artistic, or whose stakes
are raised by the aims and ambitions of scientific inquiry as opposed to those of artistic
creation.
32 The incontrovertible, here-to-stay arrival of the digital image, which D.N. Rodowick
has demonstrated is more virtual than actual and hence not an image at all, can be said,
When Erice, alone in the courtyard (behind the camera) after about a month of
work has been put in the painting, tilts up and away from Lopez's workspace around the
quince tree to the trunk and branches and then the aging leaves of a different, immensely
taller tree that neither has paid any attention to, I became overwhelmingly aware of the
ease with which the beauty and complexity and raw immediacy of the tree was given a
model form of representation on film. It turns out that Lopez's laboriously constraining
method for creating a hyper-realistic form of representation on canvas is embodied as an
absolute in every image oí Dream ofLight and, moreover, is achievable precisely due to
the fact that there is simply no need for any such methodological constraints on top of
what the camera already does. This ease of the movie camera to automatically and
instantaneously represent reality is a truly remarkable and even surprising characteristic
for an art form to possess, especially at this point in the film after so much time and
energy and passion has been invested in the painterly representation of the quince tree.
Through this near flick of a gesture, it seemed to me quite clear that the end to which this
painter strives - representing his thoughtful perception of a living object - is precisely the
point at which cinema technically begins - but to what end? If Erice can accomplish in
the pushing of a button what for Lopez has cost the frustrating abandonment of not one
but two significantly developed canvases, what is the destiny of cinema if the primary
tool for constructing the primary element of the moving image is such that it already
presents a finished product to the eye of the filmmaker?
despite what I've been saying, to pit cinema against the question over whether the art of
making and viewing film is rising or falling to the occasion of the digital.
33 There are obviously many answers (and many good answers) to the question of film's
destiny as an art. The point here, rather, is to emphasize not just the importance of a
filmmaker managing the question within his own film, but that the question was thought
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The flexibility of the camera is such that it can be pointed almost anywhere, at
almost anything, and for almost any length of time. But while the camera allows Erice the
freedom to embrace real-life contingencies as subjects in their own right, it
simultaneously bars him from directly encountering and deeply experiencing his
consciousness of them and participating in a devotional intimacy with the life of a
particular that Lopez claims with absolute sincerity to be the unconditional purpose (and
gift) of his chosen art. ("The most important part about painting the tree is being with the
tree.") Later on, after abandoning the canvas for a drawing, and deeply involved - almost
implicated - in the tree's encroaching demise at the end of autumn, Lopez asks his friend
and fellow painter Enrique Gran: "Do you know how long I've been here, since I started
working on this tree?" The answer, according to the film's scrupulous documentation of
the passage of time, is one month and twenty-five days. In light of such a staggering
investment and commitment, it's all Erice can do, immediately after Lopez finishes
asking the partially rhetorical question, to cut away from the tree and digress to yet
another widespread, all-embracing montage of the city - for how could the spatio-
temporal nature of the moving image and the physical nature of the camera, not to
worth dwelling upon despite the dangers of doing so; a question, as it turns out, rarely
asked by film, as though filmmakers were completely convinced of its usefulness,
legitimacy and fate as an art despite the fact that only a short time ago film as art was
guilty until proven innocent. Erice' s doubts about the integrity of film in Dream ofLight
are perhaps also rooted in a response to the excessive and heedless confidence placed in
moving images today, where the entire media nexus is innocent until proven guilty.
(Erice himself has referred to the television screens pulsing their sharp blue light inside
nouses and apartments as "false suns," which rise up like moons in the film when the real
sun goes down.) It is up to filmmakers, I think, to provide ways, short of trembling, of
helping people cope with the crisis of the image through authentic, non-didactic, patient
forms of contention. For there is no way to solve the fact that moving images in particular
are guilty of seeming innocent, nor the stranger fact, or paradox, that images of this kind
are, too, all that they seem.
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mention the language of narrative (especially when spoken as quickly and distractedly as
the great majority of feature-length films), ever hope to sufficiently answer for the
inscrutable presence of detail in the world the way painting owns up to the intensely
singular existence of any and all things? A filmmaker would never gain the kind of
knowledge that Cezanne earned from his studies of apples. By filming an apple, even if it
becomes a lifelong obsession, one is hardly in the best creative position to work through,
challenge and cleanse one's experience of it, and thus will never experience an ecstatic
sense of its true "appleness." An artist like the best of them, Erice would still be fated to a
relative passivity before the apple, and not just because of the camera's ability to record
one without any human intervention during the act of recording, but primarily due to the
likely decision to record an apple that exists - whichever one happens to be there or is
chosen as a prop - instead of create a wholly different one.34 That decision, assuming it is
even made, cannot pursue the spirit and alterity of a thing. Filmmakers like
photographers are dealt - even if they designed the deck - the presence of things
"solved" by way of the appearances of things "sealed" (or transposed) in a recording. The
machine of the camera puts the filmmaker in the awkward position of having to "break
into" a form of representation that is always standing a priori to the will of creation and
direct the world as such in line with The Human. It is perhaps at this point that
filmmakers start to make good on cinema's ability to make use of the other arts:
34 Notwithstanding (and cherishing) the feats of an Antonioni who painted the sprawling
park grass a perfectly healthy green in Blow-Up (1966), or those of a Kurosawa who slept
in bedding for a solid year before deeming it sufficiently worn to appear in the home of a
19th century country doctor in Red Beard (1965), or those of a Tati for a film like Play
Time (1967) for which days were spent in a sound studio tearing pieces of paper and cloth
in search of the perfect sound for when one of the waiters in the new chic restaurant -
poor unfortunate soul! - rends his brand new slacks on the back of one of the most
foolishly designed chairs imaginable.
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animating aspects of the world into a discrete and functioning fantasy-reality by
configuring a host of raw documents for the cinematic text, thereby structuring a specific
take on reality.
I still think the scene near the end with the camera turning on by itself to film a
recreation of Lopez's childhood memory marks the climax of the film's highly discreet,
almost secretive meditation on its own artistic plight. Two of the tripod's three legs are
shown pressed up against the same nails that Lopez used to fix his stance, but from the
opposite side in place of the absent easel, thereby linking the tripod with the easel and the
camera with the canvas. The camera, in contrast with the absent canvas, is pointed at the
ground, though since it is night we cannot see clearly the object of its focus; and the
camera, moreover, since it does not "see," won't be able to register anything at all in the
faint moonlight. After a few moments a tungsten light sitting on the ground suddenly and
inexplicably turns on, revealing some rotting quinces strewn about the base of the tree.
These quinces are similar to the ones that Lopez, in voice over, remembers having seen
as a child at the end of autumn returning to the earth beneath a strange light that seemed
to him "dark yet clear" - an indescribable light that "isn't the night light, nor that of
twilight, nor of the dawn." That extraordinary quality of light, much more than the rotting
quinces illuminated by it, burned into his innermost being the glory of the evening sun
35 Breaking into the content of an image from behind a camera needn't involve the
application of structural devices and conventions. Andy Warhol's cunning and
conscientious strategy of removing himself from his studio after turning on a camera to
film a portrait of someone who interested him is a fascinating case where the intention to
do a portrait is executed through a decisive act of self-effacement. Perhaps the idea came
from the realization that people who are worth photographing hate to be stared at and
immortalized, tried in honor of those who wish to remain true to themselves - and can,
indeed are - but fear being thwarted if put on the spot, beneath the pressure of expectant
and silent gazes, to produce something true about themselves.
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shining a light on the face of death just before the night falls and the onset of winter. But
rather than attempt to paint the mysterious memory that is the source of his inspiration for
the painting, Lopez chose to paint an actual quince tree with actual autumn light in his
studio backyard. What might appear as a gesture of tact based on a matter of aesthetic or
even moral principle is, perhaps, little more than a simple exercising of common sense:
An early but vivid memory of awakening to the inevitable night of death - in which the
life prior to death's dawn is grasped as the most mature or ripe state for being to be in -
transcends with ease the limits of painterly representation while reducing language to an
endless list of precise negations. (Not the night light, nor that of twilight, nor of the
dawn.)
I imagine that painters who draw from their past or unconscious learn this lesson
pretty quickly when failure does irrevocable damage to the most fragile balance between
having and not having a distant memory or fading dream. An old photograph of ourselves
can actually confuse us with its persuasive posturing of proof that we are who we once
were, even though in all truth it is only halftrue that we are still more or less behind that
reminiscent face. The danger of the camera, however, is that nothing that falls within the
range of its lens lies beyond its power to document it because cameras are made to
represent in an image that which exists, or at least begins, independently of a maker. And
since the world exists independently of anyone, it can seem to contain everything that
exists, as if there were no room for anything (everything) else. The camera maintains this
view of the world as always already there. Any feelings we have about someone whose
picture we are taking because of those feelings have no way of entering the world from
behind the camera to take their rightful place within the photograph, regardless of the
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degree of passion in the eye . . . These sorts of claims, I realize, are quite self-evident and
perhaps uninteresting, and nowhere as futile as I make them sound, but I make them
again to say that it is for these reasons especially that it is easy to take pictures, and to
take them one after another after another. It is so easy that even a filmmaker whose
direction is at every point both meaningful, appreciable and, as I have argued, perceptible
as a self-directed performance, is in no way obliged to hold, stand behind, or keep even
the most remote watch over the working camera throughout this scene. By
acknowledging the strange necessity of his exclusion from the automatic nature of the
camera as it represents - under the cover of night - Lopez's unrepresentable dream of
light, Erice is able to suggest that the art of cinema might depend on the responsibility as
much as the creativity of filmmakers to do everything in their power to supervise (as
opposed to exploit) the power of cinema to inspire excess in the form of gratuitous
indulgences in cinema's own excessive "nature." What a filmmaker does not know how
to show, or knows is beyond showing, should not appear on the screen in the name of the
world in which we live, for if cinema has a plight in this regard it is through it that




Facing the Wall ofthe World:
The Value ofContingency in Moving Images, or "Contingency Where It Counts "
"Bare reality: what a crook it sometimes is. It
steals things, and afterwards it has no idea what
to do with them. It just seems to spread sorrow
for fun. Of course, I like sorrow very much as
well, it's very valuable, very. It shapes one."
Robert Walser, Jakob Von Gunten
What is it about images that move as opposed to ones that don't that evoke not just an
impression (feelings or thoughts) of contingency but project the weight of contingency -
the very predicament of contingency? A photograph on a wall or screen, and especially in
one's hands, is helpless against the wrath of the viewer's controlling and calculating
gaze, helpless against being scanned as if read through and through. That is to say, a
photograph is eventually reducible such that the thorough processing (or consumption) of
what it depicts can eventually wear down the stand of contingency specific to
representational denotation. We encounter that stand face-to-face, and know it when we
see it, with the resigned exclamation "It could have been otherwise," at which point,
standing before a particular photograph, we might stress its permanency in our perception
with the logical trick of a double negation: "It could not have been not otherwise." Which
says: the content of a photograph could have been otherwise, but not the photograph as a
whole. The content of a moving image could also have been otherwise, but since the
image as a whole does not stay and continue to stand, that can only be true in the wake of
its passing. The ephemerality of moving images, then, makes their impermanence
replaceable not by another image, the next image, or the screen on which they are
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projected or which projects them, but by their very own continuous duration. Moving
images, in this way, resist the "rape" of reason by fleeing before our very eyes and ears
and minds and every which way. They take with them not just the impression of a chance
event but the event of a contingent world in which events both necessary and unnecessary
are possible impressions. And if where they go (once they have gone) is "into the past,"
then that past can be said to coincide with the world from whence they came (be it the
world itself if directly filmed or, not necessarily just as well, a world indirectly "filmed,"
created from the image of the world itself and adequately overpowering to appear a priori
to whatever appears). So these images, if they are to move past, must move the world or
an idea of the world and therefore like the world, hence acknowledging the world, in
order for contingency to be at stake while on display. At stake, contingency in or as the
moving image would appear to demand the viewer's acknowledgement without
providing, or there being, any instructions for what to make of it nor how to make it sign
and signify, and consequently there is no telling from that untraceable demand the extent
to which an acknowledgment must express itself as appropriation. With the help of the
evidence of moving images, which has to include the evidence of our almost instinctive
and compulsive attraction to them, so with the help of our shared commitment to them as
well, we must do some speculation in order to find out what an acknowledgement of their
contingency as the basis and power of their evidence could consist of, lead to, and
ultimately mean.
*
When a camera records a fixed amount of the world, that portion is made to overwhelm
the recording, filling it almost to the point of possessing or becoming it. Exposure of the
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film (or conversion of digital code) is total, totalized in a succession of discrete frames-
per-second flashes that, in succeeding one another without moving one after the other,
exposes the thin barriers or frame lines between the photographs concealed in their
movement (which is why those 24 film or 30 video photographs making 1 second of
movement are called "frames" instead of what they actually are). But for all its excess of
exposure, a moving image of the world onscreen obviously cannot contain what exceeds
it. Instead, that part of the world lost in theframe lines is the world running off the edge
of the frame itself (as liquid spilling off a table, paint dripping off the canvas, a leak from
all sides), rendering the image a full-out trace as much as a mechanical representation of
the world that overwhelmed it and which we see, or gather, in the swooning richness of a
projected reality. At no point during the projection (unless there are damaged or missing
frames) does this picture of reality lose, or give up, or cease, this unbearable richness. It
continues, taxing its own containment like water behind a dam, but not beyond the image
as though it stood in separation from the image or as if the image were altogether separate
from the frame. The image, I want to say, as the whole ofitsframe, as the mechanical
necessity of framing off the remaining whole of the world (and an infinity of
contingency), continues the continuum of the reality represented for as long as the past is
present and the present pasts.
*
If it makes enough sense to say that the camera puts the user in the position to hand over
the controls of creation to the world, it is as a prior datum of the camera's implication.
The tool of the camera, in other words, needn't be involved, or yet wielded, for a
filmmaker to be faced with a given foundation of the most rigidly particular givens.
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Another, slightly more dramatic way of putting this is to say that the world being filmed
is also in a state, or temporal flux, of "filming." The world so filmed then does not avail
itself to exposure for the sake of a camera or because there is one engaged in the process
of filming it. The precise intersecting of filming and filmed is too coincidental to be so
synchronous. The world, here, is what is always to be found persisting, behind one's back
should one turn around and throughout the night should one wake up, irrespectively and
as such. Its perfect vigil is its immanence and is in no one's honor.
*
Although the world fills our consciousness, and surrounds our consciousness of
ourselves, our consciousness ofit founds a reality which, depending on how we shape
and our shaped by it, invariably keeps us out of- and looking in at - the world that it is
"of." (I like to think we are comfortable, even complacent in our belief in a world in
common worthy of being accounted for.) Our sense of reality, then, is not specifically
experiential save for an experience of profound lucidity, which is to say that reality does
not come in between the T and the world so much as it holds our consciousness of the
two in place (oiling the hinge or cleaning the window of consciousness, as it were) should
they start to drift apart or meld together. But the human body provides a sort of practical
means for opening the currents of experience to bridge reality - back and forth, to and
away from the world, to and away from ourselves, for or against what we experience in
either direction. The recording apparatus of the camera is fascinatingly built to take the
very same approach, or make the same advance, to the world, but it can only do so
dispassionately and hence indiscriminately and excessively when activated: flying us
straight over the intricate paths of experience to the threshold of the world-as-such. (As a
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prototype of the body without consciousness, the camera pictures the body to the
consciousness behind it, or assists consciousness in positioning its body in front of itself
- perhaps out of its reach or so as to begin its reach from the body instead of the mind.)
To this effect, the camera does not draw the world in but nor does it hold it at bay. Its
lucidity of operation - a sort of mechanical decisiveness - is a sole means, unflinchingly
steadfast in its capacity to record the time and space of mediation governing subjects and
objects as the most basic and unadorned reality. So the world that appears as a result, too,
is basic and unadorned, zeroed to the ground of its presence and virtually identical with,
or at least indiscernible from, a heightened sense of the real. A stronger way of
explaining this without risking conflating "reality" and "world" would be to say that the
reality in a moving image is objective or that the illusion of reality respects the
experience of reality in the world.
*
In moving images of the world, that world can strike us with the force of "will" because
something like the world is characterized. Perhaps this characterization is fundamentally
indebted to a remarkable (but no longer startling) fact of the photographic basis of the
image: that the world onscreen never leaves the screen as long as the objects on the
screen function to screen us from the world that they continue to belong to. The camera
had the world as its one and only need, and, more importantly (and fundamentally), as
that which it needs and is built to need - darkness being the only condition of the world
that does not strike, or alert, the high sensitivity of film, and darkness being the absence
of the world (as we know it via perception). Every frame of film is presented to the world
at the same time, more or less, as burned by its light, which is the intense immaterial
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property that the camera, structuring by way of a lens, receives by way of a pinhole that
still cannot manage to keep the light from drowning the dark. This tiniest of holes (the
aperture fixed at its narrowest setting) is by no stretch too small to obstruct the explosive
surge of light from seeping. The pressure of the world held at bay, trembling behind the
camera's gate, along with the speed of the individual frames running (sensing) past the
opening, results in something of a measured flood, controlled just enough by the
"science" of the camera. The flood, therefore, is not disastrous as long as light -
assuming it is light out and light enough - is properly measured. But if the hole been
much bigger, if the film had ran much slower, there would be no way for the contents of
such records to be even remotely recognizable from the light required to space them in
our perception. Based on these extreme and precise constraints of intake, and modeled
after discoveries about how perception is built to take things in, at any given moment "the
world" is all we can take of it - "it" being all that must be lost on us in order to be able to
register, in confidence and in doubt, precisely what we perceive, no more no less and no
other way.
*
Moving images of the world can provide a response to skepticism about the world (a
skepticism specifically about existence but that is perhaps over meaning) with an actual
representation of the world that survives even its own absence; present enough, perhaps
more than enough, is the world in its absence, and perhaps precisely because it is absent.
Absence, here, is crucial for the rhetoric of presence, for without complete absence of
object the representation would be without the power of its substance as a trace to
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partake completely of the quality (minus the substance) of presence. Thus it is tempting
to conclude that the world doesn't merely survive in a moving image but thrives there.
*
What else makes a moving image of the world represent as present a world that is
undoubtedly absent? Is it our presence before it and to it (with it, perhaps?) and not in it?
Is it our satisfaction with the fact that even the appearance of presence can be doubted
and still there is a world as "present" as ever, a world whose mere presence in the form or
effect of a trace can overpower even thefact (and no mere fact) of its being absent?
These paradoxes are manageable, if not resolvable, through what persists to strike me as
the blind or groundless facticity of moving images - the faith of which, as it were, is that
absence as such is impossible because unimaginable. The presence of absence here shows
that the logical consequences of skepticism's success against the world prove to be just as
unimaginable as the world's disappearance from mere represented appearance, which
might mean that the endeavor of external-world skepticism harbors a secret, perhaps
unconscious ideal -justifying painful sacrifices along the way - to affirm and not
destroy. And so, like images that affirm all that they deny, it destroys to find out what is
affirmable.
*
The key factor, I think, that is at work in the world's absence from its own apparent
presence in a moving image is the way in which cinematic representation emphasizes (I
want to say promotes or advertises) the contingency of the world as such, such that no
part of it need purpose, nor any necessary presence beyond being absent, to justify the
possibility of its onscreen existence. Moving images of the world are, in a way, the only
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shadows that pursue their origins full circle in an effort to be cast and possessed by them
once again. In no other medium is the trace of being (the being of non-being) as self-
sufficient and practical, practically self-sufficient, as it is here. In support of this idea it
might even make sense to say, in basic Heideggerian terms, that the Being of the
nonexistent beings onscreen is, as it were, being used, that its necessity with respect to
the persistent grounding of things and living beings in time and space is again put to
work - undergone - by being put on display - exhibited. That the work (or performance)
of Being is exhibited "behind the glass" of a moving image lends this most essential work
(the existing of what exists) the quality of an aesthetic; and it is this sense of there being
an aesthetic to, or something aesthetic about, the mechanical and man-made appearance
of things-in-themselves that Stanley Cavell responds to and so admires in the film Days
ofHeaven (1978) by Terrence Malick when he chooses to come to terms with its
magnanimously indiscriminate and therefore crushing beauty of the natural world by
linking Heidegger's conceptualization of Being with film's innate ontological
predilection for it. After quoting a complex sequence of remarks by Heidegger
(ambitiously in a foreword) on the subject (substance) of Being, beings, and man's
responsibility to think their relation in the world, he expresses the following: "If Malick
has indeed found a way to transpose such [Heidegger's] thoughts for our meditation, he
can have done it only, it seems to me, by having discovered, or discovered how to
acknowledge, a fundamental fact of film's photographic basis: that objects participate in
the photographic presence of themselves; they participate in the re-creation of themselves
on film; they are essential in the making of their appearances."1 Being itself, however,
1 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed, enlarged edition (Cambridge, Mass., and London:
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could have no inherent aesthetic of its own, no position with respect to itself that is not
itself; although if we are inclined to agree with Cavell (either with what he writes about
Malick and Heidegger or what he believes to be true regarding a film as truly unique as
Days ofHeaven) that Malick' s acknowledgement works as an achievement, as a strategic
transposition of Heideggerian ontology, the Being would certainly seem to be amenable
to the point of participating with the rule of almost any aesthetic devised to approach it
for itself, whether it be for the sake of Being or in the interest of aesthetics. (For instance,
one could bring the idea of "silence" to bear on aparticular period of silence, giving it
the kind of meaning typically reserved for acts of speech. That here is a silence that only
we can hear as being silent is, then, what goes without saying.)
*
In a moving image of the world, the concept of Being is activated and hence justifiable
non-philosophically (hence also non-conceptually). That is to say, its automatic
aestheticization through the medium's immersion in the world (ideally with but
potentially without the help of photographic transcription) constitutes the ground of its
own screenedjustification, going without saying more often than not if went without
anyone noticing. Now, generally speaking, with respect to aesthetic appropriations of
moving images, whatever concepts and hermeneutics are deployed as principles of
organization, or form, would seem to flit about the surface oí being qua being, unable to
(justifiably) penetrate the auratic singularity of objects participating in the re-creation of
their own appearances. In order, for an object to occupy a specific place within an order
of significance in a film and function as one of its grammatical elements of expression, it
Harvard University Press, 1979), p. xv-xvi.
104
would have to appear more than once (the same object across different or repeated
contexts or appearances) or more than the object itself requires to appear "as it is" (which
might always be the case if we believe its appearance to depend on the context of its
appearance). The idea behind the explicit repetition or "excessing" of an object lifts it,
without necessarily succeeding to pry it, from the clutches of contingency - the constant
but "contentless" work of Being - so that it can stand for the time being on a privileged
plane of reference and perform its imaginary function.
*
There is a sense in which every thing belongs in a moving image of the world. The
internal juxtapositions between one thing and another are so effortlessly, so smoothly
incongruous that they are almost completely leveled. This cinematic landscape, within
and across images, is an ontologically "democratic" one, which means that any thing, any
moment, at any time and anywhere, can potentially become the focus of various
attentions (a film character's or the filmmaker's or a film viewer's) and move from not
having a purpose in the background or outskirts to now having a significant purpose in
the foreground. But when now becomes then and the present slips away out of view to be
replaced, nothing really changes within this new "now" except the view, or rather nothing
except the view of reality turns out to have an effect on reality. And yet the filming of the
world cannot be said to "write" on the world, through it nor with it. If it could have either
one of these functions, having any of these effects, it could not make into an image the
reproduction of the world as it was when it was filmed. Moving images, then, are the
closest representation has come to literalizing a mediated transposition of the world. The
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world so transposed is perhaps overly involved, with a deterministic influence upon the
forms of its reciprocation by way of a camera.
*
The camera's implication in the world it films calls for a deference of will to the prior
existence of the world (the ease ofwhich is the responsibility of the filmmaker to
interject). But does this mean that the filmmaker has no exact determinable say with
respect to the device he or she has chosen to speak with? Not exactly. The filmmaker can
speak by choosing, let us say, the moment of speechlessness as a response to his peculiar
powerlessness (assuming he has managed to take power over the process of filming),
choosing not just the moment but the means by which he exchanges his will for that of
the world's and starts shooting. For it is the world - where human beings work out (or
don't) their purposes - that can accept and sometimes abide but never fully absorb or take
on an act of will. If it could, we would have no sense of the world as separate from, and
hence a reference point for and possibility of, our sense of reality: a dichotomy so sharply
defined as when two realities intersect in the world.
*
The desire to attribute "will" to the world begins in radical exclamation to the
inexplicable or paradoxical obtrusiveness of contingency, to its boldly demanding
negation of necessity and impossibility that Niklas Luhmann describes as conceptually
problematic insofar as "the two negations cannot be reduced to a single negation." But
the exclamation, however hysterical, has logical substance at its source, and is in direct
2 Niklas Luhmann, "Contingency as Modern Society's Defining Attribute," in
Observations on Modernity, trans. William Whobrey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1998), p. 45.
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reference, I think, to the possibility o/will, the condemnation to the will, and the
immanent interactions and collisions between willing agents. The world does not,
obviously, have a will of its own, but when a particular event occurs in the world it
comes to pass in spite of its lack of objective necessity, which essentially means that what
is meaningful for the agent(s) behind that event, coming to pass in a meaningful way for
those out in front, is potentially meaningless - contingent - to the agents surrounding it or
nowhere near it or perhaps indifferent to it. Acts ofwill break off from the will as an
event is put into motion, and, after gaining enough speed as it were to sustain itself,
stands in spite of the forces that in acting upon it (reciprocating, opposing, participating)
can never succeed to act upon it directly, upon the world now (so the deductive leap
goes) as the total crystallization of action. The weight of the world as a whole is felt to
weigh down or add "world-weight" to the event because the event has become something
of a social microcosm. Emerging solid from the forces that constitute it, the world can
appear to "supervise" the relations between its subjects and objects or "facilitate" stability
through the facility of the one characteristic that is in fact the world's to "will":
immanence, a concept waiting in the wings.
*
A medium that directly implicates the external world, using it as the basis for it, is an
open medium. The camera, by itself, unleashes successive framings of perspective upon
the world after the fact of the world's existence, thus obstructing the injection of concrete
intention into the concrete elements stationed before it. Technologically, at least, the
medium of film comes "unprepared," albeit quite focused, to the extent that the camera
takes its beginning - starting over with the materiality of time and space - in light of an
observation. To begin from within the hold ofa response, regardless of how
predetermined the object of the response, is to invite the element of contingency into the
interior of the representation. The precedence of the object mingles or interferes with the
meaning or function that has been ascribed to it and which justifies it in the image,
keeping the formation of significance in a state of indeterminacy or exploration.
*
Despite the fact that cameras promise the preservation of what is captured, what is
preserved in an image can never absolutely take the form of what was intended to be
preserved because the nature of the camera is such that it beats the filmmaker to the
punch of creation, so to speak, always having an image, as it were, "in mind."
Filmmakers who recognize this fact are in all likelihood not purposive, goal-oriented
storytellers who force images, first and foremost, into fulfilling precise narrative
functions. Rather, in relinquishing a mastery of rational intentionalism for a spontaneous
responsiveness enabled by the automatic nature of the camera, the ambiguity and
unpredictability of the present tense within the reality of the film can be deliberately and
strategically unleashed. But if a moving image of the world is the result, fundamentally,
of a response, then how would one go about determining, from our point of view, which
images function in narrative film as invitations for the disturbance and/or multiplication
ofmeaning? Why, for example, are the films of Terrence Malick or Robert Bresson or
Michelangelo Antonioni more prone to the "lure and threat of contingency"3 than other
directors and even something more or less undirected like a surveillance video, and why,
more importantly, can it be true of only certain images, or moments, from their films?
3 Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence ofCinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the
Archive (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 1 1.
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Perhaps because in a medium that lends itself to showing the visible at the expense of the
invisible they are filmmakers who very often succeed in placing sound above sight in the
hierarchy of response, and who see the hearing in seeing, which requires that the
realization of imagery begin by first intuiting their form (drawing them out in the sense of
luring a threat) before figuring their semantic worth within the currency of the whole.
These unassimilated facts of the film world, facts that precede a purpose or whose
purpose is the very lack of an obvious teleological or thematic one (excluding the false-
importance trickery of narrative decoys like the red herring), have a peculiarly aural
quality about them.
*
The argument that moving image contingency hinges on thefacts of photographic
indexicality (that the filming of objects leaves a trace on film that, when projected,
directly refers to those objects in their absence) is seriously undermined by the
possibilities inherent in the frequently underprivileged aural dimension of a film.
Whether sound is recorded by a microphone built into the camera itself, or from an
external source, or during post-production and laid in long after the fact, sound is the
primary means by which a filmmaker can evoke the porous membrane of the pictorial
frame and delineate aspects of the surrounding, merely invisible world (incoming or
receding away or lingering static) that the camera is in no position to reach (even if it
could infinitely extend beyond what it shows). The frame might be said to "refer" to the
ongoing world by functioning as a "brake"4 against the indiscriminate free-flow of space,
but it is sound that shows how - and a little bit of where - the world does in fact go on
4 Only one of Doane's many evocative metaphors for cinema's rationalization of a
contingency it helps justify. Ibid., p.22.
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(until those facts run out and endlessness is intimated). Good hearing is pure receptivity,
and close attention to the dimension of sound (as a filmmaker or viewer or critic) paves a
way for the invisible to enter the visible and alter the course of a shot, scene or even the
entire film.
*
Contingency is an inextricable factor in the process of recording images creatively and
for creative use. This aspect of contingency, however, is of a fundamental or elementary
type, and is not specific to signs of the deliberate aesthetic use of contingency (as in the
case of Malick's methods for Days ofHeaven), but rather to the possibility of it taking
over the filming process and winning the will of the filmmaker(s) at any moment,
drastically changing some perhaps very made-up minds. This possibility is also tied to
and tantamount with the possibility that any moment from a film can seem contingent,
more found than made, or made by way of first having found. The idea of making
contingency "from scratch" by ceding strategically to chaos is another matter entirely. It
seems to me that the only way of making contingency aesthetically legible, significant
and interesting is to go against contingency despite it. Going in headfirst, sidestepping
intention altogether and becoming skeptical towards the fixation of meaning, is the surest
way of waiting for - and getting - nothing, or of misrepresenting nothingness by filling it
with mere conceit. Chaos, meaninglessness, nothingness, pure existence or bare life -
whatever you want to call it - are nothing, are insubstantial and unnoticeable, without
their opposites - their contingencies - working full force.
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Sensing contingency as a viewer might depend more on a fact that is disconnected from,
although hardly unrelated to, the ontology of moving images: whether or not their making
occurred in the world, in actuality, as opposed to outside the world, virtually, or nowhere
in particular. While the total synthetic creation of a world on computers is by no means
immune or inhospitable to the influence and incorporation of contingencies to
characterize the world of the film as "world-like" (over and above the trajectories of a
narrative), I feel it is fair to say that the possibility of creating a contingent moment or
event authentically, as though it were not created and just happened to occur (which may
or may not have been the case), is somewhat contradictory without the existence of a
contingent world (fit, of course, with the proper historical paradigms) in which lives are
"thrown" without destinies writ large and whose seemingly causal connections within
and between events appear contingent (to the camera or at first glance). It is improbable
that a purely synthetic image will be able to afford an experience of contingency and
through no fault of its own ontology, for it would have been equally improbable for the
virtual epistemology of digital mediums (or automatisms5) to have afforded the maker(s)
with the sorts of encounters with contingency unique and abundant in the world (and
especially in this world). The shooting stage of filmmaking, where a film's images and
sounds get constructed and collected for post-production refinements and manipulations,
has the defining characteristic of depending upon an instrument like a camera whose
usage depends entirely on things external to it. With the camera functioning as a kind of
bridge or conduit between a "behind" and an "in front," the creation involved in the act of
5 This term, extrapolated from surrealism, is used by Cavell in The World Viewed to refer
to the working possibilities of an art form, discovered by artists and then as if donated to
the medium that they discovered it with, and discovered again each time they are put to
significant use.
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recording shots or scenes not only occurs within a state of being-in-the-world but also
stages that very state. The act of filming operates within these conditions of existence
underlying and exceeding any and all forms of expression in the form of a contingent
ground or a ground contingent to them. A virtual mode of imaging does away with the
automatism of being-in-the-world and replaces it with a being-out-of-the-world, a
relationship to the world that appears to place one's being above the world, above and
beyond a concern for and service to the being of the world as such, by placing one in
front of a screen that falsely demarcates a "new world" where mastery over existence -
creating the power for what will exist to exist - is pursued as a final frontier. In response
to D.N. Rodowick's claim that "[There] is no ontological difference between the
information captured by charge-coupled devices [i.e. digital video cameras] and
information constructed on a computer in ignorance of an originating state of affairs,"
there is no doubt a significant epistemological difference between working with a
medium that takes its user into the midst of the world and one that requires its user to
completely simulate a world - a world that exists only insofar as it is made and is made
only to the extent that it fulfills certain logical criteria for existence. That is why
simulated worlds usually contain a lot of "world," so to speak, because of the paradox of
creating the existence that prevails even when there is nothing.
6 D.N. Rodowick, The Virtual Life ofFilm (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2007), p. 123.
7 Avatar (James Cameron, 2009) is the best example of a virtual film that falls into the
trap of creating a world by filling the screen to the brim with details, confusing what
makes a world exist with how much ofthat world can be shown. But since there is no
way to create the existence of even one thing, for the simple reason that it will not exist
for real, it is common for filmmakers to try and compensate for this by creating the
existence of many things one way, operating under the fallacy (and in Cameron's case the
fantasy) that in order to make a world cohere one must make it coherently unified, one,
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Photographic indexicality is only justifiable as the primary criterion for moving image
contingency if it is activated as an automatism (i.e. through stasis or deep-focus or
excessive duration), figuring into the experience of a viewer who ascribes to the image
the power of the objects he or she believes to have been brought back, more or less as
they were. It is possible, therefore, to have an experience of contingency without the
index, but not without an experience of indexicality or "indexicalness," as it were. Such
an experience, I want to say, depends more on the degree in which the claim of
indexicality is made through a qualitative approach to objects, with the consequent
facilitation and perhaps even prioritization of contingency (first by the filmmaker and
then by the viewer). In this theoretical case, and perhaps in every actual case, automatism
will override ontology. (This is in keeping with, and no less indebted to, one of the major
underlying threads of Cavell' s The World Viewed: reflections on the ontology of film
become reflections on automatisms primed by what must be, or become, an evolving
ontology.)
*
Mary Ann Doane states in The Emergence ofCinematic Time that "contingency
introduces the element of life and the concrete, but too much contingency threatens the
crucial representational concept of totality, wholeness. . . The present moment,
contingency, and temporality as indeterminate are hazardous to sense." She goes on to
suggest that the narrative structures that took hold shortly after cinema's technological
not just geologically but politically, with no exceptions to the rule (i.e. manifesto) of its
oneness, making it incoherently non-contingent in all respects.
8 Ibid., p. 12. (Doan's italics)
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advent can be seen as the attempt to rationalize the representational excess of
contingency.9 The codes and conventions designed, in effect, to steer contingency into a
ideological trajectory enforce the same kind of control on the intractable and
indeterminable nature of natural and social reality as statistics does, while resisting the
suppression of the elements of chance that do arise as inevitable or "fair" deviations. It is
the work of narrative, in part, to counter and smooth out the latent effusions and manifest
aberrations of contingency while keeping an eye on the generative unpredictability of
contingency to deliver the vitality of the variation, of the new, so as to unlock the
potentiality of the instant. Statistics and narrative - statistics as the narrative of chance
and narrative as somewhat statistical in function - presume that there is no such thing as
an objective epistemological pursuit because there is no way of creating knowledge
without an audience for whom it can count, and hence no possibility of procuring
anything resembling general knowledge. The resolutions and explanations that are forced
out of contingency are lost as absolute truth if gained at the expense of contingency. But
statistics and narrative walk a fine line; and cases where contingency is beyond
integration but a factor nevertheless testify, I gather, to what Doane refers to with
appropriate humor as the "embarrassment"10 of contingency.
9 For a full appreciation of the complex layering and elegant pace of her historical
argument, I refer the reader to the fifth and sixth chapters of the book, including their
prefacing or staging at the end of the fourth chapter, which contains a brief analysis of the
surprising affinities (as opposed to the over-emphasized and convenient binaries)
between the "realist" films of the Lumière brothers and the "fantastic" forms of Georges
Méliès as turn-of-the-century technicians of the contingent. Classical narrative form, she
concludes, would be a repudiation of both deviations and their respective deviants, almost
in one fell swoop.
10 Ibid., p. 144.
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Moving image contingency is obviously not conceptually commensurate with
contingency itself, but that needn't be the case to proceed with an investigation of the
latter through the former. And since consciousness of the latter may be fundamentally
inscrutable by virtue of being too close to consciousness itself, the former, on its own,
and without the help of teleological structures of meaning, provides that basic
rationalization so crucial, in this case, to the expression as opposed to the organization
and harnessing of contingency. If it is more accurate to say that moving images express
instead of embody contingency, or appear to embody it only when expressed and
experienced on some level by makers and viewers, then it is the "affective temperament"
as opposed to the "lurking ontology" of contingency - what I will want to call,
paradoxically, an anthropomorphism of contingency - that I am responsible for taking as
my cue in the attempt to access the spirit of contingency "itself (which I deem valuable
- "spirited" -for-itself, in a manner and for reasons which will become clearer later on).
The moving image, I think, is an effective cue here because it moves in time and space
and as - as a comprehensive image of- time and space. Moving images (again,
specifically of or about the world), in bearing the qualities of time and space, and as
representations that withstand their own ambition of totalization, characterize or
dramatize contingency by characterizing or dramatizing the world onscreen into
something that seems necessary, governed by the mechanical and immutable laws of its
onscreen replication. The degree to which Aristotle's early albeit enduring definition of
contingency proper holds for moving images, expressive or not of contingency, is
striking: "It can occur, that once it exists, given that it is not necessary, there will be no
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potential in it not to be."11 What a moving image represents is no less unnecessary, with
no less potential not to have been, than anything we might call contingent; but the fact
that it is preserved as a fact before one's eyes (and only one's eyes, hence only on the
surface) has the effect of factualizing what could have been otherwise, reinforcing and
perhaps even aestheticising the lack ofpotential to be other than it is by being or seeming
to be what it was.
*
I accept that the experience of contingency can be a historical issue before a
representational or epistemological or existential one (determined by historical shifts no
less contingent than contingency itself), but only on the condition that I am free to accept,
despite whatever contradictions, that the portrayal and propagation of contingency in
moving images solidifies contingency, bringing contingency to its very limit,
contradicting it (theoretically) with an appearance of profound necessity. The cinema,
then, not to mention the entire virtual spread and saturation of moving images which
follow and extend it, is not just another cultural "symptom" of its own historical context;
but, as the artistic medium par excellence, the one that relinquished its control over space
by accepting the autonomous onslaught of time, the first one to liberate the ontological
synchronicity of time and space in aesthetics, it is the one that stares its own death - its
own inherent and pregnant impurity as an art form - in the face. In doing so, it naturalizes
the intricately complex weave of historical contingency in an ontological way by
picturing the world (the scene of history) as unaffectedly deprived (ontologically
II Aristotle, Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes, vol. 1: The Categories, On
Interpretation, and Prior Analytics, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1983), p. 32.
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deprived) of ontological constants, striking a new restlessly finite or "contingent
ontology" with every picturing.
*
Moving images prioritize existence over meaning with respect to their contents. But that
is to say: the existence of the possibility of meaning is itself meaningful, that meaning
can exist in the form of existence, simultaneously present and absent. If one happens to
be struck by something contingent, something seemingly without decisive meaning,
something relatively ambiguous or neutral, then the very possibility of meaning or
purpose or value in the first place is so strikingly tangible, so actual and immanent, so
obviously meaningful by virtue of being what it is as a first and fundamental priority
before becoming anything else.
*
Tracing our sense of cinematic contingency will necessarily take us beyond the recorded
or composited or synthetically constructed content of a moving image to its circumstance
as an observation, a circumstance that might be more precisely characterized as "the
factual dimension of the medium of meaning."12 This path, however, will not or should
not lead us to rest anywhere near an ontology of the moving image as the locus of
contingency. Instead, this factual dimension of the medium of meaning puts us directly in
front of the sort of image that seems at any given instant of its duration to be directly in
front of- and so close to being at one with - the world itself. Such an image appears to
"want" to lead us back to the cause of its contingency in the rawness of the world, but all
the while an equally significant cause operates out in front, in between it and a viewer,
Ibid., p. 48.
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where an observation is itself observed. I wish to call this phenomenon whereby a viewer
is conscious of observing an observation to the point of observing a representation of
observation the backwards or mirror ontology of moving image contingency.
*
The obviousness of the world's parts is part of what the world as a whole is, or what we
mean in referring to it as one. But in living the world we tend to lose sight of the fact that
no amount or depth of experience can ever lift the surfaces that inspire us into deepest
pursuit. A moving image, in holding the surface of the world at an impassable and hence
permanent distance, can succeed, nevertheless, in holding our attention, reminding us,
perhaps, and in the midst of our absorption, how little we attend to the world in our own
lives, to the world and nothing more - an attentiveness that would be the sole measure,
day by day, of our intimate process through it. The closest point to the screen, therefore,
is hardly the place from which to be in touch with what it shows. The same lesson time
and again: the closer one tries to get to the world in an image the closer one comes to an
image of the world - to an image and nothing more.
*
It is important to remember that the effect of reality in a moving image is an assertion of
the medium for chemical or technical as much as for conventional reasons. Beneath the
appearance of something definite and immaculately recognizable there are no things-in-
themselves to ground a particular experience of the real. As a result, the world onscreen
cannot be said to exist in the consciousness of a depicted person or film character no
matter how much it may appear to be the case, for without the world itself there is no
"ontological material" through which to be conscious or towards which to be
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unconscious. Since an automatic transposition of the world is always already an image of
it, an image with a clear phenomenological as opposed to a metaphysical ontology, it
cannot assume the form of any other reality except the reality of the world in its absence.
This is no longer the same world that we look out at, that we see on the other side of us,
the other half of perception. For this reason it is not a questionable mind-independent
world but a hypothetical one; it would make no sense, for example, to deny it to the
figures and characters appearing there (and on the same grounds that it would make sense
to deny the actual residence - what about the actual appearance? - of figures or
characters in films and film worlds).
*
The human beings found existing within their respective lives onscreen - carrying out
their screen lives in the guise of their characters - are to some significant extent
commensurate with the people - the moving breathing bodies - who undoubtedly lack
this very existence, that is, the conditions necessary for their existence to be on par with
how it appears in moving images of themselves. Screen characters, we "know," are the
embodied lives of the people brought back to us, delivered as they are, so seamlessly, that
they can continue to be as they were when they were filmed. It is through them that the
past, like a ghost, is summoned back into the present as perhaps the most curiously
trasgressive and grotesque aspect of the medium. The exclamation "There is Falconetti's
face!", said while staring at the real woman's tears in La Passion de Jeanne d'Arc (1928),
would not twitch at the tip of my tongue or go so far as to part from my lips as readily as,
say, "Falconetti's face is there," as in "over there" - which actually turns out to be more
of a comment than an exclamation. That her face has accompanied its appropriation into
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the moving image without having altogether survived it, which would be to surpass it, is
exactly the kind of paradox that reminds me just how obvious, blunt, and easy to
overlook even the most indissoluble paradox can be.
*
Screen characters who aspire to deny the world to themselves, or who refuse to recognize
the world as separate from themselves, thus denying themselves to the world, are
uncommon, for they are up against the obstinate evidence of the world's paradoxical
presence in moving images. With respect to the dispositions of nihilism and solipsism,
moving images of the world reveal that the influence of thought in the formation and
fixation of a retaliatory perspective on the world is specific to the thinker whose thinking
clouds instead of clears his or her view of the world. For the rabid nihilist, the world,
although rejected, does not withdraw. For the passionate solipsist, lost to the world as if
left behind, had never been able to break with it in the first place. Neither one made a
dent in their enemy. The world, according to but a few verifications from the existence of
others in not dissimilar relations to it, does not reinforce or reciprocate (I want to say
indulge) the peculiar maladies of narcissistic impulse so degrading to one's intellectual
conscience. But the mind contracts illnesses - drifts out of step or out of synch with
respect to the minds of others -just as the body does. Moods descend unannounced and
stick to us as obstinately and impeccably as our shadows. Sometimes a good night's sleep
is enough to shake off the awkward imbalance, although oftentimes it is nowhere near,
and just as often backfires by slotting yet another brick in the wall. As long as one's
consciousness of the world remains partly clouded by self-consciousness, the less the
world can shine through it, the more it will shrink and dim in proportion to the growth
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and brightening of the self to itself. If only we could see with sharper clarity how
mistaken we are in thinking that we can actually see through and past ourselves to the
world, so far beyond our clouds. Seeing such a sight as us, we could see ourselves from
outside ourselves trapped as the self, trapped inside the body's animation of the T. In the
space of a moving image where we can see ourselves projected, the self appears to have
an "outer edge" or wear a "hard shell" as it delineates inwardness and on certain
occasions punctuates psychosis, bearing the look of solitude or harboring the stuff of
privacy or wielding the enigma of madness. Although such an image never succeeds in
getting behind a face entirely, its derailment at the threshold of interiority - somewhere in
the realm of the close-up - results in nothing short of a detailed, visualized inference of
the view of the intensely singular angle (or point) of another mind. Unable to probe the
depths of consciousness, and yet so certain that a person's innerness begins with their
expression, the hard evidence of even the most absent look has the power to charge the
neutrality of its surroundings into surroundings all its own. The face, it turns out, no
longer stands out in separation from the head. (I'm thinking of the final close-up of
Anthony Perkins in Hitchcock's Psycho (I960).) The entire head - fortified siege of skull
- is now the face; and the "seeping" of the mind onto the world surrounding it, or the
"folding" of the mind upon the world inside of it, touches not those or any surrounds but
rather the senses, the permeable surrounds of the self through which consciousness flows,
all in keeping with Béla Balász's "microphysiognomy of the soul."13 At least this is what
can be inferred from the indistinguishable nature of environments surrounding a human
subject from those which look from the point-of-view of a subject or, in the absence of a
13 Béla Balász, "The Face of Man," in Film Theory and Criticism (fifth edition), ed. Leo
Braudy and Marshall Cohen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 309.
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subject, are their own subjects. Each case survives equally well the powers and problems
of first, third and point-of-view perspectives, be it outside looking in or inside looking out
or just looking.
*
The persistence of the world in moving images is therefore backgrounded. Often it
becomes blurred there when the focus is put on the persistence of a perspective - a
perceiver perceiving - as opposed to the perception. The sharp contours of the head, most
apparent in the close-up, reference the clarity of distortion that is further emphasized
through the containment of a countenance. The camera can only come up to it as close as
the physiognomic point where it appears at once to begin and end its remove from the
world, across the hinge to and from privacy. The stress, however, of deep introspection,
its estrangement and mounting danger in the close-up (again Perkins' face at the end of
Psycho comes forcefully to mind), supports the suspicion of there being no authentic or
chartable place to inhabit outside of one's "place" - the selfs concrete materialization of
the body's separateness - respectively (respectfully) to the places of others. This is one
way, it seems to me, in which we are shown to have, to the extent of being visibly had by
- bound by - a body.
*
In his "More of The World Viewed" Cavell claims that "the myth of film is that nature
survives our treatment of it and its loss of enchantment for us, and that community
remains possible even when the authority of society is denied us." This myth runs
counter to the hermeneutic drift of conventional myth, which uses (and abuses)
14 Stanley Cavell, "More of The World Viewed" in The World Viewed, enlarged edition,
p. 214.
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semiological operations in the naturalization of history. The myth of film as told by
Cavell seems less a type of speech as defined by Roland Barthes in his Mythologies, for
its language (if it indeed can be called one) is more closely aligned in breadth and bearing
to a basis for speech itself: the involvement of metaphysical attributes in the
naturalization of history, or history put at the mercy of the metaphysical. That nature has
survived the entire history of attempts to naturalize history suggests that nature had
barely even had to survive them, that it had never been our true collective subject, never
once put on the stand regarding our ideas and judgments about what should and shouldn't
have significance for us; and that it is humanity alone, one community to another, which
resides in the realm of its own linguistic projections - valuing and evaluating the various
conceptual schémas and trajectories by which the present continues the past into the
future. But if nature's survival is believed to have been "oblivious" to ours, if it is thought
"indifferent" to its disenchantment and hence to our survival on terms of our own
making, then the possibilities of human survival (i.e. changing the criteria by which
survival is achieved) can become quickly relegated to Utopian ideals like "community" or
"nation" or "historical destiny," which all seem to point towards something off in the
distance, to settling a future where something deeper and more lasting than nature is
pictured as enchanted for the first time: Time itself. That real lasting present-specific
change might require a change to the effect of the enchantment of time, begs the
immediate, almost logistical and perhaps unanswerable question of whether or not the
present can serve as an accessible point of intervention upon the time of history, with a
wide enough entry onto the space of time itself or of time passing, or if it is even new -
15 See the section "Myth Today" in Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), p. 109-159.
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present - enough or just the resonance of the past forcing itself through the one way street
of time.
*
One thing that cinema in particular seems to have shown over time is that nature or the
world is never remade or unmade by what we make of it, that what we make of it
epistemologically is actually only what we make of ourselves metaphysically.
Throughout its short but congested and manifold history, the same external world is cast
again and again as a kind of ontological backdrop, regardless of what a particular film's
discourse concludes is different about it - even temporally different about it - by the end.
While a film's characters can undergo change, film itself reminds us that history (the
discourse of change) goes on despite change, perhaps as the very continuum and constant
of change itself.
*
Contingencies onscreen can occur with the same force as contingencies in the world
through a common reaction which, when phrased as a response, goes by the name
"accident." They are given this name at the moment when they cannot be made to fit -
and just as often when they sweep by unfitted - to a world-view premised on covering the
world as a whole. I can think of seven characteristics (or "temperaments" as has been my
preference, but characteristics nonetheless) of contingency that constitute the force to
proceed uninterrupted and stand up to the world we maintain in our everyday views of it
by thwarting our attempts to categorize what is contingent upon those views: spontaneity,
ephemerality, neutrality, opacity, bareness, conspicuousness, and deceptive or non-
indifferent unimportance.
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The shapelessness of time, or one too many shapes for it, hence a scattered abundance of
unregulated crossroads, renders contingency into something of an element out of which
the world seems built, or better yet a principle upon which the world seems organized.
Positive, concrete meaninglessness, as it were, is thus everywhere bountiful and growing
and potentially meaningful. The content of this bare life, everything now contingent to
one's own life, is, however, too overfull and pressing to be freshly or insightfully or even
practically reducible. Meaning made for the sake of substituting the "materiality" of the
meaningless, made in the spirit of subversion or privation, tries to make room for
something to be found missing (amiss) in this burgeoning diversification and
stratification of dormant content - one that must by its very definition include everything
and more, everything on the verge of becoming new but remaining old unless
encountered on that verge - making the case that extreme potentiality is as good as
extreme poverty. To dismiss as an accident a brush with indeterminate plenitude accuses
potentiality of ambiguity, and then goes on to accuse ambiguity for being inadequate to
any working criteria for certainty. The "search for meaning" in a time where contingency
is as much a reality (that is, concrete) as the concept of it, is such that whatever meaning
is claimed to be discovered is likely not to be credited to the type of search that created it,
or that created the conditions for discovering it, so that what appears (cuts) abruptly
(contingently) and without warning along the way of the method, perhaps right in the
midst ofwhat is being selectively sought to then show up conveniently found, threatens
to distress, diverge and perhaps altogether reorient a methodological or existential course
through life into the chaotic panorama of a tailspin ofpure potentiality - and into the life
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of any course whatsoever. With respect to a commitment to facilitate or lubricate the
process of making meaning at whatever cost, instants of contingency (call them aportas)
by the same token can also be the most supplely indiscriminate materials to do so in a
material way, assuming one can find grounds for discriminating between one instant and
another, thus holding offa chain reaction or downward spiral into contingency. And the
search for meaning (as opposed to a meaningful search) takes all the help it presumes to
have received.
*
CS. Peirce says of chance that it is of all things the most obtrusive and manifestly
absolute in our intellectual perceptions.16 Along with being the most "decisive"
characteristics of the indeterminable, obtrusiveness and absoluteness are also the most
seemingly contradictory to that which lacks necessity, for necessity would seem to
obtrude the most upon our absolute freedom or the will. However, chance encounters or
aporias of contingency, upon closer inspection, can be accurately interpreted as circular
expansions or "butterfly-effects" of linear courses of will, especially and most profoundly
within the single opposition of a competing or counter-course. They can also be
accounted for as concrete or crude contradictions to the extent that they do not signify
differently or logically or rhetorically or with any recognizable measure of intention and
hence not yet at all: profusely realized, thoroughly extended, and fundamentally resistant
to a full-out rejection. I said before, however, that when considered with a view to their
source they become, as a whole, the manifest force (call it the crest) of another act of will
that can no longer be traced back to its original agent. Lost in the labyrinth of historical
16 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers ofCharles Sanders Peirce, Vol. 6: Scientific
Metaphysics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 425.
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and material contingency, that original act ofwill (unbeknownst to the agent who
originated it) is hopelessly untraceable, having "snowballed" as it were into a
concentrated and random realization of various combinations of cause and effect that, at
its most obtrusive and manifestly absolute, has entered its final phase of resonation before
dissipating. These material resonances of will - these palimpsests of will - have the
power as pure potential to trigger a single working will without necessarily opposing it.
So the dutiful acknowledgement of a contingent factor or live aporia would do very little
to motivate the will, not to mention reorient its method of encounter - and means of
decisiveness - from thoughts to things. By and large, we cannot seem to break out of this
stance of vacant reflection and meet existence face-to-face - participating with
contingency - until something obtrusively and absolutely significant (non-contingent) is
perceived as punctuating the banal, stirring repetition; but should that (by chance?) occur,
our attention will have been so abruptly piqued that we might not know (in time) if it will
be the response or the reaction of the will to open or close, receive or protect, elasticize or
flatten, consciousness. The crux of the matter, as I see it, does not hinge on whether or
not consciousness is the impoverishment of the will, but whether or not the way it
represents the will in our own experience is representative of the will's power to engage
consciousness in experience, that is, experientially; and, depending on the verdict, if it
actually makes sense, from the point of view of consciousness, to be able to will our
experiences - empowering experience - without necessarily being able to have or grasp
the experience of having done so.
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To be in awe of an experience is to have nothing to offer the experience one is in awe of,
except perhaps to send it into explanation by withdrawing it into consciousness. The last
resort attempt to hold in one's hands what one has undergone gradually becomes
knowledge the means of which cannot simultaneously be held and hence were excluded
in the knowing. But means can't be held period because means never actually take hold
of their ends, which is probably one of the reasons why knowledge is held onto so tightly
and at the expense of its means. The feeling, then, of missing the means to a particular
end - and in general missing the knowledge to become a reliable means to knowledge -
betrays having been in the clutches of an experience that one could not join hands with
however hard one tried and without making matters worse by counting off the degrees of
separation. (These hands seem tied behind the back of sturdiest reflection, tongue-tied as
it were by the body's appeal to the sterile touch of cognition.) The impression that our
strongest experiences are like objects dangling just beyond the span of our reach, that
they are inevitably and therefore fittingly unreachable with respect to an enigmatic sense
of outright otherness, hits with the blunt force of a conclusion. The awed subject is
rendered passive not before the object it knows to the extent that it owns it, but rather as
a subject ignorant or uncertain or perhaps altogether unqualified to approach such an
experience immanently from within as opposed to possessively from outside the span of
its reach to communicate it to itself. The experience as a whole thus faces the fate of
complete and utter wordlessness before even a single word is tried on for size. Worse
than the fear of finding words that are a bad fit is the temptation to leave the whole thing
naked, that is, more or less behind as one found it. Unsure about the place and purpose of
our involvement in the experience that overwhelms us; confused perhaps about whether
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or not this world, so cryptically revealed in its manifestations, is compatible with our
consciousness of it; and skeptical, perhaps fearful, that the use of experience as a form of
mediation and imagination between thought and perception will entail a loss of
consciousness altogether: these are some of the bases of fear itself in the face of what
faces us. (But in the event that consciousness at last subsides in awe, what, / wonder,
would be left of ourselves to respond with? Would there even be a response to speak of,
or in the very least a movement towards one? Or rather only a sense of relief with the
world's presence so suddenly full bringing the temporary suspension of the need to
search for some way to fill it?)
I don't think there is much doubt that passivity is peculiar to the whole of film: the
automatism that is the condition for the making of moving images of the world is
reflected in the condition for viewing the world already viewed. This is the peculiar
condition of animate passivity that Gilles Deleuze in The Time-Image uses to characterize
the viewer as something of a "spiritual automaton."17 1 wish to speak of passivity in a
sense that is similarly peculiar, the sense of it having a sense, a state, with its own
specific message of reply. The passivity of filming and the passivity of viewing what has
been filmed have already been described as sharing an implicitly decisive deference to
the world's perpetual "readiness" to survive and succeed (as if unfazed) whatever
discriminations and manipulations and extrapolations projected upon it (as if against a
wall). "I relate that idea," writes Cavell, "most immediately to my passiveness before the
exhibition of the world, to the fascination, the uncanniness, in this chance to view the
17 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), p. 156.
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manifestation of the world as a whole."18 For makers and viewers alike, depending of
course on their positions and preferences, the state of passivity when operant, perhaps
even when passionate, becomes the basis of a deep fascination with a world that is not
only there to behold but also to be helplessly (uncannily) in the hold of, as if equally
locked behind the glass of an exhibit. This world as a whole, perceived from the
perspective of passivity, is the one that holds for everybody, manifesting distinctly in
each subjectivity as the one we all recognize to exist despite subjectivity, and to which
we therefore invariably turn in an effort to become recognizable to each other and,
perhaps, to belong to each other. This act of outwardly turning towards the exhibition of
the world as a way of turning towards others, that is, others facing the same way, at the
screen as opposed to the face, seems to be at its most intuitive with respect to the
experience of movie going. For it is perhaps the essential contribution or "claim" of
cinema as a whole that the world in which we continue to find and re-find ourselves alive
and living provides the conditions of the possibility of community even when members
choose to exercise the authority of their privacy out in public. (If this is indeed what
happens in movie theaters, it is worrisome that people today seem reluctant to go to the
movies, as worrisome as people who seem reluctant to make movies by getting together
with people on a set, dreading the difficulties and loss of control that come with
collaboration, and anticipating with glee finding themselves solitary in front of a screen.)
But rather than completely break down the distinction between private and public in a
movie theater, forcing an agreement that could never satisfy the demands of both within
this special situation, I shall settle for reading the specific "reply" of this quiet and
18 Stanley Cavell, "More of The World Viewed" in The World Viewed, enlarged edition,
p. 212.
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enclosed passivity before the exhibition of the world as simply entertaining "the public"
on the stage of "the private." Bonding in the dark over a world in common, we cannot
know with whom we are bonding if sitting by ourselves, because the bond is with people
in general over the world inprinciple.
*
I wish to also speak to a sense ofpassivity with respect to the people appearing as
fictional characters or as caricatures of themselves in films. I am not ascribing this sense
of passivity to the characters, however, whose attitudes and interests we, too, become
aligned with and invested in, for or against them; but rather to the human beings onscreen
whose attitudes and interests - and everything else that tells us who they are - are always
unknown to us if known or kept to themselves and, therefore, who are and are not the
sum of their characterizations. The poise of the presence of the human as the character
strikes me as the effect of a certain powerlessness on part of the actor, or as part of acting,
to completely separate who they are from who they play during the exposure called for
by the art of photographed performances. These performances approach purity when the
characters are as flesh around stone; when the actors have tailored themselves (as
opposed to their characters) to the medium of film, showing a responsibility for their role
in a specific film through an understanding of their role in the specificity of the medium
of film, to take their place in the myth of film: All things alive or dead assume the
mystery of things-in-themselves at the moment they are made to appear again in their
own light as light.
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Moving images make possible the opening and capturing of the intervals in the fabric of
the everyday where we truly are passive and perhaps at our most true. These intervals
where we have successfully put our thoughts to rest or are put to rest successfully by our
thoughts - sitting down in the chair of our being while the events of today unfold much
as yesterday, etc. - constitute, to be fair, not only what is most common and recurrent but
also the very backdrop and average temperature, so to speak, of interior life. Upon
entering and settling upon this most silent, perhaps eerily silent of intervals, moving
images discover in the present passivity of the human subject something unexpected and
which I have referred to as its sense: The bare existence of the person onscreen becomes
the form (call it the focusing) not of who or what or why they are but that they are. This
focusing of being brings the being of the person as such into view, but the person is not in
the position (our position) to know that this is what has happened as a consequence. As
viewers we have entered abruptly, albeit silently, as deviously undetected as the invisible
presence of the filmmaker, but in getting a glimpse of solitude it is clear that no part of it
can be entered this way. (Perhaps other ways are just as precise in their impossibility.)
When it seems that there could be no place closer to another person than at the threshold
of their most intimate aloneness, that intimacy can bite back, causing us to doubt solitude
as an accessible form of existence, and doubly hard when it dawns on us that its intimacy
is precisely not ours to share because solitude is existence as we know it still under
formation. Can we know who anyone is when they are no one - not one? Can we know
where anyone is when they are perfectly alone? Does it make any sense to ask or even
wish to know what someone who is by himself is thinking? And is it right to assume that
thought is even underway, to assume that the look of disengagement necessarily entails
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(or denotes) some kind of fastened, deliberate and enforced introspection? When we
wonder what goes on in the mind of another human being we often make the assumption
that there is something going on that is being withheld, while it might be the case that
there is nothing at all to speak of, no secrets as it were being passed from the self to itself
that the person is able or willing to keep track of and care about. Perhaps all that can be
said of this most fundamental state of being by and to oneself is that the condition does
not naturally avail its subject to any basis for insight into itself, and to such a degree that
it can stir curiosity - even obsession - in an outside observer over what consciousness is
when it is intending (swirling with intentionality) as opposed to being intended through
reason. We might be able to guess at how someone is feeling based on the expression on
their face or how they move or don't move, but the guess, however perceptive, is a
breach of trust, a blow to solidarity that fails to disturb us, for consciousness is not
necessarily always conscious of itself. We forget, dodging the fact of the face in front of
us, that we are being inadvertently kept out or left out by the spiraling mask of solitude, a
solitude whose structure is echoed in the barrier that is, so often, the moving image itself.
*
In our interest in the solitary state of the other, we are in the perfect position to forget
what it is like to inhabit a state of disinterestedness ourselves, to have nothing outside of
us (including us) interest us, for the world to go flat and recede and lose its demand.
Moreover, in forgetting this all-important fact, we are also liable to repress a common
motivation underlying and fueling this very forgetfulness: that it through being fascinated
with the cipher of another mind that the opacity of our own self-consciousness can be
cleared into a false transparency, thus delaying a reluctant or fearful return to the
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everyday interval of passivity. Though the clouds of solitude seem temporarily broken by
the rays of other solitudes, the state of solitude itself is simultaneously affirmed - or lit -
by those rays. This is due in part to the way in which our interest in the momentary
specification of other minds or the otherness of the world necessitates the condition of
our separateness from otherness, separateness being the necessary criteria for otherness.
Even if we end up somehow marooned in the wild abandon of complete and utter
astonishment, the closest we ever come to leaving our own minds behind is by escaping
into them as in a fantasy. Consciousness of otherness, but particularly consciousness of
the otherness of consciousness, creates a compromise that, in the last analysis, cannot
really be judged unfavorable (although we might deem it diminishing) because
compromise is precisely what consciousness is (in the Kantian sense) or does (in the
Husserlian and Heideggerian sense) in order for us to have consciousness at all. Because
the potential of consciousness can, in principle, horribly compromise (by burning) the
integrity of the subject, the part of the self that preserves the self (call it the tyranny of the
T) aspires to protect the self from its encounters with otherness by licking wounds into
boundaries. This requires that it do one of two things, or react in one of two ways, in the
event that its power of mediation is taxed to its utmost limits: either identify itself
wholeheartedly with the body and go limp, or wholeheartedly with the mind and
dissociate. We might hate on this "part"19 of ourselves, want to accuse it of stagnating our
growth, for rendering us impervious to change and hostile to surprise, for shelling up the
flying strands and flames of the spirit, but only when it is convenient for us to do so, that
is, within the quiet aftermath of the compromise itself when we are safe from our flames
19 On top of not knowing what to call this part, I am reluctant to pin down in a word
where and who it is in relation to us.
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and believe, quite hypocritically, that danger is the only path to salvation from the
inhospitable realm of the everyday. This part of ourselves that holds onto the self is the
part of the self that fears losing our selves, losing hold, and is the cause of much regret.
The fear of death, in this sense, is not the fear of passing from life, but right into the heart
of it, into an instant of pure absolute life where one's life - life itself- flashes before
one's eyes (as they say). And it's not simply the fear of losing control over one's life
either, but not being able (lacking the means) to become and, more seriously, to want to
(to strive to become those very means).
*
The fear of death and the fear of change become one and the same when a single instant
of a phase or a life becomes the point after which there can be no return to the land of
preceding instants. The fear comes from the deep, irrepressible intuition that death and
change are incomprehensible outside of dying and changing, and that dying and
changing, despite preparation, are to a large extent undergone in an instant, the last
instant where "we are who we are." But that final instant is doomed, in the end, to
misrepresent the entire continuum, an entire phase of a life, for it is set up to be indulged
to the max as the only one worth accounting for, as if endings ended conclusively as
opposed to abruptly and the self attained wholeness only at the moment of its
disintegration (after which there could be no evidence to the contrary). The problem with
these limit scenarios is that they cast thick concealing shadows across one too many
degrees ofparticularity (hence of separation), making the whole scale appear to slide
away from the tip turned beacon. Now all ends shine as two neighboring stars whose
blinding light commands the most covetous attention to where no soul could actually find
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itself alive (though it might be able to imagine, indulging itself to the max in doing so).
Meanwhile, darkness reigns across the jurisdiction of the everyday, plunging where we
can and do live into iciest obscurity, and with it the magnanimous struggles (more or less
lost to history) of lighting our days from within.
*
A passion for precision with respect to one's observations originates in, and is further
inflamed by, the dispassionate capacity of consciousness to hone in, scrutinize, constitute,
and eventually altogether forsake its object. For the scrupulously detached type of
observer, this capacity can be strategically wielded as an epistemological safeguard,
preventing the outpour of any excess motive, investment or fulfillment by conditioning
the passion of the observer whose integrity and discipline in the face of chance is perhaps
more important when knowledge of the world is being valued as opposed to, say, self-
knowledge. Precautions against the disproportionate implication of the subject in the
object of study certainly belong to a valid enough method for epistemological pursuits
organized around standards of objectivity, but that doesn't necessarily make them sound
even if the methods employed satisfy all our criteria for what soundness is, because the
subject's inescapable (albeit non-phenomenological) basis of influence upon an object
and the object, in turn, reflecting that influence back upon the subject is being forsaken -
stared through or conveniently bypassed or crudely comprehended - and at the same
time, quite necessarily (and perhaps a bit phenomenologically), as the object itself as a
whole is lost sight of. This is never a coincidence and therefore, at the very least, ought
not to be dismissed by one. The standard of objectivity commits us to an extreme poise
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that calls for some rather unpleasant pretense in order to passionately perform the magic
trick of self-effacement.
*
In seeing something that releases the full force of sight, is it nevertheless possible through
sight alone to find oneself out as if dragged by the world's surf, amalgamated, baptized
by the world, to be returned not unlike a piece of driftwood to our shores, no longer of the
land nor anymore of the sea? Since the activity of seeing is, all too often, ruled by rote
and hence anticlimactically harmless, the near absence of any impact or disorienting
intimacy as a result of it points not so much to the weakness of sight to put us who see
back in touch (in a touching relation with the world) and set us down where the real
pavement starts, but rather to the effectiveness or strength of sight in bringing the world
close without us having to close in on it, when all we want to do is see instead of
experience it. Whether or not this is what we want of sight does not change the role of
sight (at least as we typically see it play out): to sort out the field of intelligibility, our
inextricable relation with the stuff of perception, and establish a more linear connection
between cognition and experience via the senses. An analogy from spectatorship in the
visual arts would be the instinct, perhaps lasting no more than a split-second, to perceive
a perfectly realistic painting as if it were no different than a photograph. Here, the act of
seeing shoots past what is there on the canvas and what that canvas actually is - a
painting - to what it is of, as if the painting itself were somehow in the way or obstructing
the view.20 Such a misrepresentation or misstep, in this case and in others less formal, is
20 The example, I realize, isn't that good because the same practice could occur while
viewing a photograph, as if it were no different than reality. But since photographs refer
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no less attributable to an irresponsible - insofar as it is dangerous - use of the power of
sight as a window to rest against. The danger is that the complacency incurred (and
perhaps relished) by the near self-sufficiency of sight entails being "used by" sight to
fulfill its role to present the world through, as opposed to with, the "glass" of the eye, and
have a gullible or blind faith in seeing.
*
That good things come to those who wait is the myth of revelations, despite the virtue of
patience promoted. He who waits in the forest for the animals to venture forth from their
secret abodes could, upon patience paying off, easily mistake his anxiety for that of
astonishment. But even astonishment, to the extent that it isn't completely reducible to
mindless thrill in the face of the wildly new, admits within the astonished a truth-feeling
that, however profound and perspicuous and promising, is inevitably superficial - merely
a promise - to the person who had not worked out a precise enough reason for setting out
to discover a solution to or even a sign of a problem and thought that good things would
come by simply waiting out the bad. The brutal irony here is that trust in a so-called self-
manifesting and hence self-evident truth, as nothing more than a conception of truth as
some sort of "metaphysical rhetoric" of revelation, is aproblem - the problem of
positioning not just truth but also human experience outside the reach of language so that
the conception of truth as "that which holds despite experience" can stay held. Patience
can take on an air of cleverness, assuming its own form ofrhetoric, when used to
strategize the moment of wildest abandon if one doesn't know quite what to expect, or to
want, from yielding to the unknown. Not knowing what to do with or about an insight
to reality, perhaps viewers can be excused for putting the latter first, although not,
perhaps, at the expense of the existence of the former.
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after it has arrived as if out of the blue is not the result of not knowing how to make it
apply, but rather of not knowing why it needs to work at all, that is, for anyone else
besides. Thus the most significant first step of the process of learning from one's own
experience is to keep fresh insights from staying secrets to language and, as Emerson
might advise, find the intuition the appropriate tuition. This does not mean that the insight
or intuition should be rushed off into expression, for that would only exacerbate the
whole problem of prematurity. The idea, ideally, would be to wait (exhausting as opposed
to manipulating patience) until one has thoroughly understood one's experience in terms
of its "thought" - grasping the circumstances of one's understanding - before giving
oneself cause to think everything through and aloud. But, in a not so ideal world, the
person doing the explaining or demonstrating will need the explanation or demonstration
to satisfy his or her own understanding as urgently as anyone who does not understand at
all what was said or written before it was shown that it happens. All this to say that what
we do after an idea has been felt or observed as an intuition or insight is as significant to
it as, and thus a possible continuation from, what we did before catching hold of it to
have been the appropriate net for it.
*
To approach or conceptualize the world as a closed circuit of forces flowing beyond the
purview of language (despite "the world" we construct within language) is the prize (but
no less the price) of skepticism. Part of the price is that one's presence to the world
becomes a martyrdom for the survival of the world as purely and unambiguously
knowable. As for the prize, the world that is won is not necessarily this one here and now,
but still only some or other world, or the world "in theory" and "absolutely" within which
consciousness cannot dwell - finding itself at home on the fringe precisely at the point
where it can have no doubt. Descartes, in winning his existence from skepticism, goes on
to trust that he is as long as the conditions for existence that survived the onslaught of an
indiscriminate or absolute skepticism maintain. Those conditions state that because he
thinks he must therefore exist, which means that he only exists on the condition that he
thinks. But by virtue of existing in this way, "he" (all he has to exist by) is profoundly
(not just theoretically) subject to anything and anyone, real or not, that he cannot think
away no matter how hard he might philosophically try. Even if everything that comes to
him through his senses - the world - is suspected of being the designs of an "evil genius"
who wants nothing more than to thwart his quest for an absolute foundation of
epistemological certitude, he is bound to be there in good conscience to acknowledge
what he may or may not take for knowledge and, in the process, confront the possibility
of his own (the subject's) contingency in the world.
*
Contingency awareness (of the world, of oneself in the world, and perhaps in that order)
can compromise the sturdiness and overall health of the will. It does so not by directly
circumventing or sedating the will's commitment to necessitating its existence, but rather
through a form of self-consciousness with respect to the will that substitutes a mosaic of
parallel and continuous willing agents for a more static and coherent and, as it were,
global picture of the world. The world as a metaphysical base upon or within which
various interactions play out day to day is here transformed into an infinitely layered and
borderless continuum whose instants are the manifestations of agency. Awareness of the
contingency of the external thus commits the subject to an awareness of the necessity of
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the internal, albeit a necessity that is no match (at first) for the contingency that gave
birth to it, for the outside rule of contingency is such that it takes on an illusory necessity
which impedes as much as it promotes the freedom of the will (or promotes by way of
oppression as opposed to censorship). Therefore, any and all acts of will that are
disproportionate (i.e. willed disproportionately) in the context of the grand scheme of
human agency are trivialized down to their actual size - the size, shape and weight of the
single individual instant - the moment the effects or consequences of those acts take on a
life of their own (i.e. in the world of another life). This process of trivialization, however,
invariably begins, it seems to me, within the psychology of the agent: A single individual
will loses sight ofthefact that the continuum referenced by the excess of effort taken to
stand out from it, or leave a trace in it, or simply take part in it, is ultimately comprised of
equally singular subjects. And as long as these subjects, regardless of their authority, blur
for the will into a single and self-sufficient continuum, as long as others in the world
cease to figure in the very idea of a world present for all, this false collectivity will
conjure, in turn, and regardless of the sensitivity of its members, an effect of trivialization
for that individual. This effect reaches the frontier of the individual conscious of
contingency (that is, of the mosaic of agency) in frighteningly no time at all because it
entersfrom within in the form of his or her anxiety over the paradox of his or her own
necessity.
"Contingency," writes Agnes Heller, "feeds on the dissatisfaction of modern men and
women; constancy in dissatisfaction is the manifestation of contingency."
Dissatisfaction is not the feeling of being empty, right now and no assured means of
fulfillment, but rather of being left empty, after the wearing off of fulfillment or due to
the failure of an attempt at fulfillment. What differentiates the latter is not just the shift in
tense to a past state of affairs (coping with a bad aftertaste, having a memory of coming
up short) but, more significantly, the uncertainty in the present as to what exactly went
wrong in the will, which can be a rather constructive way of inquiring into the cause(s)
behind the perpetual renewal (and perhaps even the significance) of disappointment. We
want to know the general prognosis regarding the potentiality (call it the health) of our
existence in the world (being in a contingent world, contingently being in a contingent
world) so that our plight can become our purpose: the constant cultivation of personal
ideals rather than the never-ending or hypothetical or purely imaginary pursuit of them.
We want to know where we stand so as to better understand where we are and where we
might go, which will determine, perhaps, how we can stand with respect to each other
and keep the same company no matter where we end up. We want answers to these
questions, at bottom, so as to know what it is safe for us to want, what it is within us to
achieve before we set out to achieve something without knowing beforehand if it is
possible or, if it is, whether or not it can be sustained over time and, if so, stave off a life
of solitude. An achievement, as I understand it, is deceiving as a mere success, for all
successes declared as possessions - logged, as it were - are to be found in the past. From
there they can do very little, and amount to almost nothing for their owner, as they
21 Agnes Heller, A Philosophy ofHistory in Fragments (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.:
Blackwell Publishers, 1 993), p. 29.
142
successfully litter the present with shadows, darkening the horizon of the will by
surrounding it with the delusion that the mere repetition and consolidation of past
fulfillment is more important than the struggle it fundamentally depends on. The only
kind of success fit for transport into the present is the success one becomes as a result of
whatever successes one wishes to bring but ends up leaving behind. (There is, after all, no
limit on what we can bring because there is no basis in which to become what we bring.
We, as it were, embody that limit and keep it at zero if we choose to know and respect
what our limits are.) Here lies the power, infinitely greater than the possession, to
succeed even the success of one's self. The successful achievement that takes the self as
its own successor is thus better described not through any material terms, but rather as a
turning point after which one's life, and only then, is the accomplishment of it. In the end,
if we want to feel a sense of accomplishment before, after and during, regardless what
we're doing, we must continue to accomplish what we have accomplished; we must
never assume that we have accomplished anything that we say we have, despite all we
have to show for it. But the only accomplishment for which these paradoxical criteria
make any sense is the accomplishing of the self, the striving of the self through, into, and
out of life. It is accomplished, paradoxically, when our disappointment satisfies us, when
contingency calms us (more on this later) - when we have earned the right through our
deepest and heaviest and most self-directed efforts to be disappointed with the lack of our
perfection (not our imperfection but rather our failure to perfect what we deem, for a
time, perfect) so that tomorrow may be rejoiced, and then the day after tomorrow. Today,
both tomorrow and the day after are uncertain as commensurable days in their own right,
which is to say they are indiscernible from each other in the near future, contingent. But
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for all its distinction, today is as uncertain (spared of tomorrow's contingency by nothing
more than the contrivances of the calendar for a spinning planet) because we do not have
cause - today is not the necessary cause - to look forward to them - one by one - for the
best of reasons. Those reasons could have us looking ahead in our own calendars, no
longer in anticipation but presciently this time, giving ourselves the right to have cause
(as the cause) to celebrate the days (steps) to come at the morning table of today.
*
"From contingency to necessity - this is the way of all problematic individuals."
*
In 1844, in an essay entitled "Experience," Ralph Waldo Emerson asked this question:
"Where do we find ourselves?"23 He was far from the first to do so. His age was far from
the first to find itself lost, somewhere in between where it has been and where it is headed
or, somewhat less successively, where it was and what's to come. And he was far from
the only one willing to face the deeper, more cumbersome question ofhow - on what
grounds - one should persist in finding a way out (in or to or back or around). At the
beginning of the 14th century, Dante seems so sure of being precisely nowhere (perhaps
as close to something as unreachable as Paradise as anywhere) that he begins The Divine
Comedy with a confession so casual that it could pass for a greeting between strangers:
"Midway along the journey of life / 1 woke to find myself in a dark wood, / for I had
22 Georg Lukacs, Soul and Form, trans. Anna Bostock (London: Merlin Press, 1974), p.
21.
23 Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Experience," in The Portable Emerson, ed. Carl Bode in
Collaboration with Malcolm Cowley (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1981), p. 266.
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wandered off from the straight path."24 Emerson's question, perhaps for being the later of
the two, and perhaps also for being such a simple question with such a complex tone of
irony and sincerity, sounds to me that much more solemn, disappointed. It's the kind of
melancholy sentiment that has been disguised as a question time and again, and answered
again and again with the same ambivalent urgency, but only for whatever it is that gets us
worrying about our potential for progress to come back again, sharper now than ever
before, and increasingly double-edged: Can a question such as Emerson's and a
confession the likes of Dante's - whose answers and responses have not only failed to
curb suspicion but added fuel to the flow of suspicion over an entire history of signs
clearly marking acts of human progress and regress (both separately and in tandem) - be
asked seriously (positively and with soul) anymore, and thus be spared the costly fate of
becoming permanently rhetorical, triggering pessimistically ironic sigh-like responses
such as "lost" or "stranded" or "exiled" or "nowhere" to the crucial human question of
how much fate is ours to decide: Where do wefind ourselves? (Perhaps it would be worth
testing the extent in which contingency has come in between us and our language, if it
has come from the space created (or torn) between language and the world.)
*
So, where do you think we currently find ourselves? - Why do you ask? - Because we
have not moved. - But how could that be? - We are not the answer to our very own
question. - Fine. Let's state the question then, the matter, simply and sincerely, as you
see it. - Watch. Why are we not, and nowhere near, where we want to be? - 1 take it that
we can all speak for ourselves on this count, but I will grant you the philosophical
24 Dante, The Divine Comedy, in The Portable Dante, ed. and trans. Mark Musa (New
York: Penguin Books USA Inc., 1995), p. 3.
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tradition to which this question belongs, specifically the branch of existentialism that tries
to start philosophy again, as if from nothing, by associating the crisis of meaning, or
meaninglessness, with nothingness and the symptom of nausea. But I want to answer
your question with another question, for your question, simple as it is, is insincere to the
extent that it does not ask to be answered before its gravity is thoroughly weighed: If,
then, it is just as true that we can find ourselves unfound, if Dante and Emerson and
Lukacs and others too innumerable can be said to know the coordinates of this and
perhaps their own lostness, what then is the point of implying that we are lost if it
prevents us from finding ourselves at a loss? - At a loss for what? - For words, for
starters. - But we don't stay lost to them for long. - Yes, which is why as soon as we start
to reach for them we stop the search for experiences to replace them with, new ways of
being at home at a loss. - You mean the experience of being in the dark that called for
them in the first place? - And which is irreplaceable. - Because it is irretrievable. - So
we cannot be in two places at once, lost and found. - It seems it's the two people we
cannot be, for what we want and what we get are two separate things. - Perhaps in
between the wanting and the getting, our thoughts and our words, our actions and our life,
we find our selves. - Each chasing the other's dream. - Each the other's better half.
*
Striving, though it might swell at the heart of desire, functions as the heart of realization,
but our heart's desire is not always in the activity of realization. Out of the same tendency
for backs that labor to waver and go limp, striving dips in and out of consciousness as it
were, taking steps forward and backward out of a fundamental inability for he or she who
strives to remain still. But why is striving so painfully laborious? Why must we push
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ourselves to strive in a particular direction? And what stops us, once in motion, from
moving in stride with ourselves, from keeping up and seeing through, taking our actions
one step at a time - taking our time - so as not to stress them the louder? Why is the fruit
of this labor - our living labor - an unacceptable reward when reaped, inedible and
offensive and sometimes even depleting to one's verve? And how is it that boredom,
amidst this potential, has become the most natural, hospitable and home-like, despite the
suffering? This storm of questions - none of which are meant nor could ever be enough
to put just anyone down, or justify regret, or set a standard for resignation - has its eye, I
think, within the eerie quotidian quietude of boredom where the mystery can be written
as follows: What is it that we do when we aren't doing anything, while doing nothing,
inescapably being, just being, when we could be doing so much more but not any less,
boredom being the absolute limit of what we can't not "do"? First, we must dispense with
the breaking impression that boredom is laziness, for although it's the case, perhaps all
too often the case, that the two are sometimes synonymous with each other that they are
not worth distinguishing anymore, "laziness," the word, aside from typically referring to
an action as opposed to a state (compare "I am being lazy" with "I am being boring" and
watch their common sense split and start to drift), has the function of laying judgment -
and what judgment is not necessarily a bit premature? - upon the peculiar time and space
of boredom. The critic, blinded by the utilitarian belief that doing nothing is akin to not
doing anything, which is akin to being useless, perceives the scene of boredom as static,
shapeless, barren and paradoxically both wasteful and destitute; all the while overlooking
a fundamental mode of being in its own right - and one of the most contagiously human
at that - where self-consciousness and unconsciousness clash as heaven and hell on earth.
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And yet, despite this apocalypse of consciousness, no other experience can come and go
so quickly and easily, or idle away so casually and calmly and near harmlessly (again,
despite the extreme tension); and it is unlike any other in this way in that it's the only
experience whose dynamic is both singular and self-sustaining. All other experiential
dynamics are reducible to phenomenological intersections, and to inhabit such an
intersection is to be a participant in a physical encounter. There, one emerges into a
crossroads where there is an important decision to be made about whether or not to seek
mindfulness of the other participant - a complete and living spectacle of otherness. But to
be bored, especially when at ease as opposed to at war with boredom, is to dwell outside
such decisions - as if in a state of exception or immunity - to the extent that one is
therein not facing or being faced with anything other to oneself, which is the result of the
decision not to expose one's face or relinquish one's perfect faceless potential by
dissenting to the critic's conviction that one must do in order to be. What is "decided" in
boredom, then, is to be no one, not one, not the one who one is to oneself before others,
and to let things pass, doing nothing out ofthe ordinary while never succeeding to do
nothing absolutely. (The anxiety of boredom that is part and parcel of not being definable
to ourselves, where self-consciousness falls short or altogether contradicts criteria of self-
definition, keeps us from realizing that absolute, leaving intact a certain immemorial
nostalgia for it - the tranquility of total anonymity). Bored, the slumber of being to or for
oneself (avoiding being as oneself) is disturbed and made restless by stubborn knocks to
become this or that, otherwise or more, to become measurable and identifiable to others
and thus to oneself, but for what? If boredom is consciousness at its most intelligible and
transparent, to what end must we depart from it, and for what purpose has boredom itself
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been set by us as an alarm typically timed to go off well before anyone - conscience
included - dares to knock? The potential endlessness of boredom tells us that there is no
being told, and we cannot tell ourselves the truth of this matter, for consciousness has
already broken the structure of being as truth has broke with Being itself.
*
What, for what, is this doing, our decisive doing - the thought and action of all human
striving? What is it to do something and then have that thing done and move onto the
next thing? The always-pressing question of what to do seems rather petty, lighthearted,
in the very least premature, in comparison to what, if anything (like a thing, ontologically
"thingly"), doing does. To ask "What does doing do?" can nevertheless seem severely
strange, as some sort of misplaced questioning of praxis or delusion of skepticism (or
perhaps more accurately of the merely and frivolously skeptical). The question, no doubt,
is an act of skepticism aimed at the nature of the will, although one might still want to say
of it that it merely fuels skepticism itself, that is, any form of skepticism whatsoever, and
therefore does not truthfully ask a question. Should one commit to this doubly skeptical
position of questioning the grounds of certain questions, the questions "what is doing?"
and "what does doing do?" might not be given the benefit of the doubt, and the person
who asks them might then be regarded as less concerned with an answer than with the
ability to pose questions unsuspectingly and hence gratuitously. But that would be
assuming too much, or assuming as unscrupulously as the question was thought (hoped)
to be skeptical. It would be much simpler if the question by itself, that is, on its own
terms, could reveal itself as being empty; but the fact that it can be asked, that the point
of asking it has been more or less logically reached, fills it with potential importance and
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guidance. But how are we to tell the difference between questions asked skeptically and
those asked accurately, as a result of or as a response to a very real problem (skepticism,
for example)? In answering this question let's try asking not the original question but the
questioning itself. What could spur the question "What does doing do?" Perhaps when it
becomes apparent to us that, as doers, we own nothing through which to do anything with
or about what we have gone on to do, that we lack the precise means (call it the
instrument) to return to what we've done and reclaim it as the person who both did it and
did not do it. Does this mean that we must ultimately fail to satisfy what we managed to
accomplish? The burden of having to begin all over again could be significantly
alleviated ifwe knew where best to end up, that is, how to end up not just at the end but
in it somehow. But in order to know where that end is - how to end up in the form as
opposed to the guise of being done - one would first have to know if one could tell the
difference between an ending and a new beginning. My intuition is that the first clue to
having come full circle as opposed to having closed a circle off might be a relatively
consistent (to the point of being consistently relative) sense of calm. The calm of not
being able to have any regrets about what we have done, calmed by every anticipation
over what we will do to continue doing what we did, as if what doing "did" was do our
future in with a life full of unfinished business . . . But this is so much speculation, easier
said than done (especially when "doing" is the subject spoken), and no less the quickest
way out of skepticism.
*
What keeps us from realizing our "worlds"? Is the world itself relentlessly and
overpoweringly standing and single, or is there something amiss, merely half-lived in our
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efforts to live in it? Or does the matter bear less on the fundamental limits and constraints
of our condition in the world than on the unconstrained limitlessness of the desire to
escape that condition? Do we, in general, and for whatever reason, avoid the labor of
realization, discounting its prospect by deeming the sweetest of fruit too difficult to grow,
opting instead to wait for our lives to start in a perpetual meantime the hospitality of
which is total, demanding that we do nothing to cultivate the immanency of the future
within a present overgrown with the unfinished business of the past? This could go on.
There are numerous sides to the complex suspiciousness of our great and monumental
potentiality. The point is, rather, that we do not appear to know, can't picture aloud, nor
have any basic reference for a life lived in one name only - the name we call our/selves
and never our lives - as if life remained its own property regardless of who or how it is
lived.
*
Are we not responsible (somehow accountable to ourselves) for using the words we say
(and presumably mean to others) to convey the intention to act on them, for was it not so
that to have said them was to have acted by them? Is it not our responsibility, and if
necessary our duty, to keep the promise that words are so that expressions formed can
have meaning beyond, beyond the consciousness of meaning? But under what
circumstances could the keeping of this promise necessarily translate into the structured
silence of realization, where a beginning is finally built according to plan? Language
inspires us not to overcome it but rather to use it further, to expand and transform our
vocabulary as a way of rejuvenating our experience. Such inspiration, however, runs the
risk of fusing language with experience by confining or reducing experience to language,
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which might keep us from discovering what our language might mean if we could just
stand by what we said. We can say whatever we want, and anything is speakable as long
as we have managed to lay our mind's eye on it, be it from a distance or up close, and
imagine, vividly or not, what we are trying to talk about. But the sense of meaning, at its
core, is entirely dictated by the rules and conventions - the structure - of the language
that frees it into speech. Perhaps there is another sense at work, beneath the meaning of
the words, regarding what a speaker can actually want from meaning, harboring only the
vaguest sense of what meaning might entail should its promise be kept, or followed, in a
movement away from language altogether.
*
To live a life in which it is possible not only to speak but act with fluency requires taking
to task the promise of language by overcoming all the excuses and justifications and
explanations contagious to the contingency of language. It is difficult to take the right
kind of responsibility for what we say when the only functioning import of language is
grammar and where the lone tie between language and the world is that of history. That is
why realization is fundamentally a commitment to forever contending with the
appropriation of contingency into necessity; and yet, as is the case with any big decision
or sacrifice, something fundamental to the selfs contingent condition is lost, however
much for the best, for good: the fantasy of an absolute or non-conditional freedom,
impossible possibilities of starting over at any time and place, achieving all, and
becoming one's destiny, in a word, realizing one's world. Transforming contingency into
necessity no longer condemns us to absolute freedom but to absolute finitude as the
condition of freedom. And although finitude provides the freedom to chart, pursue and
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expand one's limits, it is a freedom won from the fact that limits get pushed by respecting
instead of opposing them. The freedom in fmitude is thus freighted with the fact that one
cannot logically oppose oneself without being, in part, the newer self. The price of
finding oneself always lost in between one self and the next self- midway through life,
off the straight path, in a dark wood, awakening - is that what appears as the realization
of a world is nothing more or less than a process of self-realization.
*
The desire to anthropomorphize contingency and honor the world with a will (the will
that opposes our will to create it anew) in a time when humanity has reclaimed the power
of will for itself alone (thus, as it were, anthropomorphizing itself), is a response to the
realization that the substitution of contingency for necessity, of possibility for
impossibility, of self-creation for self-sacrifice, has the consequence of bringing about a
peculiar and unprecedented bareness - a conditioned (or contingent) necessity - to life
itself, causing the will to turn against the necessity of contingency to mold that bareness
into an image worthy of the will's total emancipation. But this infinitely complex
nakedness, this metaphysical nakedness, this uncultivated wildness of contingency, will
also "accidentally determine" in the end, our progress along the infinite scale of degrees
across which a form of life capable of will can become the embodiment of its will. As the
foundation of our freedom, contingency gains the force of determination over our
freedom (as the law of freedom) because freedom in the context of fmitude requires the
friction of "how things are" and "who one is" - the absence of illusions within the clarity
of intellectual conscience - to keep it from a wholesale identification with raw
potentiality. The idea here, if it can be put this way, is that the will can will what it wills,
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nothing stops it from willing what it can, but in the end we will what we will (if we will
at all) and at the same time, it would appear, as the possible passes into the actual,
presencing presences, becoming becomes. "For our relation to the world, to brute power
and to naked pain, is not the sort of relation we have to persons. Faced with the
nonhuman, the nonlinguistic, we no longer have an ability to overcome contingency and
pain by appropriation and transformation, but only the ability to recognize contingency
and pain. The final victory ofpoetry in its ancient quarrel with philosophy - the final
victory of metaphors of self-creation over metaphors of discovery - would consist in our
becoming reconciled to the thought that this is the only sort of power over the world
which we can hope to have."25 The highest expression of will, which isn't necessarily its
highest achievement or apotheosis, would be the will to recognize, perhaps while bending
the world to one's will, that only the coming-to-pass and not that which comes to pass,
the experience o/the event and not the content of the event, is within the reach of the will
to will again as if for the first time. It is for this reason, I think, that Nietzsche often
approached the pure act of will as an affirmative instead of a purely creative act.
*
How can we humanize our being in the world without anthropomorphizing the world
itself? This question presumes a number of things on both sides of the equation. First,
that human beings have a reality that is separate from the world, a reflection or refraction
of it. Second, that this reality is comprised of our conscious and unconscious making.
Third, that it is primarily about what we feel and think and need as beings struggling to
25 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge, Mass., and New York:
Cambridge University press, 1989), p. 40. (Rorty's emphasis)
26 See Book Four of The Gay Science, p. 221-275.
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master an existence in which we are thrown, which is why the world can sometimes
appear to come in between (for better and for worse) us and our world. The question then
goes on to presume, or wager, that human consciousness and the world in which humans
find themselves conscious intersect at a bad place or in a bad, combative way, such that
the constitutive capacity of consciousness is called upon to interpret, over-determine and
dominate its surroundings at whatever cost to ethics and truth. Call this cost cruelty - to
others by way of misguided retaliation and/or to oneself by way of self-serving self-
deception peaking with narcissism. Finally, the question seems to rhetorically imply that
human beings should not anthropomorphize the world, or risk confusing our conceptions
of reality with it as a result of our attempts to make the world a habitable place, that
humanization should remain a human affair. I can accept this conclusion as extending
from the preceding points, but do not know how much to agree with it despite knowing a
bit of the grounds, an extension of not knowing how much "space" actually exists
between reality and the world independently of how we refer to them (slightly but
significantly distinct in our everyday usage). Perhaps it is the case that space of this kind
can only exist within a reality where room has been made for the world to interject with
fresh opportunities for cross-reference from the outside and self-consciousness from the
inside. To take our making sense of the world to apply to the world itself would be to
take the world to be that which lacks sense as opposed to our being in it; and to make
sense of our being in this sense is to call upon our imaginations to humanize reality by
becoming more human in a world that need not show signs of corroboration (i.e. take on
human qualities) for humanization to matter. By letting the world take credit for our own
architectures of existence we relinquish our ownership of them, hence the power - and
155
maybe even the right - to draft up new plans upon changing our minds for how best to
endure. But as long as we continue to try to make sense of things there is always the risk
in doing so once and for all with a permanent metaphysical plot. I also sincerely doubt
that anyone, if given the chance in their quest for truth, would actually know how or even
want to know the truth of their own magnanimous disillusion or make disillusionment the
condition of all knowledge, especially if the question ofhow best to endure is known to
lay buried somewhere within disillusionment itself. It seems, therefore, that to take
precautions against this tendency and temptation to anthropomorphize entails taking them
at the expense of what is still weak in our humanity, but which we know, nonetheless, to
be still so specific to it, specifying to a large extent what it is to be human.
*
In The Virtual Life ofFilm, we catch D.N. Rodowick musing over the double
directionality (window and mirror) of the moving image as one that heads for the outside
world while destined for the inside world: "Perhaps the gateway to our present inner life,
what we value in our current mode of existence, is through the experience of surface
reality in the matrix of its duration? Perhaps film's particular attentiveness to the external
life that surrounds us leads back to and enriches a mental or psychological life that is
bereft of anchors in unchallenged universale?"27 The hypothesis here (one worth valuing,
it seems to me, regardless of the outcome) is that to observe an observation of extreme
particularity, of contingency, of a world that is all surface, is one way of coming to value
what is without any underlying metaphysical value. It is also a way of using contingency
against itself by using its cinematic concreteness to overcome the fear that a full
D.N. Rodowick, The Virtual Life ofFilm, p. 77-8.
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acknowledgement of universal contingency will invariably turn the self against itself by
reducing consciousness to a wall cutting off interiority from exteriority into
fundamentally separate camps of our psychological life. Thus it is worth following more
closely how an appropriation of moving image contingency in particular could come to
pass through a rerouting of the external to the internal by way of- though it is still a
metaphor - a window transformed into a mirror. First, moving images establish
contingency through the reticent and intractable forms of external world particularity.
Second, time sentences particularity to ephemerality, carrying cinematic space beyond
the mode of its representation and the grasp of our subjectivity. As a result, a moving
image of the world is prohibited (prohibits itself) from operating as a gateway into the
depiction it so clearly appears to be, though in lieu of the fact that such images succeed so
well to represent the world in the absence of its actual presence they are certainly less
readily apparent as gateways into the interior of the viewer. The gate, therefore, would
have to be shut; and a gate that is shut is no different from a wall, like the wall at the back
of a cave. Wall-like, beyond the wall that consciousness already is, moving images
remind consciousness that the world as we know it (the shadows of perception) is
uninhabitable because impenetrable, that is, without a mediating reality to literally
ground the world as such. A wall facing another wall could then potentially put us who
are behind one and in front of the other back in touch with the very subjectivity that, in
Cavell's understanding of modern skepticism, became interposed between us and the
world also like a wall.28 Moving images of the world reinforce the modern structure of
28 1 extrapolate this idea of a "wall" as a metaphor for skepticism from the following lines
from The World Viewed: "At some point the unhinging of our consciousness from the
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existential distance by showing us just how intimate our distance from the world can be.
The clarity, closeness and intimacy of this image of distance is a revelation of our desire
to gain access to ourselves and become one again with ourselves by way of the world.
The claim of contingency, while for Peirce and other philosophers of science stands as a
critique of the argument from mechanical necessity, here assumes the form of an appeal
(perhaps a final appeal) to grounds for psychological necessity, stating that what appears
in the world with the force of contingency appears forceful in front of us because we
necessitated it without realizing it. This is the gradual process by which we take back
possession of the world that possessed us throughout our developing years, of everything
that happened to us before becoming masters of our own existence. Freud's world, in
short, wherein contingency and necessity are meaningful concepts not only in reference
to the world as it is or as we know it, but also, and perhaps primarily, to he or she who
claims one over the other with respect to a given particular of his or her life. And in
viewing moving images of the world, especially as part of a substantial and significant
way of leading rich inner lives, we are on the lookout for the psychological necessity of
contingent particulars.
*
The self is still founded upon the thing that bears it, the body, which seems incapable of
bearing anything else that the self, perfectly willed, could not eventually do away with.
Emerson ascribed this condition to an all but malevolent temperament of objects where
an ontological "evanescence and lubricity,"29 an intrinsic lack of availability or
world interposed our subjectivity between us and our presentness to the world. Then our
subjectivity became what is present to us, individuality became isolation."(22)
29 Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Experience," in The Portable Emerson, p. 269.
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forgiveness to our procedures and poetries of knowing, becomes the primary cause of our
failure to expose, explore and participate in their nature. But there is no sense accusing
the objects around us of being dodgy or temperamental or even malevolent towards our
advances. Such a response is a desire or delusion that is ultimately rooted to an even
deeper source (deeper, perhaps, than the Being of a being) within our very own hands,
hands held, as it were, with a touch as if mediated by a tool: what Emerson calls "the
most unhandsome part of our condition."30 The object of attention suddenly slips from
our knowing grasp not because it is "ontologically slippery" but rather because all objects
must eventually slip away, that is, pass away in our hands the moment we lose interest.
Why do we pick some up and hold others close if not for reasons of our own, reasons
anterior to the object regardless how characteristic ofthe object? So it is that in reaching
out in the direction of objects we cannot grasp them, however briefly, without spilling
something of ourselves - call it our criteria for what counts. Focused in this way, primed
with the idiosyncrasies of preference, grips tighten in proportion to their resistance, that
is, disproportionately as reactions to resistance, releasing in great volume the unconscious
stores of value, causing the object to go missing. We cannot know what we opt to hold,
what we seek to know for reasons of need, and for no other reason than such reasons are
nowhere to be found with the object so close.
*
Past the body, but in consciousness, the objects of the world - the ones there to ascertain
and the ones made ascertainable - are our other side. This is not the contradiction it
appears to be, for when played out in actual circumstances we tend to remain confined, or
30 Ibid.
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to confine ourselves, to our own side. Here, standing to the world, face forward, looking
is the opposite of what touching is. But touching, I would say, is very often to do nothing
more than to confirm as opposed to continue the act of looking, causing it to lose out to
looking, to fail to take up what is seen and expound upon it, which is how we normally
touch and why, perhaps, we typically hesitate to touch. Touching in a spirit of
confirmation is ironically self-protective, and yet the power ofperception to let loose the
perceiver into the realm of the perceptible is within it to unlock. One is perceived only by
what one can truly touch, where touching is to be touched and where being touched is to
know through being known. In coming to know others and otherness in the world it
strikes me as intuitively necessary to now and then become something knowable in it.
Otherwise it is impossible to come to any knowledge but only on the contrary to have
claimed to, that is, for one's knowledge to be reducible to, and therefore the sole property
of, claims. Call the emergence of knowledge from the experience of being known the
experience of knowledge as the morality of knowing, or self-knowledge.
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Chapter 3
Reading our Rights ofPassage
"But like one who walks alone and in the twilight I reso-
lved to go so slowly, and to use so much circumspection
in all things, that ifmy advance was but very small, at
least I guarded myself well from falling." Rene Descartes,
Discourse on the Method
"I approach deep problems like cold baths: quickly into
them and quickly out again. That one does not get to the
depths that way, not deep enough down, is the superstiti-
on of those afraid of the water, the enemies of cold water;
they speak without experience. The freezing cold makes
one swift." Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science
"It isn't necessary that you leave home. Sit at your desk
and listen. Don't even listen, just wait. Don't wait, be still
and alone. The whole world will offer itself to you to be
unmasked, it can do no other, it will writhe before you in
ecstasy." Franz Kafka, The Zurau Aphorisms
It is still possible, after all, for wordlessness to be as significant a response to a
work of art or piece of criticism as an essay. The "response" is a potentially significant
one because silence, for the lack of a better word, so often marks the beginning of any
serious commitment to a responding, particularly one whose reciprocation is both
voluntary and involuntary. Within the unstable and somewhat vindictive silence of the
beginning, we do not yet know how to know what we think.1 There is no point yet to our
1 Who are "we," exactly? Or to whom does the "our" of this chapter's title refer whose
rights of passage can be read aloud, here in writing? It seems these sorts of pronouns
(whose temptation of universal applicability is tough to resist) must logically refer to
critics, interpreters, creators of things already created - writers, in the end, who begin by
reading. So why am I not more respectfully specific here - specific in the very least to the
specificity of what I myself am doing in writing about reading and (and as) writing - and
call you by your rightful name: a reader who writes? My brief and tentative answer to this
is that for those cases where wordlessness is not a calm before the storm but rather the
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position, nothing so dry and removed as a conviction or hypothesis to step up to and look
down from, as the work goes on working. The state one can sometimes find oneself
inhabiting, or inhabited by, is a stranded one, and there is nothing at all we must
necessarily say or do about what has occurred (and not occurred) nor why. We are under
no outside obligation to subject our experiences of a text (experienced, say, as a
geography of meaning) to the scrutiny (compass) of language, and yet we almost always
do, we almost always end up forming some sort of account (in some cases a calculation)
for what has been done to us as a result of reading and which we help bring upon
ourselves. To think or speak or write in rigorous response to resonant encounters with
certain texts very often proceeds under the duress of an inner duty, an implacable itch, to
rectify an original wordlessness. Original in the sense - its original sense - of
originating: Not being able to exactly know what we've come to understand (hence not
fully understanding) but not being able to stay wordless about it either is the first step, the
beginning, in finding our way in language - a way of life in language - by struggling to
speak our very own speechlessness. Speechlessness rectified says: A silence was never
empty if it had the power, like a spell, to be broken. To speak such a language, to word an
inaugurating wordlessness as a result of and with respect to a given text, would thus
require the honoring and exhaustion of an implicit or latent set of terms (that is, the full
extent of what we set out for ourselves in coming-to-terms with something which has
wake of a storm of sensation that is the ominous fading or forgetting of reading (those
many cases of aesthetic encounter which never officially open up as investigations), we
are too intact, too noticeably the same, to go by any other name than the most general,
improper and unassuming - one that stands for us and not we for it. What it takes for
someone - anyone - to cease to read and become a reader of a text - any text - and in the
process become something written to themselves - open to themselves like a book, like a
case up for investigation - is the concern of this chapter and, I hope, its permission not to
perform the reading it promotes.
162
already arrived at its own terminology), and hence a precarious commitment to nothing
less than all one's words.
If a text is the sort ofthing that can ask or even demand from the reader or viewer
the writing of another text, then such a return commitment, it seems to me, is entitled to
support the logic of its own internal susceptibility by forming a separate, private set of
terms and conditions to which it is just as responsible for abiding as those publicized
within the reading process itself. Not just one but two sets of terms and conditions (those
of the reading and the reader-turned-writer) maintain for an interpretation whose process
of investigation is, as it were, two-way and double-edged to the extent that something like
creativity, something like starting over and standing at the helm of a new mission, is
required to turn the hinge from reading to writing. The ambivalent, excruciating, and
exhausting (because hopelessly inexhaustible) effort at settling upon a rational estimate
of the relationship between a text's force or impact (its claim of authority) and its value
(its right to that authority) is such that a reading committed to negotiating the two can be
undergone gradually, inconspicuously, perhaps even tacitly, in the direction of a
categorically different mode of coming-to-terms that acknowledges the workings of
another wholly latent text, one whose writing occurs, precisely, through the very
commitment to, and hence to the consequences of, writing. I mean the "text" of the
investment in a particular text as the exposure (out on a limb) that comes with being
invested for reasons both known and unknown (reasons suspected at the beginning and
knowable, or officially identifiable, only at the end). The sneaking suspicion at the
beginning that the end holds in store key secrets about the beginning, I wish to suggest, is
an accurate and hence sincere response (and basis of pursuit) to the possibility or chance
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for personal stakes to become legitimately and effectively at stake within a particular
reading of a no less particular text via a no less textual (because historical, hence
particular) reader.
The concept of particularity - pointing to one thing (this) and not another (that)
and in the direction of otherness (mystery) - points to the possibility for epistemological
unpredictability, for something unpredictable within our experience to rearrange or
thwart or altogether ignore our most vicarious conceptual schemes. The
acknowledgement of particularity on all fronts of the battlefield of interpretation yields a
form of writing that would be unlikely to find solace in the capacity for interpretation as
an epistemological procedure to position the writer on the most empowered, or immune,
side of knowing. Let us say for argument's sake - though we shouldn't have to draw on
too much imagination for this - that the average interpretive process is typically
approached as a game where the goal is to win, in a spirit of possession fueled by the
prize, some deeply internal or intrinsic current of distilled content from a text's
environment - how then would a player go about cheating in his or her victory? Where in
the game, which rule of the game, is the window of opportunity to cheat oneself out of a
claim to the very stakes that compel one to play (if, indeed, one is compelled for reasons
of one's own)? Perhaps, in being unable to resist having an end in sight prior to
departing, cheating could consist in taking advantage of the other player's inherent
scrupulousness. I'm speaking here of the text one has decided to play with, conceiving
the confidence of its necessary (inescapable) integrity as the most luminous exposure of
intention in behavior, behavior absorbing intention in the light of supreme or determinate
manifestation. (A text might be full of secrets and lies, but the text itself is the truthful
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showing and telling of them.) Now if the interpreter of a text need not be as exposed or
fully "on the table" as the text being interpreted, having the freedom at his disposal
within the game of interpretation to hide from the source of his own participation, to
disassociate himself from his role, what then could ground and perhaps even measure the
rule of his own integrity? Is there a way to play here that is not only agreeable but makes
sense for players of such games when the stakes are to be found not in winning (where to
win is to succeed in taking something away from the text) but in playing - be it "with" or
"against" or "despite all odds" but ultimatelyfor the sheer thrill!2 I'm not saying that
whatever is taken away from it does not somewhere somehow belong to it, and in
belonging to it is therefore not a factor in what it's about (and doing about what it's
about), but that the aim to do so - entering through the exit or beginning in order to end -
will be a decisive factor in the restlessness of a reading in pursuit of its own justification,
as if the process of interpretation were not a goal in of itself and the very mode of
justification, and thus the only thing about the text that can, in the end, be taken away.
Such restlessness (by no means quick to act) seems to me to harbor the aspiration
to take or strip something fundamental to the text, either within or beyond or beneath the
reach of the text's "knowledge of itself," often in the interest of increasing the self-
sufficiency of the game in which it is at play and to reinforce the means in which it can
be played to produce a decisive or "final score." Such a move, or motivation, we could
say, leaves the text in the dark about the rules that come to govern the forms its meanings
are permitted to take in a given institutional or intellectual community. How, then, can
2 A text, in other words, has no "say" over the words we use to speak about it (although
we might merely repeat what it says or speak in its voice) and thus no power of response
to what is eventually printed in its name (and never just in ours).
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the reader-turned-writer, who is part of a community that works for the most part in
pieces (i.e. in states of separation or isolation while reading and writing), proceed to play
properly, enjoy playing honestly, and on level with the text respectively, if shadowed by
the strange awareness that the game looks to its players to officiate, this being in essence
a game without any rules - the dangerously human game of epistemology in the
humanities? The window of opportunity to cheat oneself out of playing one's part
particularly would be to play as an official, relegated to the sidelines of one's method
blowing whistles at the slightest deviation and on behalf of an alien conscience. This self-
surveillance, this overprotective and interruptive self-consciousness, can result in the kind
of reading that amounts to a set of results, or findings, to be submitted for approval,
perhaps with the overarching aim of securing the approval of whomever (whatever)
deigns to deliver those verdicts. We can and do cheat ourselves when we reserve our best
speech (speech spoken with authority) for situations in which our authority as speakers is
felt to precede us (speech spoken as authority, delivered authoritatively as the speech of
rhetoric itself, delivering our own verdicts as the reward for an immaculate and proud
obedience). What is lost to the sound o/authority is nothing less than groundsfor
authority: carefully listening to the language of our speechlessness, weighing and bearing
the most irrepressible uncertainty. As if the discovery of those grounds depended upon a
process of elimination in detecting the source and power of our actual voice. As if the act
of shedding protective layers of authority were essential in recognizing the naked ground
on which we stand and from which we speak and, upon standing and speaking, hearing
our voice echo and recognizing the sound as that of our very own.
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If we can see the voice as the point in us where language and experience meet in a
silence that is their respectful attendance to, and attenuation of, one another, then the act
of writing becomes the heaviest matter of finding the words through which to plot it.
Every word found in writing plots a moment in our responsiveness that until then, until
pointing it out to ourselves, had been lost on us. Thus our words are nowhere to be found
in the decision to write, for the voice is still not quite recognizable prior to the friction
with language (where the warp of thought is subject to the flow of verbal reification). In
the beginning, one is usually always bound to be at a bit of a loss for a means through
which to perform this finding, to overcome the already said and transgress our memories.
But it is to be remembered while resisting the seductive, stealing onslaught of the past,
and the obstinacy of the realized voices that make up the very grammar of our own, that it
is in finding a word after all others and put in its place that it sings in the sentence. The
exact appearance of the exact word, one by one, consummates our newest tense. What
we have it within us to say we have, by having it within us, first, and now, to say it. That
is to take our experience as the first step in the direction ofwhat draws us, a step we are
always in partial anticipation of taking however reservedly, a step we can nevertheless
trust to take outright in the "shoes" of words, which make it possible to plant our feet in
our thoughts and think through. Without this trust in our own experience, without trusting
3 Wittgenstein apprehends this aesthetic quality of linguistic precision - "these words in
these positions" - by allowing it to help account for the peculiarly intuitive and sudden
grasping of the meaning of a poem. The sensible and sometimes purely affective dawning
could be seen as the ripe effect of the meaning ofthe necessity of the poem's rhythm and
timbre. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe
(Massachusetts, Oxford, Victoria: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2001), p. 122, #531.
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the right to take an interest in what has interested us, in what strikes us, showing that
interest with inquiry, thus sealing it, "rote is fate."
What, then, is the fate of a reader who sits in response to a text, sustaining a
conversation with it, whose only language to speak it is based on the one he hears while
listening to it? Listening, what becomes of a reader whose reading strives for the means,
the knowledge, to (re)write it, to be able to know (to begin) how to write this complex
and complexly intimate refraction? (And what depth of reading must be reached for
writing to be called upon to surface from it or to reach the limits of reading?) It is the fate
of someone who cannot know in advance of writing what the writing will take, someone
for whom the sequence of, and the divide between, reading and writing is a fantasy. Fate,
here, if secured by the opposite of rote, is released from the security of fate into whim.
"Whim" is the word that Emerson writes on the lintel of the door to his house, an
imaginary door beneath which he re-embarks upon the ship and wide open seas of his
solitude; and while it is his hope that what transpires in solitude is somewhat better than
whim at last he recognizes that one cannot spend the day in explanation. There is little
progress to be made, psychologically or historically, in the attempt to determine why one
chose to follow the fragrant winds of an intuition instead of head the train of reason, to
answer for the trust showed an intuition over and above all the self-sufficient tuitions in
no need of our trust anymore. Intuitions, by definition, by virtue of the hypocrisy in
explaining them, are not to be trusted; their unaccountable and implacable nature has the
power to backfire, disappoint, or lead astray, but that doesn't mean they are
4 Stanley Cavell, Pursuits ofHappiness: The Hollywood Comedy ofRemarriage
(Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 12.
5 Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Self-Reliance," in The Portable Emerson, ed. Carl Bode in
collaboration with Malcolm Cowley (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1981), p. 142.
168
untrustworthy. In fact (if the facts themselves are any guide) nothing is worthier of our
trust, and nothing needs our trust more, than that which has yet to be tested.
Passing up an intuition, passing over one's experience for its rote compensations
and hypothetical standardizations, is akin to closing curtains on the dawn, dismissing the
dawn as nothing more than the start of an inevitable descent through the order of the day
and into the closure of dusk. But the idea of beginning the day at the crack of dawn - in
the crack between darkness and light where things reappear as if responsive to our
reawakening - seems to require that one be able to wake up before it, when it's still dark,
still the night, so as to usher in a new unforeseen yet dream-foresaw aspect. The
implication of the temporal metaphor (that the catching of the dawn's crack calls for a
chair to be pulled up and steadiest vigil kept throughout the night) is that an intuition
must in some sense be anticipated, unexpectedly won but worked for, so as to fall into the
right hands, the only pair of upturned hands, if there is to be any means of
comprehending, in a spirit of recognition, its cryptic form of guidance.
I want to explore this notion of "using oneself the way one is," or the power
contained in "what comes naturally," because I think it offers a way inside the immanent
6 This image of having to "wake up" before an intuition in order for it to purposefully
illuminate is, to be sure, an image - and a fate - of solitude. The person who kindles the
light of his or her own solitude is necessarily unaccompanied in this task, and it is the
necessity of this aloneness that limits the fruit of this labor (the labor of love for being)
from satisfying the self by self-satisfaction alone. (The ivory tower's ivory is the very
irony of compensation in this regard.) Embarking upon the ship of solitude does not
guarantee that the ship will set sail, that the night will give in or silence stir, and so
resigning oneself to the state of the self is not necessarily the best remedy for enduring its
dark hours. But if one should nonetheless persist at port, doing whatever possible to
adjust to this darkness, then perhaps it is the case that brute endurance is the only way to
get the better of one's being - standing so finitely beside the one self at our infinite
disposal. Call it getting the most out of our least, with solitude as the beginning of the use
of oneself.
form of interpretation as the process, or behavior, of an epiphany. I pick up Stanley
Cavell picking up Wittgenstein on what one might call the innate epistemology of
interpretation:
[W]hat he [Wittgenstein] calls "seeing an aspect" is the form of interpretation: it
is seeing something as something. Two conditions hold of a case in which the
concept of "seeing as" is correctly employed. There must be a competing way of
seeing the phenomenon in question, something else to see it as (in Wittgenstein's
most famous case, that of the Gestalt figure of the "duck-rabbit," it may be seen
as a duck or as a rabbit); and a given person may not be able to see it both ways,
in which case it will not be true for him that he sees it (that is, sees a duck or sees
a rabbit) as anything (though it will be true to say of him, if said by us who see
both possibilities, that he sees it as one or the other). And one aspect dawns not
just as a way of seeing but as a way of seeing something now, a way that eclipses
some other, definite way in which one can oneself see the "same" thing.
Perhaps my use of the word "behavior" with respect to the form of interpretation came
across as something of a stretch, perhaps an inappropriate stretch into heartlessly
behavioristic territory, but does it not also stem from the same source as Wittgenstein's
notion that when we see something as something our perception, coterminous with the
emergent temperament of a thought, has effectively shone a light upon the rich and
amorphous gloom of an ambiguity that has triggered or conditioned it? While it is
difficult to know after the fact what precisely kindled the light of recognition, nor where
7 Stanley Cavell, Pursuits ofHappiness, p. 36. (CavelFs emphases)
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the light finally settles and shines in consciousness, it is not difficult to see that what we
do see (that is, when we see it, always in a now) we must see: we must see whatever it is
we can exclaim as a sight to behold - a sight whose successful capture or constitution is
o
therefore fit for another's corroboration.
Now this does not mean that it is impossible for us to alter our view, to change
projectors from the duck to the rabbit and back to the duck (if we have the option), but
that in order to complete the switch a dawn must crack, an impression must strike,
realities must alternate without a trace. In short, we must go blind in order to and perhaps
for the sake of seeing that which has summoned the senses into the whole of a new
perception, because to see something that went previously unseen, something that the rote
continuity of perception passed over so as to persist, is to be blinded by what we have
come to see it as. (This "as" blinds us to everything else standing-by, to all that is and all
other ways of as, and thus makes possible the peculiarly assertive sense of blindness as
being blinded by rather than to one's own perception.) Which ambiguity has been
precisely resolved, where precisely between thought and the world the perception can lie,
and why the subject standing in the middle might wish to claim the dawning as entirely of
its own doing, are questions whose answers constitute further aspects of the aspect
(aspects sacrificed for the aspect dawned) caught somewhere in between the absence and
invisibility of the aspect as a whole - as a complete structure of thought in the world. As
the parts of perception they are not part of the experience o/perception, and for that
reason, according to Wittgenstein, dawning (which is an experience) is like seeing and
8 This sense of determinacy with respect to perception is somewhat reminiscent of the
sense ofpre-articulation that Wittgenstein perceives, and unconditionally respects, in
grammar.
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again not like.9 Through some way we can come to see and think simultaneously, without
thinking strictly with our minds nor seeing solely through our eyes, and arrive at the
dawning of an aspect the moment it, too, has appeared to arrive, as if from out of the
dark, the blue, springing forth from the sleep of things. And a secluded epiphany
envelops - honoring - the perfect coincidence of subject and object or mind and eye that
could be called, in fact, the synchronization or harmonization of consciousness. This
locking together of discrete modes or paths of perception (ultimately hinging on the
contingency of timing) is the occasion - the germination - for those first few spasms of
consciousness in which thoughts, glistening "in the flesh," begin to hatch before as
opposed to behind one's eyes. I'm pushed to say in response to this that to see like this
(unto the this of a this) is to be surprised (sometimes ambushed) by one's thoughts, just
as if you managed to recognize a face in a crowd seconds before the person whose face it
is senses the pressure that has been put to turn in your direction and reply before saying a
word.10
The picture of consciousness that this picture of interpretation stirs to mind is
almost surreal: consciousness as the impossibility of complete and utter darkness in
consciousness insofar as consciousness is the creation - the necessitation - of its own
eclipses. The "light" of consciousness in this regard can be said to differentiate the
continuum of light itself, cutting it up through a certain power - the invisible touch - of
9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 168.
10 Although more often than we know we recognize things that we have never actually
seen before, or been in contact with, because they are characteristic of what we are
looking for, are examples of it. Would we then be well advised to take our surprise at the
sight of something strange - or a stranger for that matter - to be the meaning of our
disappointment with perfect strangeness? That we are not familiar enough or experienced
enough with our own interests, or with having interests, to be pursued by them?
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emphasis. Perhaps it is the case, then, that the moments of consciousness only seem
mundane and uneventful as absent experiences because they are all (technically)
epiphanies: the epistemic flood of consciousness renders a continuum of successive
flashes into the most silent interpretations. But something is not quite right, or too right,
too homogeneous, about this particular picture. (We are staring at a landscape, an
undifferentiated vista of intense tranquility, not a soul in sight and where nothing can take
our wide-open eyes by the slightest surprise.) I was moved to say, before stopping myself
short, that the moments of consciousness are mundane and uneventful (imperceptible
within experience and unaccountable as experiences), but instead wrote (wanting)
"seem," as if not bearing witness to the dawning of an aspect (keeping to the comforts of
one's post, so to speak, by not bringing one's experience to bear) were a choice, even a
strategy for maintaining (perhaps unconsciously preferring) continuity and coherence in
what can only amount to an ordinary experience of our experience of the ordinary. The
dullness of a dawn I can attribute only to the fact that the familiar aspect is already slated
to appear like clockwork in an almost programmed hour of the day's regimen. Too many
times the radiance of this or that dawn has failed to catch hold of the hands of time the
way time had seemed to stop its first time around when the aspect first struck. It's as
though we have as little power over the duration and deepening of a habitual dawning as
we do over its initial triggering. But that we again missed the dawn as if half asleep
throughout our rote participation in the luminous return of "the same" - the same aspect
which continues to knit, so seamlessly and spectacularly, all our senses to the outside
world - means that because we do not wake up to the ordinary it does not wake up to us
either and therefore cannot wake us up. For that to happen we would first have to find a
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way to see that we have seen something, anything, as something in order to better explore
the conditions of "seeing-as" (circular conditions which condition the very thought that
has conditioned the actual perception). And just because the form of a perception fails to
provoke a reciprocal exclamation (a response which is key, in Wittgenstein, to the event
of "seeing-as") does not change the fact that the perception has a form in the form of
constantformation, and thus retains the chance to appear unfamiliar precisely in its own
light of day.11
Along the way towards the self-reliance of reading, I have been passing through
some hard-to-read signposts in concepts like "whim," "intuition" and "seeing-as,"
concepts that are as elusive as they are seductive as potentially (and potentially
appropriately) misleading. Such concepts are like calls to danger that, depending on how
we interpret them, impact lines of inquiry more by their capacity to inspire than instruct
or guide, putting the onus on us to exercise our experience to the point where it can
withstand not only our deepest investment but in addition, and by turns, our most
rigorous antagonism. The sustaining and constant strengthening of an artistic conscience
is something to strive for in our reading of texts, and is at stake especially in the rereading
of them. Imagine reaching a point with respect to your own experience where it is no
1 1 Yet I have no reason, at least no practical reason, to expect or to want to be struck by
the new or the old come alive again if to be struck is to be hit hard, from beyond the
specific "nowhere" of the ordinary. It is a rare occurrence - extra ordinary - for the
ordinary to be the sole cause of a change in my relation to it and estimation of it, because
the ordinary itself- ordinariness - is the gradual negotiation of the terms by which our
experiences become conditioned agreements. What lies within the league of my
everyday, however, is the freedom to acknowledge that what I might want to call familiar
or mundane or uneventful I might yet to have deemed otherwise or even properly to have
acknowledged. Thus the redemption of what we call "the ordinary" shall mark not the
rebirth but, in reality, the first and only birth of it, our birth as from a post-natal womb.
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longer possible for you to like a work of art without going on about how it tastes, where it
is no longer possible to see a work of art as the work of art you experienced but rather as
your experience ofthat work of art. Part ofmy intention in calling upon the "interpretive
spark" at the center of "seeing-as" was to find a ground for indulging such a wish: that no
matter how far we have to go to gain the force of deliberation over our experiences, our
capacity to see one thing as another is not to mistake an identity or to project a desire but
rather to work a muscle. This capacity to reach, to stretch out or make a stretch, is ours to
reach with. But the responsibility rests solely on us to acknowledge that the way we are
set up to perceive is an opportunity or opening for experience precisely because
perception is an intricately precise coordination of our limitations. Limitation, at least in
12
principle, is the root of potentiality and the germ of idiosyncrasy.
12 Giorgio Agamben, following Aristotle, shapes this reversal of fortune in the following
way: "To be potential means: to be one's own lack, to be in relation to one 's own
incapacity." Potentialities, ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1999), p. 182. (Agamben's emphasis) To have potential for a particular
action over all others is to be capable first, of first acting, one's fundamental
impotentiality towards it. It is, however, certainly, tragically within everyone's potential
to repeatedly test the waters of potentiality until the deepest abyss opens below it; and
what once receded away as the road to fruition, as the most natural means to the
crystallization of ends, becomes not just the end in itself but of itself- the fogging up of
the road - and thus of any chance to begin at the beginning. So the moral (if we care to
draw one from this tiny parable) would be to jump if you're going to jump, if that is your
purpose in standing at the edge or your being. And it is well worth remembering (as long
as we're moralizing) that the longer you wait the colder the water will get for no other
reason than the gradual decrease of the likelihood of you jumping, a decrease in stark
proportion to the mounting clarity that the edge is as close as you were planning on
getting to the decision. The retreat, the avoidance of defeat, the skirting of limits
detrimental to any experience of success, is bitterness itself. And during the long way
home, obscured by the shadows of possibility yet known too well as the back of one's
hand, no foreseeable circumstance in which you will find yourself more capable of being
capable of your potential will be readily conceivable, for to have potential (as you might
have guessed) is always to be potentially capable of being incapable of realizing it.
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This ground zero ofperception, which I am picturing as a sort of calibration of
consciousness within our most basic standing-towards in the field of fmitude, becomes
amenable to the "jerk of whim" upon holding one's ground in the interest of cultivating it
by honoring the self as something akin to a ground worth cultivating. Abandoning a stead
for whatever is next and dancing on the horizon is not to act on a whim but rather to act
whimsically fatalistically. In trying to stay warm, to keep flowing one's blood, it is the
difference between building (a fire) and moving (as a fire), or between moving (to a fire)
and building (a house of fire), a difference Emerson himselfperceives between "the
weakness of someone who stands on his head and the strength of someone who stands on
his feet."13 To stand on your feet, I'm inclined to say, is to know where you stand with
respect to yourself no matter where you go or end up. Grounds shift, as do moods, but the
feeling of standing (and hence of moving) is always the same. If such is your experience
then you are less likely to travel out of a desire to follow, and even less likely to follow a
desire for the sake of traveling or escaping, because you are in the position to stay where
you are or not to.
Though it does not aid the sense of our inner orientation, nor facilitate the
expressiveness of our limitations as we navigate fmitude, that we are usually found the
first to speak. But what does it mean to speakfirsf? An aspect dawns, we see something
as something, we have something to say, but we do not say what we have seen. What we
say (when it is said so first) is something else, not quite of another matter as a digression
away from hard matters altogether. Speaking first is therefore a bold circumvention of
the natural order of perception. It is to begin with ourselves as opposed to what is in front
Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Self-Reliance," p. 164.
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of us, facing us, as though the T were a thing, and despite the fact that we are never in
the absence of something external about which to say. The impression that we are, that
we are left to a silence that is ours to fill, can occur when we use language without
acknowledging, or remembering, that to do so, in order to have had cause to speak in the
first place, is to have already listened by way oflanguage. We can now come back to the
idea of wordlessness as a response to a text because it is apparent that wordlessness is the
result - beneath or within which resonates the attitude - of such an acknowledgement.
Waiting for one's turn to speak is to wait until one can have in one 's hands something to
say. And for this reason I like to think of this waiting for one's turn to speak as waiting
for one's speech to turn, almost like a tide.
Embarking upon the wait, patiently being the one not to have been the first to
speak, is to be fated to the knowledge of one's wordlessness, which is an encroachment
upon the terrain of one's possibilities. The trouble with finding words at a moment when
we feel we need them most coincides with the sudden, sometimes jarring availability of
unforeseen and hence inconceivable possibilities for new understanding and new clarities
of understanding. Not to have been the first to speak is, quite simply, to have recognized
what one stood to gain for oneself by remaining silent to oneself. In being the second to
speak you are thus spoken to the extent that you cannot know what (no less who) you will
feel the need to say (and no less become). You cannot know what you will have cause (no
less caused) to say. You cannot know, upon joining up with the enterprise of your
experience, what knowledge you are on the verge of coming into. (It is impossible, for
instance, to know what dreams await you before falling asleep, but the inevitability of
waking up to your self again, to consciousness once more, is evidence of who "the
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author" was all along: who or what it was that absorbed the full measure of the day's
events regardless if they were memorable.) "One should speak only when one may not
stay silent; and then only ofthat which one has overcome"14 is Nietzsche's way of saying
that his decision to write is triggered, or necessitated, by thefact that he has been spoken
(comes spoken) by an experience; that he can heed the call to speak about the realest and
hardest of ideas (and in turn create as opposed to conquer new ideas) because he has
sufficiently (and near thoroughly) exercised his experience of them in the historical world
to the point of agility - bending to the way of the logos like Socrates.
So one may not be anything but silent when trying to hear (so as to have) the
thoughts of a response. To be sure, the thoughts of our responses can be none other than
our own, though it is worth stressing that this seal of possession or entitlement is not
necessarily stamped or legibly signed.16 This is due to the fact that, on the one hand, it is
14 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, AU Too Human: A Bookforfree Spirits, trans. R.J.
Hollingdale (Cambridge, UK., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.
209. (Mine and Nietzsche's emphasis)
15 The near perfect physical condition of the dancer is fundamental to the elastic
articulacy and precision swiftness by which Nietzsche's aphorisms thrive on an entropy
of philosophical speculation. Pitched in between one self-contained organism of thought
and the next as if balanced on a tightrope, I imagine the dancer in Nietzsche summoning
the optimal coordination of focus, composure and calm before launching himself into a
head-on trajectory of activity, patiently awaiting the moment when he will be quite
physically incapable of waiting any longer, when his turn to speak finally comes through
the most natural breaking of silence by way of insight, turning his dancing body toward
the next (and never the nearest) necessity of thought. Evidence that one speaks with
experience is losing, in all fairness, the struggle to hold one's tongue after holding one's
breath all the way to the bottom of the depths. The best storytellers not only wait until
their part in the story is completely done to open their mouths, but dare not open them at
all unless the story is felt to be in danger of being completely forgotten, for only then is
the teller fit (right) to pass it on.
16 Any thought which is formed in isolation from experience - as a frame for it or as a
bridge to pass it - and whose root is untraceable outside of language, is the sort of
thought I deem foreign to experience insofar as it fails to come into contact with it (due
perhaps to a lack of any relevant resemblance to it). In missing or avoiding the entrance
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never really up to us to be faced with brute experience and, on the other, that it is rarely
within our power to avoid missing most of the time much of what is obvious in it. (The
freedom to turn away from our experience and the feeling of there being nothing to turn
awayfrom, or nowhere to turn, are respective indications of both.) However, it is our
decision, or fully up to us, to face what faces us - to turn back. This interjection of
consciousness calls for a conscientious assertion of will, and one ofgoodwill with
respect to encounters whose extreme complexity tempts the will to extreme reduction.
What I am calling a "conscientious exertion" is put in the service of experiencing our
experiences in such a way as to have them as responses, but not to hold as we would a
possession as to be held - in a spasm of understanding - by what we have come at last to
notice. The noticing is tardy, but never untimely, and a relief of sorts upon its arrival: a
life is never without a chance to move on. But in the event that we have allowed our
thoughts to speak first by giving ourselves first say (speaking before and therefore in the
absence of the object of attention's ripe singularity), then to a certain extent we have
altogether cut in front of the object's "say" (slogan of specificity, so to speak). Now, in
light of the fact that texts are notorious for having too much to say, what, if anything, can
a choice (i.e. chosen) text say in the event that we have spoken for it? My sense is that it
can say whatever we might want it or require it or force it to show. A text, in this way, is
made to answer a question that may or may not resemble or bear upon the question(s)
which motivate it, and is thus made to answerfor an invisible meta-text of assumptions,
restrictions and underlying desires "written" in the shift from reading to writing by a
to experience, as it were, such "thoughts" can miss or avoid the chance to be checked and
if need be revised: missed opportunities as long as thought has a role to play in solving
problems or understanding situations or negotiating relations, and not just collaborating
and conflicting and ultimately "bouncing off other thoughts.
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reader-turned-writer and to which the concept of methodology is often loosely connected
and eagerly glossed. Texts, like objects, though far from innocent, do not resist being
spoken for, or, if they do, resist passively and in silence.
If a text does put up a fight against reader ventriloquism - defending its rights,
claiming its knowledge, inciting the potential for new knowledge - then it is only out of
our deepest respect for what a text can do to the act of reading and, by inescapable
extension, to us who read it:
[I]t is the text that draws us out of our knowledge into the pursuit of a knowledge
beyond us. A knowledge we are drawn to, which is beyond ourselves but
nevertheless pertains to us, can be construed as a knowledge of our possibilities.
For the reader ready to be "spoken by" the reading of a text (whose turn to writing is
bound to heed instead of spur the call of writing), the shift implied by Gould from what a
text means to what a text knows, or from what it containsfor any reader to what it
communicates to a particular reader, also marks a significant shift towards a specifically
reader-oriented (or performative) directive for what I then (and only then) would want to
call an "ethics of interpretation."18 The shift is a precarious one (warranting some
17 Timothy Gould, Hearing Things: Voice and Method in the Writing ofStanley Cavell
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 194.
18 In the lengthy and sprawling introduction to Pursuits ofHappiness, CavelPs first book
of film readings, a preliminary link between performance and ethics is pursued through
the more explicit example of the necessity of musical interpretation: "A performance of a
piece of music is an interpretation of it, the manifestation of one way of hearing it, and it
arises (if it is serious) from a process of analysis. (This will no longer be the case where a
piece just is its performance; where, say, it is itself a process of improvisation.) Say that
my readings, my secondary texts, arise from processes of analysis. Then I would like to
say that what I am doing in reading a film is performing it (if you wish, performing it
inside myself). (I welcome here the sense in the idea of performance that it is the meeting
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suspicion) and comes close to demanding a flat-out reversal of the routine directionality
of interpretation as opposed to a mere shift in emphasis. Suspicious, we might want to
ask what kind of interpretive ethics could justify putting the priorities of the text itself
after the possibilities generated through its experience? The text-to-reader reversal
(where the reading of a text finishes not at the end of the text but at the end of the
reading) would seem to contradict the essential activity of reading as an unbridled
affirmation of textual possibilities were it not the case that in order to reach this point of
reversal (where the text flowers with the pertinence of our possibilities) the unbridled
affirmation must have reached, or nearly reached, its apotheosis in the form of an
acknowledgement expressed through analysis. And the only way this apotheosis can be
reached, it seems to me, is on the momentum of the excitement of being interested by it
and therefore in it, and therefore (almost invariably) in one's interest in it. But to
demonstrate that investment by positioning yourself "ethically" with respect to the text's
or its author's "rights" is to be preoccupied with the baggage of a principle, with the
performance of an etiquette (i.e. reciprocating the gift), which can cause us to lose sight
of something significant (and perhaps significantly ethical) that is potentially at stake: the
creation of another text that renews the gift that was given by harboring the same power
to create in its turn future texts. A text on a specific text that is about what that text
"means" means (perhaps tacitly) to be the final word on it within the context of a given
approach to reading it and vocabulary for writing it; whereas a text that is about what a
text "knows" is knowable as such only as part of the knowledge generated by it and can
of a responsibility.) This leaves open to investigation what the relations are between
performance and interpretation, and between both of these and analysis, and between
differing analyses, and hence between differing performances."(37-38)
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mean, as a result, only the full meaning of its own fold of words (unto the voice of the
wording) - thoughts which amount to nothing less than the knowledge of the interpreter's
possibilities within a text made fully possible to itself through the analysis of reading.
The new text is then found in a position to inspire rather than instruct a way into the
"originary" or prior text for the simple reason that it does not claim to know what caused
it to become a fully fledged text and not just a dependent reading insofar as it will not
claim what it knows as absolute knowledge of its object even if its claims are found to
hold for it. Which ultimately goes to show that there will never be a permanent way out
of a prior text upon finding one's own way in or in discovering that the only way in is by
writing one's way "out."19
There is something uninspiring about inspiration that can strike us as reassuring
here. Inspiration is governed by the same rule instruction aspires to instill: there is no
such thing as a perfectly original thought. Every inspiration gets ignited with something
borrowed, but unless it proceeds with the conviction that in these hands it can be bettered
it is not inspiration but seduction. Handled any other way the inspiration is but stored for
safe keeping, perhaps in the form of instructions for how to avoid letting go of them by
being inspired by them. The practice of self-reliance, in light of this genealogical
perspective on inspiration, becomes one of appropriation or passage that is the exercise,
19 So it is that the texts we care most deeply about, holding the most importance and
relevance for our own lives, resonating throughout the duration of our lives, are not
unlike places to which we can and often do claim a certain spiritual residency. We tend to
return to them, in parts or as a whole, and with the frequency of a regular visitor -
breaking with obligations regardless of how pressing - for yet another pleasantly
unpredictable and revitalizing conversation in our meantime: a space where time flies by
like nowhere else, as if absent in the purest realm of the child's imagination, or stops as a
result of the imagination at work.
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in Cavell 's terms, not of power but reception.20 The self is herein proposed (and in an
unsettling sense wagered) as the embodiment of the potential of its capacity
(responsibility?) to make something out of itself, out of the foreign materials (call them
voices) responsible for forming it, thus finding its cause - plight of purpose - in the
complex of effects whose causes they eclipse. ("Our task is and remains above all not to
mistake ourselves for others."21) But there's always a standing formula for thought ready
and waiting to take over thinking for ourselves: the silent authority of precedence,
precursors and the indefatigable dead can steal our say by subsuming, even
impersonating our voice, governing from the inside our methods of beginning, filling
them up with so much thought such that what ends up said can have little to no sound,
having passed through barely any space, as it were. Conformity (mistaking ourselves for
others) coincides with the assumption that only established ideas and precursors (what are
often called the original and originating ones), and not our encounters and conflicts with
them, can bring about purposeful knowledge; and that the voicing ofthat knowledge -
the particular path one took to understand what has already been understood - is not in
some sense vital to the existing sense of it, which is perhaps also what we intuitively take
any knowledge to count on: perspicacity. I think the basis of this intuition that knowledge
counts on the lucidity of its sense (hard won and free of anxiety) in order to resonate as
(not like) knowledge is the same as the intuition which leads us to take the same criterion
20 Stanley Cavell, The Senses of Waiden: An Expanded Edition (San Francisco: North
Point Press, 1981), p. 135.
21 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 345. For Harold Bloom, the task of the poet is
similar: not to succumb to the anxiety of his or her influences by proceeding to alleviate
that anxiety with acknowledgements of authority that do nothing but confer authority. For
live instances in which the "weaker" poets make poetry out of debt to the "stronger"
ones, see his book The Anxiety ofInfluence (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.,
1973).
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- perspicacity - to hold for the seal of our liberation as thinking feeling dreaming beings:
not to be ashamed in front of ourselves. You are free (to be free) when you have learned
(hence earned) to speak your own voice in front of yourself without stuttering on account
of shame or repressing that stutter with preachy all-knowingness by the same account.
But stuttering and preaching out of shame for sounding the way we do (the awkwardly
tuned instruments that we are) seems exactly the kind of lesson we enforce upon
ourselves in the former case, and therefore inevitably upon each other in the latter case,
within the various institutions to which the facilitation and circulation and posterity of
our discourse is ultimately entrusted. Since "becoming the person you are" by "taking
your person into your own hands" is generally regarded, at least in public, as bad
(undisciplined) methodology, eventually coming to regard yourself as the slate for the
image of a profession, and then as a vehicle for the task of professionalization, suggests
the workings of an implicit and self-sustaining ideological pressure, or methodological
pressuring, by which an institution fosters in a given member (particularly within aspiring
members) near causal associations between independence and withdrawal, self-
affirmation and self-indulgence, and gaps in knowledge with the lack of experience.
I wish to stress, for it is an aspect easily lost, that to insist on self-reliance in the
act of interpreting a text is not an occasion to insist on the self of the reader-turned-writer.
Such an interpretation of self-reliance as the enforcing of oneself to oneself is a
misunderstanding of the potential for self-reliance to avail the self to new, perhaps
contradictory meanings - a foreign knowledge of possibilities activated by the rigor of
reading's wildest abandon. The nagging feeling of being confronted and judged and
somehow defeated by the immaculate, immutable and undoubtedly mythical image of the
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person of the author one is reading betrays a desperate insecurity in the face of the risk of
reading, threatening not just the possibility of reading but also the very reality of reading,
the very experience of an encroachment into the exotic, mysterious and forbidden-feeling
terrain of point-of-no-return renewal. For a critic like Maurice Blanchot, so committed to
precision self-effacement in the face of a text, it is ultimately "the reader's reality, his
personality, his immodesty, his stubborn insistence upon remaining himself in the face of
what he reads, someone who knows in general how to read,"22 that leaves him stranded
with nowhere to go, after demonstrating his capacity to finish a book, except back to the
shelf for the next one.23 The reader's reluctance to receive the gift of reading as the
ennobling of dependency into the highest form of concentration, however, might be an
indication of a premature (or aversive) attack on conformity. Self-reliance (mis)construed
as the necessity of looking to the self for the source or key to a fixed identity (by means
of which an existence is inscribed) is fueled by the desire (worse than the error) to
conform to the self. The stand against conformity ironically backfires here with perhaps
its most extreme and irreversible consolidation in the form of a self that is itself only on
22 Maurice Blanchot, The Space ofLiterature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln, London:
University ofNebraska Press, 1989), p. 1 98.
23 A little bit before making this critical remark, Blanchot expresses the workings of a
terrible ambivalence plaguing the very ambition and hope of reading: "There is in
reading, at least at reading's point of departure, something vertiginous that resembles the
movement by which, going against reason, we want to open onto life eyes already closed.
This movement is linked to desire which, like inspiration, is a leap, an infinite leap: I
want to read what is, however, not written."(195, Blanchot' s emphasis) As unthinkable
as it sounds to open onto life eyes already closed while preparing to stare at page after
page ofwriting, perhaps there is something to be said for the way in which desire and
fear at the threshold of reading can produce, on the one hand, an excitement and, on the
other, cancel out into disinterest or even repulsion, blinding one to the book as such.
Perhaps it is always the next book that we wish we could be reading while reading, for it
is the next book which is the only "book" that could support the wish for a book, at last,
to read to us itself on behalf of all books.
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the condition that it remains other to all others by performing all its differences. The kind
of self-reliance I'm encouraging, on the other hand, ends with the opposite of a head-rush
of empowerment that crowns with a sense of mastery so brutal when placed at the helm
of a method. I see it less as an objedification of consciousness than as a symptom of total,
reckless, indeterminable receptivity to the point of losing your guard, and any hope of
timing your protection, before the object of contemplation or wonder.
For the poet John Keats, there is nothing paradoxical (at least nothing
incoherently paradoxical) about a self-reliance that has absolutely no self to rely on:
As to the poetical Character itself (I mean that sort of which, if I am any thing, I
am a Member . . . ): it is not itself- it has no self- it is every thing and nothing -
It has no character - it enjoys light and shade; it lives in gusto, be it foul or fair,
high or low, rich or poor, mean or elevated - It has as much delight in conceiving
an Iago as an Imogen. What shocks the virtuous philosopher, delights the
chameleon Poet. It does no harm from its relish of the dark side of things any
more than from its taste for the bright one; because they both end in speculation.
A Poet is the most unpoetical of any thing in existence; because he has no Identity
- he is continuingly in for - and filling some other Body - The Sun, the Moon,
the Sea, and Men and Women who are creatures of impulse are poetical and have
about them an unchangeable attribute - the poet has none; no identity - he is
24 Unlike self-reliance as self-mastery, this shiny albeit darker (certainly the other) side of
self-reliance could never become a method anyone could honestly or even logically
espouse as a method worth adopting. It would not be safe, and thus far from sound, to
advise someone that they are not, that is, under no given circumstance, who they think
they are, particularly if that person is not accustomed to or concerned with thinking about
the meaning and consequences of their thoughts of themselves.
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certainly the most unpoetical of all God's Creatures. If then he has no self, and if I
am a Poet, where is the Wonder that I should say I would write no more? It is a
wretched thing to confess; but is a very fact that not one word I ever utter can be
taken for granted as an opinion growing out of my identical nature - how can it,
when I have no nature?
When self-reliance, continuingly and uncompromisingly turned to and trusted, devolves
over time into the stage of affliction (the sickness of being hyper-permeable, as porous in
the mind as in the body, or the sickness of always getting sick), the self relied alters
temperaments from a show of confidence, or perhaps even one of vanity, to a vitally
irremediable crisis of identity. "Vitally irremediable crisis": does such a phrase, we might
wonder, pit us against a contradiction or sentence us to a paradox? In general, paradoxes
have an implosive semantic effect whereas contradictions bear an explosive consequence
to their illogic. The former, being potentially or secretly dialectical, are constructive
when they come out true; the latter, being quite impotent as nullifications, are destructive
insofar as there is no meaning left over (or not enough of it) in which to qualify for
evaluations of truth and falsity and common sense. So when Keats writes in a letter that
he has no selfbut is still (possibly, probably) a poet, is he canceling himself (putting
himself as a poet into crisis) or creating himself (elevating his self to the crisis of the
poet) when he goes on to ask - as if forced to take the last step of an unstoppable
argument - where the wonder is that he should say he would never write again?
25 John Keats, "The Letters of John Keats," in English Romantic Writers (second edition),
ed. David Perkins (Boston: Heinle & Heinle, 1967), p. 1286.
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Let us break down the internal dialogue Keats has with himself about himself as a
poet before proceeding to answer to the confessional and rhetorical aspects of his
concluding couple of questions: 'He, Keats the poet, has no self, but I, Keats, am one of
these poets. Ergo, the poet is not who I am. But if the part of me by which I measure the
whole of myself and therefore wish to call myself is, in the end, not who I am, then I
must be no one. And if that is true that I am not one then I must therefore be too many:
How else could my nature be so wretchedly unpoetical?' The conclusion reached is that
poets are unpoetical because to be a poet is to strive to think about something apart from
the self to such a point in the thing that whatever is thought is ensconced in its terms.
Keats describes this reversal as "filling some other body." Though it might be more
accurate to say, insofar as it completes the reversal of thought, that the "thought" of some
other body fills the poet upon discovering that his speculations while thinking poetically
about something (anything) in particular will cease only when they have "spilled over"
into the act of writing poetry. Such is a self that creates, as it were, with the created (or
writes with the already written, with, say, the impulsive signatures of the world). Now if
Keats means that having a self that can create is the meaning of being self created (in the
sense of not being unchangeable to himself), but can only come at the expense of what he
calls poetical identity, what then is left for him - Keats - to create with! What, he
unwillingly speculates, is left ofhis self- what self? - with which to create? If the
premises add up and the conclusion rings true, where would lie the point of our wonder if
he should declare that he, the most unpoetical, will write no more poetry under the name
"John Keats" or any name which takes "him" for granted?
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It is there to see that any answer to Keats's questions is bound to be no less
paradoxical and multiple than the roots of the questions themselves. As deeply earnest as
they are, they are also rhetorical and, paradoxically in this case, no less earnest for that.
The importance of the questions for tracking the conditions, strategies and consequences
of self-reliance will turn out to hinge, I believe, on just this quality of indeterminacy -
just this characteristic crisis - with respect to our identity. We cannot know the answer to
the question of our identity in part because there is no answer, or set of answers, or even a
set of questions, that could permanently alleviate skepticism over the accuracy and
applicability of the concept of "identity" to that of the "self," doubts over the existence of
agreeable and sharable criteria for the non-contingent characterization of a self-concept
(to say nothing of doubts regarding self-knowledge as the appropriate moral base for such
criteria). At the very least we would want to add or subtract from the list of
characteristics, or rewrite it or tear it up or switch mediums, the second we sent it to be
published. That is the awkward moment in which we can suddenly find ourselves out of
our own hands despite an interminable condemnation to holding our being, to being the
ones who cannot let go of it short of losing not just all we have but all we are - that we
are. This contradictory form of self-consciousness has the power to both sterilize our
relationship to ourselves and cut into our conscience. But Keats's insight or confession
(the two words strike me here as sharing the same spirit) is that to be the incessant
holders of our own hands is to be in relation to our "selves" only in relation to other
bodies, which all lead back to a (sense of) self whose identity must hinge (or claw) on the
contingency of its relations for being split at its core or for simply lacking a core
altogether. This is no longer to hold but to be held by whatever foreign body (i.e. an
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object standing in perfect reference to its nature) the self aspires to become temporarily
subordinate, for in being their one and only holder - our hands - is to be capable
(responsible?) of holding our palms wide open. (To be against being the official holder of
our own hands would be to use them for the purpose of keeping them fisted closed to
anything - and potentially everything - that might threaten to pry ourselves - our false
sense of self- out of them.) Now, the consequences of this condition in which you are
lead by yourself to the brink of change (the vitally irremediable crisis) is that the self
ceases to exist as some thing you can hold onto at the precise moment when it is relied
upon most fully. "There is no such thing," Wittgenstein says, confessing too, "as the
subject that thinks or entertains ideas."
My persistent use of the verb "to hold" in relation to the metaphor of "our hands"
is meant not to loosen the grip of consciousness on the world as our grip on
consciousness itself in order to capture the sense of being in the hold of something
powerful, or beheld by something overpowering. Depending on the tightness and
relentlessness of the grip we might need to substitute a word like "possession," which
could then come to stand for being overwhelmed to the point of being overcome. The
point, however, is that when we find ourselves grabbed by something as powerful as a
work of art that has worked so well on us we are not, I'm suggesting, anymore properly
our self, which is to say that we can no longer stand properly as a self, as if being
ourselves were a matter of standing up straight. We behave significantly differently,
differently significantly, behave the behavior of the text perhaps, or cease to behave
26 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F.
McGuinness (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2002), p. 69, #5.631. (My
emphasis)
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reliably, perhaps not knowing how to behave, how to respond, in accordance with our
most developed habits. There is no telling how we will finally respond (I want to say
resound) should we decide to write about it, that is, to write our reading - this fortuitous
integration with the otherness of a text. I like to think of this act of writing our reading,
working through our reading with writing, as a rare opportunity for /wwbehaving. But the
sense of misbehavior Fm after is not entirely one of transgression. I do not mean for it to
promote the sorts of interpretive behaviors that transgress the structure and character of
texts to the ends of the performative. Rather, the angle can be found, I believe, in the
need to transgress, say, the text of oneself: not to misbehave as a writer as miss one 's own
behaviors of writing (which is tantamount to missing behaviors of thinking in the sense
of both escaping and lacking one's "old ways"). This is the connection I was trying to
make between the possibility for behaving differently, for differently behaving towards
one's possibilities, and a temporary loss of posture (as opposed to an overly decisive, and
perhaps aggressive, change in attitude): You suddenly find yourself dissatisfied with the
familiar tendencies and overall drift of your thought, and begin to experience those
shapes and patterns as the unchecked habits and rituals and quiet comforts that they are,
when taking it upon yourself to put into words what has spoken to you and through you
and thanks to the poet in you.
* * *
In his "More of The World Viewed," admitting to the charge of having made a
difficult and sometimes incomprehensible book on the ontology of film, Cavell recounts
how he found himself wanting to write not his "usual" thoughts, that is, not the thoughts
he is accustomed to formulating on occasions in which clarity or cleanliness of
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expression is both implicitly called for and reciprocally called upon as the highest
priority, but rather the thoughts of his most intimate and tangled responses to the
"thought" of film:
[I]n writing about film I felt called upon to voice my responses with their privacy,
their argumentativeness, even their intellectual perverseness, on their face; often
to avoid voicing a thought awaiting its voice, to refuse that thought, to break into
the thought, as if our standing responses to film are themselves standing between
us and the responses that film is made to elicit and to satisfy.
Something about film (let's call it its poetical character) issued out of Cavell' s sustained
responsiveness (to particular films and the particularity of film in general) a type of
response that can no longer be called (that is, with any justice)just a response. The
response is characterized, paradoxically and near negligibly, as that which stands in
between him and the responses he expects to have while watching, remembering or
contemplating film. Cavell calls this response (curiously, perhaps, while sitting) a
"standing response."28 By that I take him to mean that as a response - intuitive,
spontaneous, urgent, protective - it is strong enough to stand in his place, and if it can
27 Stanley Cavell, "More of The World Viewed," in The World Viewed: Reflections on the
Ontology ofFilm, enlarged edition (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University
Press, 1979), p. 163.
28 Although it best be remembered that Cavell does not place this concept in quotations
and in leaving it bare (or to stand) does not merely call it by its name but instead by what
it is - a response. But since I have not emerged from a position of subordination to the
ontology of an object, have not been filled by that which I hold (for I do not hold it here),
and thus can't make the same claim about my own experiences with film lest I drop the
self-conscious or meta-critical theme of experience altogether, I feel I must take him at
his word and proceed by way of the meanings suggested by it: the response that stands
"in between," "in the way," "behind," "against". . .
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stand in his place without reservation or regret, despite the risks that come with thinking
outside the terrain of one's thought, then it must be able to stand on his behalf, which
would require that it also be fit to withstand his behalf, to withstand the potential for the
most rigorous checking via the obstinate shadowing of his own thinking presence - and
all the clerical customs to which his thought, in all its forms, remains unconditionally
committed - standing tall and presiding over (and over-determining) its responses. In
other words and in the end, the standing response, however much his own, and however
much in response to film, requires its own response - a second response or set of
responses to stand up to it so as to be in the best position to read the (full) measure it has
taken. It is from this point directly outside his self, a point of pure view - unscathed and
experiential, experientially unscathed - that is the intimate remove with and from the
intractable captivation of film, where Cavell's writing gets underway. ("Why do precisely
these objects which we behold make a world?")29 This phenomenon is an event with the
29 Cavell holds the entire speculative enterprise of The World Viewed beneath the
epigrammatic banner of this question from Thoreau's Waiden. If the book as a whole can
be said to offer an answer, it is only by way of pointing us in the direction of the layered
encryption within this idea and image of "a world viewed" that Cavell casts as the master
key to the nature of film (opening, if you like, a secret passage into nature itself). This
metaphorical concept - a temporal as much as a spatial inversion, both outcomes of the
grammatical inversion - raises Thoreau's question in a new light (precisely film's) by
referring to the unique capacity for moving images to restate the fact of the world's
existence without the facts of our world - objects and their beholders and "the world" as
a fact of language - to back it up or bolt it down. Thoreau's question, when put to
viewers of the screen, is thus in a position to provoke an answer within the logical yet
faith-filled leap necessary to transcend the perception of objects as they appear in a false
light unto a credulous sense of the world as a whole, spreading beyond the limits of its
present beholding while reaching back to the past once held. Moreover, the act of
experiencing a film as the whole it constructs, fundamentally reducible to it on the one
hand but also fundamentally separate from it (piece by piece) on the other, requires that
we exercise the same power of belief (logically faithful) as when the existence of what is
present before us in the world manifests as the right kind and amount of evidence of the
world's existence independently of our own, especially when that existence is capable of
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power to call up the field of writing, calling upon the figure of the writer to rise up from
the depths of what he or she has undertaken to read, to stand up into the standing
response and give bodily meaning to the name "understand."
In the event that one is called upon by one's reading to write it, the idea, as Cavell
sees it, is to avoid writing through the response as though it were a window, as if the
object of it were something entirely separable and therefore clearly visible past the lucid
opacity of its subject.30 At first glance, the alternative to writing right through your
standing responses (to film, or whatever provokes responses which appear unaccountable
or untraceable or irreconcilable to their actual cause) would seem to be to write with
them, letting them speak on your behalf (perhaps as the speech of your better half), which
is to start your own speaking from the center ofthat conversation as an interlocutor. I
think that for Cavell this means thinking a type of thought that one is not in the habit of
thinking, or a language of thought whose speaking is achieved only by the adventure of
writing, to the extent that one has yet to be able to have, and to know where to find, and
being put in doubt by being on our own - by the shadows of our consciousness of it. But
since we cannot help flex this power - pulse with this faith - in our forward
acknowledgement of the world thus lived, it becomes the gift of film that we are
delivered, sometimes driven to recall that what we experience at any moment is but a way
of the world and side of ourselves, that what is beyond our reach is within someone
else's, that the muscle, as it were, stays flexed - fundamentally inflexible faith - even as
we sit back to the world whose partial and piecemeal and altogether incomplete existence
onscreen only seems to deny our existence to it (and to others equally denied). Seeming,
here, especially here, is believing: moving images, existing both near and far from the
truth oftheir own reference, stand far from one truth but close to another.
30 The transparency of the standing response would be of the same degree of falsity and
order of fallaciousness as the transparency of the film it has felt. And yet the illusion, the
fantasy, the temptation, of transparency - so commensurate with and indistinguishable
from the figure of objectivity - is, at the same time, part of film's power to ambush,
disorient and sometimes pervert the self-imposed etiquette of even the most strategically
regimented and detached type of thinker by cutting straight through the responses of
reason.
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how to strike, to sound, particular thoughts with particular words. The thoughts that
we've already had before tempt us into taking them for granted, to trusting them without
another word from us, but not on the grounds of their actual aptness and appropriateness.
On the contrary, the old thoughts come back, as stern and sharp as our most engraved
memories, complete with instructions for the voicing of them (the commemoration of
them), seeming and then merely sounding apt and appropriate. The ensconcing timbre of
the cliché resonates, against the background of our every better judgment, as the
harmonious ring ofthat which has been mastered by rote. The thought, in other words,
stemming from Cavell' s words, awaits its familiar voice, its finishing touch, the levity by
which it can preside as a personal law, and receives it as soon as the habit of having it has
been permitted to follow through on its tendency to repeat itself unconditionally. In the
interest of breaking these habits of thought Cavell suggests that refusing them is not
enough. What he calls for in order to break them (for the sake of pursuing the heart of
what has interested him) is a breaking not o/thought but into thought, as if the only way
to break habits of thought is to escape into our thoughts as they come by throwing
ourselves unhesitatingly upon them. (This is also the surest way of finding out what, if
anything, they are made of.) The inherent risk, however, in conceding to think such
thoughts - thoughts which not only constitute but simultaneously rend the dense fabric of
The World Viewed's "foreign rigor"31 - is that you can never be entirely sure about your
31 This is a phrase occasionally deployed by Cavell in his struggles to account for what he
takes to be the groundless and ultimately ungracious neglect of Emerson as Philosopher.
See Emerson 's Transcendental Etudes, ed. David Justin Hodge (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2003). My use of it with respect to the complexly clarified
mystifications of The World Viewed's reflections on film is meant to acknowledge a
similar struggle against the groundless dismissal and ungracious under-appreciation of
this equally grounding and generous text by the field that stands to benefit from it most.
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meaning at the level of your intention, for a "certain obscurity of prompting" will not
have been external to what you wished most fervently to say.
The experience of being obscurely prompted by an artistic work or medium or
aspects thereof (or whatever you chance to see standing before you and staring back)
carries within it the romance, potentially urgent, of a private investigation. Why were you
so suddenly stopped! What is the meaning ofwhat caused you to look up, when and the
way you did? What are the consequences, the stakes, should you decide to pursue the
source of what struck you? In permitting the seriousness of such questions to spur, and
afterwards haunt, his own interpretive investigations, Cavell' s method strikes me as
internally (as opposed to theoretically) psychoanalytic. And in full deference to an
obscurity of prompting equal to Emerson's conviction in "whim" (which, we might
At the same time, it is important to qualify this struggle (as Cavell does in about as many
essays on Emerson as penned by Emerson and as scrupulously) as standing in almost
perfect proportion to those presented (and never entirely explained) by this text's foreign
rigor. The not unnecessary and timely gesture of explanation, justification and
contextualization is the cue for Cavell to become his own ambitious reader in "More of
The World Viewed," a long essay published as the second part of the enlarged edition,
which he opens quite appropriately (and familiarly) with an acknowledgement of his
critics before proceeding to respond to them as to criticisms all his own: "I have been
told, and by friends sympathetic to the issues of The World Viewed and patient with the
difficulty of their expression, that I have made a difficult book, a sometimes
incomprehensible book."(162) The piece plays out as a test of both the external and
internal criticism and skepticism to which Cavell may or may not be forced to align
himself against his will "to believe in the book."(162) The World Viewed 's passing of the
test is thus determined by the successes and failures that come with answering to all the
questions and concerns formed in response to it, with no one question or concern judged
to be more or less representative of the question of its significance than any other, leaving
the final score square in the hands of Cavell' s sincerity as an interpreter of his own
writing, his capacity and commitment to see-through his acknowledgement of the
criticism, and the strength of his intellectual conscience to not only recognize but be
convinced by the keenest criticisms without betraying the logic of belief in the obscurity
that prompted him to respond to film in the first place with something analogously
(though nowhere near equally) obscure.
32 Ibid. And for Cavell no obscurity is as self-evident, thus full of prompt, as a world
from which we are absent.
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recall, he goes so far as to inscribe above his methodological door), Cavell remarks that
in the event of a natural provocation (where a dark contingency turns fragrantly, hence
near imperceptibly diurnal) it is mystically evident that "Something has happened; it is up
to us to name it, or not to. Something is wrestling for our blessing."33 Hypotheses
regarding the thing that has happened (the coinciding of the thing with the consciousness
of its happening) would have to pertain as much to the potential for it to ripen in our hold
- dependent as much on our potential to be sufficiently patient with ourselves - as to the
circumstances and eventfulness of the thing itself. It is then not just the eventful object
which stands marked as a question but that in the light ofit we are found standing,
wondering, needing an answer to the meaning of our coming to attention. This
heightened sense of being on the verge of beingfound out by the spurs of thought, of
becoming rooted in the field of our most present point or step in the time and space of our
interior lives, is perfectly (and paradoxically) coincident with the discovery of the means
to move on, in thought and through life, across the space and time of oneself, onward,
away from this step here (now a foothold) towards the one slightly above, or below,
slightly off- the same sort of landing which eluded us before when we got up off our feet
so as to move. The "next step," because it is next, because we can merely glimpse the lip
of it, is what wrestles for our blessing to receive us, as it were, in the best of health but
poorest of shape. Upon giving our blessing, and in anticipation of the paralyzing swell of
anxiety, the condition is that the entire step must be taken before there can be any
assurance that all of it is in fact there to be taken, short of which we are fated to spend
our lives in a kind of rote ambivalence towards to the future of our potential. The
Stanley Cavell, The Senses of Waiden: An Expanded Edition, p. 137.
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blessing, assuming we know how to give it, that is, how to become vulnerable and
amenable to the knowledge of our most irreducibly resonant experiences, is given in the
name ofthat which has succeeded to stop thought from moving in circles around the
unthinkable, thoughtlessly and selflessly (as if the self were being driven or dragged
around by itself)· The self seems to be one if not the last candidate, so to speak, to which
we can safely entrust the fate of our future that it be approachable. This is so, I think,
because the self cannot be trusted to know what has meaning for it without being
somehow and very suddenly reminded, with or without the help of names, what has
happened to it, even if it has been irrevocably altered by what it has undergone. To come
to some definite and definitive understanding of what we think, feel or believe, or know,
the self to which we "consult" - the self to whom we ask about ourselves - is confined to
the awkward position of having to consult itself, to ask itself what, truly, it thinks, feels,
believes, knows, only to provide knowledge in the form of claims about itself. And since
we end up forgetting, effortlessly and without harm, what we log in our memory, the self,
in order to reclaim its past in the name of our present, must find a way to make a "sense"
out of memory, out of the past, so that the blessing of a reminder need not depend upon -
or worse result in - a self wrestled to the ground, thrown to its knees or altogether bowled
over by the same thing happening again as if for the first time, as if the most personal
past could pass for the most unpredictable and promising future.
It is from such an idea of not being in possession ofour knowledge or, in
possessing it, ceasing to know how to acknowledge it (appreciating what we have but
could never truly own) that the event of being stopped by a sense of immanent possibility
emanating from the reading of a text can be seen to function with - to the point of being
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the function of- the force of recollection. Thus Emerson can claim that "In every work
of genius we recognize our own rejected thoughts; they come back to us with a certain
alienated majesty."34 The recognition, perhaps, bubbles up to our consciousness as from
under the rocks of repression, returning beautifully foreign and gift-like. One could also
say that the discarded memory returns as a thought we can finally have in front of us, see
and touch as it were without thinking, a thought we have finally learned through
experience how to experience, that is, for ourselves, and in the process take back forever
what was never ours to begin with. (When we were able to have forgotten it we had no
choice, in retrospect, but to reject the form that it took as fundamentally incompatible
with a certain way of looking at things that privileged - without necessarily knowing why
-the one way.) When stopped by "something" the cause of which is virtually
irreconcilable with its actual or intended effect in the text itself, where such an event is
seen to stand somewhere "outside" the text's boundaries as if it has yet to be accounted
for or taken responsibility for by the text from whence it came, a different register of
explanation (inextricably tied, of course, to the angle of the interpretation) is required to
comprehend the uncanny feeling of something familiar come back unfamiliar. The
important point here is that this unfamiliar form does not contain the key to its own
uncanny familiarity, it is not equipped to reveal to us why it seems (and is) so familiar for
us: it is not in the jurisdiction of a text, after all, to single-handedly reopen the case of a
particular possibility of its readers. To this end such uncanniness it is at most a clue, but
to be in the hold of such a clue is like holding a key to understanding something about
34 Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Self-Reliance," p. 139. Wittgenstein seems to claim as much
for the archeological labor of what has managed to be called (ignorantly) or to call itself
(naively) "genius": "The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a
particular purpose." Philosophical Investigations, p. 43, #1 27.
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ourselves that we have always, as it turns out, merely known, or perhaps, until now,
misunderstood (which is probably why we could never properly articulate it or, just the
same, could only speculate about its existence). The clue, or clues, is a cause (or steps) to
carry out a motion, to move, to move on, to move on back, and find words for what we
are finding out about our own possibilities within a text that has made it possible to put a
stop, at last, to "us"35
35 This reference (and others like it) to the state of the subject (temporarily suspended by
the reader-turned-writer) is awfully broad. Left as it is, it would appear to level all the
variations, both subtle and pronounced, of an entire continuum of forms, roles, positions
and paradigms assumed by human consciousness in the history of philosophy at least
since Descartes. The mold of consciousness (or the picture of the subject) that I've been
appropriating throughout my discussion of readers and writers and interpreters is, I must
admit, somewhat formless and raw, or perhaps too introspected or underexposed,
particularly when faced with its own history to which it is bound, like everything, to
answer for (lest its silence on the stand of history be accused of concealing its own
motives within history). But suppose I were to answer for it now by proceeding to trace
the origin of this picture of consciousness to which I am drawn, not forgetting to account
for the logic of its extremely precise position within a history that encircles it. Suppose I
had said or tried to say, somewhere near the beginning, what "I" or "us" or "self says or
can say in the hands and mouths of the writers and speakers of our time who, depending
on their chosen profession (complete in each case with concrete presentiments of both
angle and audience), operate in relation to readymade images of themselves in their work.
Suppose one could actually characterize the contents of a given conception of
consciousness in accordance with a conception of consciousness in general as
fundamentally (or perhaps phenomenologically) genealogical - layering the philosophies
of Descartes upon Kant upon Nietzsche upon Husserl upon Bergson and Deleuze and
onward - 1 would nevertheless still want to know how to reconcile the experience of
myself (to myself) in the world with so many bodies of knowledge concerning "the self
(the same self, as far as I can tell, to which "I" (me) am subject), including all their
convenient conceptual distillations like "consciousness" or "subjectivity" or "experience"
or "knowledge" or "morality" at our disposal today to frame and measure and potentially
risk isolating ourselves. "Us," though more of a tool-like referent than an organic-like
concept, is no less a mode of image (particularly when italicized), a mode through which
"the one as one" pictures "the many as too many," a mode with the power to picture
ourselves as we are - as such, as it were, in the absence of the other - to each (and every)
other, and as having our being still in common despite all distance and difference. But as
an image (left as it is) it is invariably quite static and rather disappointingly opaque. In
the end, it gathers everything into it except the gatherer, excluding the attempt to include
oneself from the distance of one's fundamental individuality, revealing nothing about the
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This eventful release from the sense of one's self, the self being stopped as the
machine of one's identity, the coming to a stop of the self one has mastered through a sort
of blind impersonation, seems to me to warrant the title of "therapy," that is, when the
exposure of a text through the process of reading affords, in return, the exposure of the
reader within, or as, or in the process of writing, the written interpretation. In this sense,
in the spirit of therapy, I have said that the text can appear (or dawn) as a clue to
something unknown and perhaps unknowable about ourselves, although I've been trying
to suggest simultaneously that it is hardly the sort of clue sought to solve a riddle as if
reading were nothing more than a way of playing hide-and-seek with our best kept
secrets. For this clue unsought we need a conception of "the clue" that the seeker does
one "behind" it except that he or she is perfectly assumable by a variety of pronominal
linguistic forms - echoes of the pure subject of the verb within language. Whichever
words, in the end, that we use to describe our selves, others, or otherness, do not - having
ended - lead to or back to anything (subject or object) that we could call separate
(separable from the structure), for to do so would be to have in use - before we can say
"I" - yet another continuous or at the very least consistent term. Facts derived from our
use of language (all facts to some extent) are first and foremost facts about language -
our use of it and its use of us - as insignificant as these may be. And this fact about fact is
to take nothing away from the facts themselves as they occurred and continue to occur in
the world as actual observable instances. But the peculiarly self-referential fact of the self
- the existence of our presence to ourselves and in the world and with others with the
same presence of existence - is not only not an exception to the rule of language but is
also the imposition of all the rules, the cause, ifnot the source, of all our criteria. The
writing or speaking of language posits a writing or speaking subject who can then relate
to the world only after the use of language is permitted to constitute the conditions of all
relations. So this use of the "widest" of words to designate the existence of the subject as
significantly more substantial (and unconditional) than even these words all told can
suggest - the subject (pure subject of the verb) as separate and irrespective and perhaps
even above words altogether - would presume that we know to whom we are referring,
that is, who all these people are as people with selves to call their own, which amounts to
presuming the self as an exception to the rule of the fact that we can't truly know "them,"
in the same way that we can't establish tenable connections between "us" or "I" or "we"
and their objects as long as words remain in control of our criteria. And what else am I,
for you, but them - one of these "them" in words like the rest of them? You and I, here
and now, bring each other together, but the fact that we speak the same language is what
keeps us together by keeping us apart.
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not know to seek out, or does not know is "seekable," and hence does not know is sorely
missing, but nevertheless pursues until it suddenly appears, falling in his or her lap,
before becoming - shining - the desired clue.
A somewhat hypothetical scenario might help remind us or, failing that, at least
help us to visualize just how common and even pragmatic this "finding without seeking"
actually is: When someone tells me that a work of art "spoke" to him, going on to explain
(if he can) what it said, I sometimes remember to take that to mean that what it succeeded
to "say" is precisely what he needed to "hear," that is, precisely the sort of context of
communication that he lacked the means to impart to himself. But not always can I be
counted on to know where he is coming from. While trying to understand him (what he is
saying he understood), I might forget to take him at his word: I might simply be blind and
deaf to the fact that he, in relating a past experience, is still in the process of finding the
words he is saying and thus still immersed in the act of coming-to-terms because he is
still coming to terms with words themselves as the guides and measurements and
presenters of experience. I might also fail to appreciate that my presence opposite him,
while certainly the cause of his presence opposite me (and vice versa), does not
necessarily constitute the call, as it were, for the occasion of his commitment to
expression despite the fact that it is I, after all, who is addressed: His words, after all, are
not solely for my understanding but are largely geared for the occasion in which his own
understanding is on the line and even put to the test by whether or not / can understand
his way of understanding. We tend to misunderstand someone else's attempt to
understand themselves just as often as we tend to miss the opportunities to catch our own
gestures of self-understanding. A possible reason for this is that witnessing another' s
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interpretation of an experience is liable to misunderstand that person's reluctance or
eagerness or ambivalence to share it as being the result of the complex nature of the
experience alone - how it was "like this" and not "like that" - as opposed to and at the
expense of all the difficulties and frustrations and hesitations of sharing, particularly
when one bears the burden of responsibility to compromise one's privacy for the sake of
contributing to one's culture by connecting to one's community. And yet the struggle
with extreme self-consciousness while expressing or narrating so-called resonant
experiences has always remained, at bottom, a struggle with experiences of having been
near totally and impossibly disarmed. The total disarmament of one's psychological
foundations in the face of experience is, however, quite inconceivable, quite fantastical,
because the self, I don't think, is not anything one could hope let alone want to lose: A
sense of self is, at some basic level of consciousness, required to undergo our experiences
if there is to be any chance of having them, once and for all, as future opportunities to
return to them, draw from them and, if forgotten, be reminded of them as if recalled by
them.36
Works of art which are granted the power to stop the sense of self from starting at
itself remind us that the road to self-knowledge not only leads equally outside of the self
but can start "without" the self, without "the person" we can think we can know solely by
way of thoughts of the self (i.e. in the acknowledgement of our own rejected thoughts).
The self, by itself, which we wish to call ours, is analogous here to the sort of thought
36 For a remarkably careful and succinct and imaginative philosophical-historical inquiry
into the modern condition of experience as inextricably shaped by the "natural
distortions" of the Cartesian subject's epistemologica! economy, I draw the reader's
inevitably rewarded (and burdened) attention to Giorgio Agamben' s Infancy and History:
An Essay on the Destruction ofExperience, trans. Liz Heron (London and New York:
Verso, 2007).
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(albeit the very thought of thought) whose terms (or grammar) we have yet to learn, or
perhaps have resisted learning, how to be able to reject, which might explain why "we"
can't come back to ourselves with that certain alienated majesty the way the things about
ourselves can. Perhaps an implicit, deeply rooted Cartesian criterion for thought still
compels us to maintain the self as an abode for thought, to occupy a self as a stead
outside of thought in which to think, as it were, in immaculate remove. There are
questions, nevertheless, that we can still put to this remarkably stubborn Cartesian legacy
even if we have no intention whatsoever of abandoning it: Why must thinking come after
a thinker? Why must it originate within a thinker? Why do we think (or is it a belief?) that
thinking implies our confirmation? What do we wish confirmed that is not in the midst of
occurring? And supposing for a moment that the human subject were, in fact, a
transcendental entity, what could be so important about it as to be more important, more
prominent, than an account of the process of thought itself, regardless of "who" or "what"
is "doing" the thinking?37
I suppose the start of an answer, at least to these last two questions, would be the
T, the mysterious letter-word T. We want to be able to say T, aloud, back to someone
who has said it or found a way to affirm it first, or towards ourselves in response to
37 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche's waning patience with unquestioned attributions
of thought to the Cartesian ego results, once again, and in prescient anticipation of
Wittgenstein's late philosophy, in a brutal unmasking (courtesy of intellectual
conscience) of the language games indulged in the attempt to contain thought within an
artificial causality of consciousness: "A thought comes when 'it' wishes, not when T
wish, so that it is a falsification of the facts to say that the subject T is the condition of
the predicate 'think.' It thinks; but that this 'it' is precisely the famous old ego is, to put it
mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an 'immediate certainty.' [. . .].
Even the 'it' contains an interpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process
itself." Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy ofthe
Future, trans. Helen Zimmern (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1997), p. 24.
(Nietzsche's emphasis)
ourselves through various acts of writing and address. A word referring to the agency
"behind" the words, thus echoing in our every word, haunting every step of our lives
through words, there is pressure nonetheless to officially state ourselves back into the
world we are wording (by way of this word) and are perhaps resigned to word (as a
result, perhaps, of this same word), as if words alone take the measure of the world we
must we live in. But is it not this fact about the T - that as the subjectpar excellence it
can literally symbolize our momentous reassertion of existence in the world - which
makes us make of it an immaculate substitution of ourselves, a seamless substitution akin
perhaps to a form of idolatry, of false idolatry? Doesn't the person who "has the word T
at his disposal [have] the quickest device for concealing himself?"38 But which or what
self is Cavell referring to? Who is this self that will hide precisely within its most
performative expression? And what is it about this self, this particular moment of
selfhood, that we have been so strategically avoiding? And how have we been able to
avoid it for so long and with nothing more than a single word uttered before, always
before, all the words that would otherwise expose us? The answering of these questions,
not to mention the previous constellation, would take me well beyond the scope of my
powers over and above the scope of this final chapter. So all I will say, less by way of
response than acknowledgement, is that such questions about who the T is are difficult
to answer, or unanswerable depending on the question, mostly because of "who we are"
that there can be a question at all about "what we are." (Why, after all, is there this need
to name what (if anything) that is?) There is a definite trace of the Poet archetype at the
bottom or base (call it the heart) of each of us that Keats, in suffering from, was
38 Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love," in The Cavell Reader, ed. Stephen Mulhall
(Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996), p. 151.
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responding to: the plight of an unpoetical nature. The observer, the beholder, the dancer,
the chameleon. The wretchedly wakeful. On our feet after The Fall (from the grace, say,
of animal silence) and no fixed identity but in our words, to our words, as inferences of
countless inscriptions or victims of countless possessions.
In uttering the word T we also show the need, deeper than any longing, to be
indissolubly single. Without it, without the impetus to capture all our selves in it, without
"a self sufficiently committed to its own coherency to justify calling on a single mirror
of a letter, we would be stranded on the ground surrounded by the most unclimbable
mountains - tall peaks from which to reflect upon our participation as a force at play in
the reality down below - without a hold by which to disassociate ourselves and even
retreat (de-poeticize) from all the various entanglements of participant forces, and risk
living the life of a Keats or, riskier still, the life of a Kafka.39 Apparently, Kafka did not
39 The risk of such a life, if we can permit ourselves to imagine it, is not the risk of losing
an identity altogether, but rather of having more than one to be at a given time. This
action oí having more than one being, of having to cope and contend with a multiple or
fractured ego, is regulated by a self-concept that, while nothing more or less than a
powerful referent or force of reference, cannot therefore be identifiable, or even so much
as relatable, with all of them combined or even any one of them on their own. The sense
of frailty and security in relation to something "misty and immovable" at the fore of
consciousness does not properly constitute a philosophical move and therefore does not
necessarily succumb to philosophical misconception. When consciously or unconsciously
utilized, the concept of "the self is, too, a circumstance. For example, take the frame of a
painting. If it is deemed necessary to the painting's sheer visibility (as it was for the
congested and somewhat collage-like displays at the salons in 1 8th century Paris), it can't
be a part of the painting at the same time as a condition for its existence - an existence of
the imagination. The concept of "the self as it applies to passionately unpoetical natures
is perhaps the core circumstance of a life of the imagination that is won from the survival,
although hardly the defeat, of the madness of contemplation. A philosopher like
Wittgenstein might have suffered from uncertainty and could even be said to have treated
it in his type of philosophical labor, but if that were the case could he not also have
thrived by it so as to live in the only way possible for him? The logic of a cure
acknowledges the right of the illness to its logic, and the "ill of soul" who exercise this
right by crafting the perfect, most proportionate cure can make public to themselves the
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regard himself as a true writer of stories until he finally found himself able to substitute
'he for T without hesitation, no longer recognizing any intrinsic difference between the
two pronouns, finding (or losing, or becoming) himself in the third person. Similarly
Keats, in speaking of himself as a poet in the long passage from his letters quoted earlier,
has no decisive use for the word T either. He only begins to use it when he sees what
remains of his self- separate from all speculations - as indifferent in nature, seeing no
way around the fact that he must be, that is, still be, the he who is dissolved by the
thinking and the writing of poetry despite the fact that the "he who is dissolved" is always
necessarily stripped of its own proof. ("If, then, he [the poet] has no self, and "if I am" a
Poet, where is the Wonder that "7" should say "7" would write no more?")
Let us return for a final, brief moment to his highly revelatory predicament. He
was confessing his guilt that he will go on writing poetry despite not being the poet to
write it with, for to have something to write about (emerging from the depths of
immersion) is to render his character unpoetical and hence his identity all but missing.
When he has (in hand) something to write, the writing that comes out will be the outcome
of his "being read." As long as the object of his contemplation sustains him, his rights of
passage shall open like a book in which nothing, yet, has been written. Writing would be
the exercising of this right to pass into a state of passage, a state not unlike the one we
ascribe to written passages in a text where the person of the writer is scaled incrementally
into the steps of the individual sentences. But is it accurate to describe this writing as "a
way" of writing or a method to start writing? Or ought we rather to consider what gets
secret of homeostasis: exercising stasis, destabilizing it, for medicine as much as for
philosophy.
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written, regardless of how or why, as a phenomenon of writing, as the fruit of the writer's
labor in writing out his or her possibilities anonymously?
This is what seems to be worrying Keats. He senses that to write this way (as an
indiscriminate and devout reader of things poetical) is to sacrifice the ground on which to
call the writing his. There ought therefore to be no wonder from anyone if he were to tell
us that he should never again write, as long as writing continues to be understood (written
and then read) as the externalized thoughts of the person of the author and not also, and
perhaps primarily, the work of an interpreter. It is a wretched thing to have to confess: not
feeling entitled to write your reading unless you are in complete prophetic control of the
writing, hence under the false impression that you are complete without genuine acts of
immediate response, hence in a false place above your own words where you are
convinced that you have already known them and are only now declaring them as a final
ritual for passing them by or as a last resort for passing them on to "those less fortunate."
However, you could have cause to celebrate the sacrifices of solitude should your writing
function as an interpretation of the self you have delivered, unknowingly, to a process of
reading. "There are the stars, and they who can may read them,"40 wrote Thoreau alone
in the woods at Waiden. If you can, proceed astronomically. But if you have yet to
commit yourself to discovering as opposed to forging connections between your
instances, it is best to avoid misreading such complexity and diminishing such immensity
- clouding the firmament of a life - with mere astrology.
40 Henry David Thoreau, Waiden; Or, Life in the Woods (New York: Dover Publications,




Consider for argument's sake - but also for its own sake - the following line of
reasoning: "What I find most rewarding about the creative process is that it brings about
ideas that I could never have conceived had I not gone through it. Had I left myself to my
own devices and kept my hands tied, I would have found confidence in the very ideas I
would later find so easy to reject. The process showed me things that I could never have
shown myself and therefore knew better than I did what I myself wished to know."
This sort of testament points to one way, if not the main way, of claiming and
exercising (claiming as exercising and exercising as claiming) our rights of passage; and
by that I mean the precise "whereabouts" - the existential coordinates or conditions if
you will - of self-cultivation within a materialistic, hence materially binding, culture.
Dream ofLight, through and through, is at once the result, or better yet the fruit, of its
unique demonstration: the power of freedom to appropriate what is given. But
contingency, in accordance with my understanding of it, gets in the way of this right to
pass - snags and wedges our reading those rights - through feelings of extreme
disorientation and profound forsakenness at the threshold of becoming. And yet,
underlying such a predicament - facing the wall of the world as it were - is the
possibility for a new beginning to emerge out of the fullest measure of the selfs most
urgent reach towards itself; and what seemed a wall turns out to be a door or, less
conveniently metaphorically, an unapproachable horizon receding, entreating, beckoning
us to expose the illusion of its wild infinity. There are, I don't doubt, a myriad of ways of
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narrating what I have, until now, avoided calling "the redemption of contingency." Mine,
I realize, can be none other than my own, which is as it should be, for that fact could not
be more consistent with what I have been calling, in so many words, "the fate of
contingency." But if it seems as if my narrative as a whole flirts with the prospect of
becoming a meta-narrative, striving to tell this philosophical story once and for all and
from every theoretical angle in the hopes of putting a permanent lid on the problem of
contingency, it is primarily due to the difficulties inherent in recognizing the problem
itself as, on the one hand, the beginning of a vitally important and monumentally
progressive solution to metaphysical deception and, on the other hand, and as a
consequence of its ambition, one so paradoxically deceiving as to be its own solution.
Indeed, if I've come up with anything true to the "nature" of contingency it is that it
persists, despite my claims to the contrary, as the first and only existential problem whose
solution depends on its staying unsolved. But in staying unsolved the problem remains -
do I need to tell you? - frustratingly unfulfilling, and all the more so for spurring our
thoughts headfirst into complex conceptions (call them promises) of action. Non-
fulfillment, where frustration and disappointment over the cultivation of contingency are
best described as our reactions to it as opposed to its symptoms in us, is contingency
declaring itself, biting back, holding on as if here to stay - our freedom holding onto us
for dear life as it were. I gather that this is the reason why most attempts to grapple with
contingency (to settle accounts with it over and above a fuller understanding of it)
amount to a frantic chase after an elusive culprit, only to discover that whatever has been
conceptually surrounded and pinned down along the way (and paraded in the end) bears
little resemblance to what contingency was thought or believed or suspected to be, but
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rather, upon closest inspection of the aftermath's unsettling calm, yet another indication
of "it." As a result, here, contingency became more defining than definable, more plight
than purpose, more mirror-like than wall-like (or a combination between the two that
can't be shattered and few think to traverse), which is why, in my story, it has the power
to migrate or spread or shape-shift from the world to the self, because I found its source
in the hands that touch: "the Midas touch of modernity."1
I realize that my deployment of contingency may appear to be more or less
conceptually isolated (confined as it is to the second chapter which traces an evolution of
the concept starting with the trace, or impression of a trace, of cinematic representation),
but to reduce the role of contingency to the concept of contingency (determined in large
measure by the umbrella of the word "contingency") would be to underestimate the sheer
amount of pressure I've been placing throughout on the role of art. Nothing less than
clarifying, negotiating and redeeming contingency as such is what I have been implicitly
expecting aesthetics to provide the tools for. This emphasis on art, however, has required
that it carry well beyond the existence of specific works of art or texts, beyond even their
appropriate cultural and historical contexts, to a less immediate (but no less immanent)
"past and future" through considerations of both creativity and criticism, amounting to
something on the lines of a generative paradigm I wish to call an "arc of discourse." It
has been my argument as much as my hope that within such a generative circuit
(creativity to constitution to recreation) our consciousness of the phenomenon of
contingency within the private and public realms outside the realm of art (the relentless
burden of the irresolvable problem as solution) has the opportunity to undergo our
1 Niklas Luhmann, Observations on Modernity, trans. William Whobrey (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 44.
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aesthetic cultivation, however artificial and idealistic it may be. {Cultivation is my choice
of word here because I imagine the "soil" of contingency to be the richest of them all, as
having the most potential to grow the self into a state of vitality and splendor, particularly
upon finding oneself in a state of "thrownness," while also being fittingly the most
difficult to till, requiring not just the most knowledge but the best, most efficient
"technologies" of knowledge.) The basic requirement of this cultivation is not that of
contingency-consciousness spanning (and surviving) the full length of the arc of
discourse: the journey from contingency to necessity - "the way of all problematic
individuals" - is not necessarily in the hands oía. single individual or consciousness to
accomplish. I am not suggesting, therefore, that one has to be, in turn, or simultaneously,
artist, spectator and critic in order to follow meaning to its logical conclusion by keeping
it in a constant state of flux. The fact of the matter is that complications in the generative
continuity of meaning will no doubt emerge when the flow of this circuit slows or
sputters or gets cut off as a result of temptations inherent in art, criticism and
spectatorship to work texts, interpretations and judgments into irreversible states of
permanence (processes into texts, readings into interpretations, experiences into
judgments). The pursuit of permanence and the wish for permanence (both symptoms of
the myth of permanence) are pursuits and wishes for a resolute finality, severe enough
not only to cease but quite literally to substitute the end - "completion" - for the work
itself ("work" understood in accordance with the transitive application of the verb "to
worjfc"). I referred to this reversal briefly and somewhat obliquely at the beginning of the
chapter on Dream ofLight, and undertook in the bulk thereafter to take to task my
intuitions that this particular film was as close to being a document of its own making as
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possible in film or any other medium - an artwork documenting the work of its art -
without, as I put it there, crossing the line of the made (i.e. deconstructing itself as a way
of referring to itself). I cited, but did not quote, an extremely heavy, disorienting and
unnerving remark of Walter Benjamin who recorded the following as the dreaded
thirteenth thesis regarding the writer's technique: "The work is the death mask of its
conception."2 This idea had tremendous consequences for me when I stumbled upon it
(and on it, I should add) some time ago. And it continues to hang somewhat ominously in
spirit over the entire thesis as the sort of critical insight that is perhaps better left in the
dark (as a doodle or fragment too volatile to be released from the margins into the body
of work presented here as finished, done, despite having to do with the impossibility of
anything being completely over and done with). Although, should it continue to remain in
these margins any longer, there is the risk of abandoning a guiding intuition that the work
of art is, somehow, somewhere, marginal in nature: If works of art can be accurately
described as concealments of their own conception, then to what extent are they even
capable ofbeing reached? To what extent does our conception of the work of art as
something finished conceive its work as fundamentally inaccessible, over and done with,
sufficiently worked-through and successfully worked-out, fundamentally surpassed, and
therefore somehow ontologically behind or separate from or perhaps even lost to the
work of art as such, as if artworks could be ontologically superior to themselves by
ceasing to work as "art"?
2 Walter Benjamin, "One-Way Street," in Selected Writings: Volume 1, 1913-1926, ed.
Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Mass., and London: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 459.
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I should say straight away that I am not out to criticize, on ontological grounds,
great works of art called "masterpieces." Such works are, typically, great for a reason,
and continue to be generous with their powers of inspiration to keep those reasons
coming in ways no one could have predicted. Instead, what I'm suggesting we expose
here is a certain "masochism of belittlement" stemming from the affective power of art
and underlying our general intuitions regarding a work of art's possession of and
entitlement to greatness despite its shortcomings, intuitions which have found their way
into some established criteria for the masterpiece. The phrase, I realize, sounds harsh and
extreme and may appear at first glance in poor taste, but let me ground it with an example
of what I mean by it. Regarding The Death ofthe Virgin, a masterpiece by the Italian
painter Caravaggio, Jean-Luc Nancy describes the experience of standing before the
sheer volume and intensity ofthat painting's epic display ofpresence as one of alienation
and loneliness and unworthiness:
On the threshold, all at once, a scene stands out. This scene is not staged for us; it
is not laid out for the attention or the intention of a subject. Everything happens in
an indifference to the visitor, and it even seems that it ought to remain hidden
from whoever is not, already, one of a familiar circle. No one looks at us or
invites us in. Indiscreet, we have, in sum, entered by force. But this force of
intrusion is that of the scene itself. If one dared, one might say that it ravishes us.
In any case, we are seized there, on the spot, as in a transport of the place that
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would be nothing other than place itself, without inside or outside - nothing but
the flattening of a plane.
Its presence is described as fierce, its bearing unbearably overbearing, as if a reflection in
water - perfectly still - had slipped back unnoticed into the very reality it casts anew.
Though it hangs on a wall in a gallery where its sole purpose is to be on display, it is felt
not to directly address the viewer or noticeably insist on the attention it inspires. On top
of describing it as "indifferent," a reluctant host to a cautious and oversensitive visitor,
Nancy proceeds to justify his sense of the painting's indifference to him by describing his
visitation as an intrusion - guilty of a wrongful trespass upon a vividly reified yet bygone
intimacy that has no way of defending itself. If he dared (and he does), the painting
ravishes him, and he likes it. He seems to favor the strange, hardly describable pleasure-
pain-fear-ecstasy feeling of being simultaneously overpowered and overlooked because, I
gather, the painting is felt stable enough (strong is not quite the right word here) to alter
the place of his being, the consciousness of his place, that is, his three-dimensional self-
consciousness, to fit the form of the artwork' s lesser dimension - "nothing but the
flattening of a plane" - and become the ecstatic prisoner of the aesthetic moment -
"seized there on the spot as in a transport." Transport is the metaphor deployed for this
unique experience of being taken aback, helplessly and unpredictably and into one's
mortality, as opposed to being the one who is constantly taking over the field of
intelligibility with readymade categories and conceptions. Transported as if back to
himself, alone, he remains stuck on the threshold of comprehension, lighter and leaner
3 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1996), p. 57.
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than is humanly or consciously possible, in an almost desperate attempt to lure the
inhuman painting out of its self-imposed fortress of solitude: silent, static, flat and past.
As partial as I am to these sorts of aesthetic experiences - part of the fun of art,
after all, is basking in a kind of secular or purely sensible mysticism - 1 find this type of
testimony disconcerting because it seems to betray (quite indiscreetly) what I referred to
above as a masochism of belittlement plaguing aesthetic criteria and thus motivating
aesthetic judgments. But, at the same time, there is nothing really unusual about such a
response once you get passed the fact that subjectivity must undergo abstraction as a
consequence of a subject's most violent appreciation - a spectatorial pathology which
seems to be more and more standard by the day in works of criticism (even those of
primarily philosophical concern like Nancy's The Muses). Accounts of art, and perhaps to
some extent all histories of art, remain for the most part accounts about accomplishment -
a subject that the accounts and histories themselves pursue as a goal - insofar as the drift
of a particular history is thought to depend upon the interjections of its currents. And
while it is not always clear in any given account what makes a work of art stand (up or
out or against the test of time), what couldn't be clearer is the sheer force, call it the
unconditional obviousness, by which some do and some don't - for whom, I feel like
saying, it makes no difference - where the ones that do stand tall. (We boost them up.)
The ones that don't are those which barely got off the ground in the first place. (We hold
them there.) In either case, however, the work of art in question is bizarrely reducible to a
claim that is accepted or rejected as if true or false.
If some glibness enters my thinking here it is probably the result of my own
criticisms (worries, doubts, fears, etc.) getting the better of me. Perhaps the power of art
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to cast a spell, or break the spell of mental and emotional stagnation, will turn out to be as
agreeable or as truthful a characterization of art because that is what the great majority of
people expect (or hope) from art, whether or not it delivers on its promise. All the same, I
do not think it off base or ill founded to acknowledge at least a sense of an instinct or
impulse to aestheticize the aesthetic as part of a fantasy in which aesthetic objects assume
the look and feel and ready-at-hand efficiency of actual objects. So I make no accusations
here. If a teleological myth of perfection and permanence is what is unconsciously at
stake in aesthetics, then it takes two (as always) to tango. It is possible and fruitful and
immeasurably profound - 1 agree - to fall in love with a work of art; all I wish to say is
that such emotions, in confusing the work's independence with its autonomy, further
elevate and empower the already high and mighty position of the work by going
profoundly unrequited. And aside from being painful and humiliating, nothing is more
detrimental to the ability to have a balanced conversation.
That being said, there is also a "history of hesitation" specific and peculiar to the
20th century in general (or to the time we call ours), one of doubt, of a reluctance to
uphold, of nihilism, underlying and sometimes informing works of art that do not set out
to establish or reinforce absolutes and, as a result, no longer depend on the old Hegelian
conception of art as the sensible presentation of the Idea. A remark by another German
philosopher/critic, Ernst Bloch, and dating from approximately the same time as
Benjamin's "death mask," provides this opposite, perhaps more optimistic picture of the
work (more specifically, for him, the philosophical work, which isn't the same I realize,
and definitely not sensible in the Hegelian sense of the word) as perpetually flooded,
hence in some sense continuously reconstituted, by the "memory" of its origin and
development:
Yet the beginning could never quite be expelled from philosophy; it echoes
significantly in the great systems, which separates the metaphysicians from the
actuaries of cosmic explanation. It also ties philosophy again and again to youth,
makes metaphysics at every point impatient again, conscientious - the wisdom of
age in the early, unerringfreshness of adolescent, primordial wonder.
Elsewhere in Bloch' s piecemeal ("scrupulously unsystematic") philosophy, a theory, a
vision, a peculiar power of insight into the tentativeness of even the most resolute
explanation is called for with reference to a potion, to a sort of alchemy in sensitivity
with the power to set pulsing again the wisdom of the work's wild inner youth. "The
potion," he writes, "not from any witch's kitchen, is still unknown that would completely
rescue youth beyond age, the beginning beyond the work, make them visible." This
prescription of a potion, however, is so fanciful (and funny) that it borders on being
completely self-defeating as a theory. And yet, the potent sense of irony in the metaphor
functions to vividly reflect our powerlessness to cheat death, reverse time or capture the
elusiveness of essences like ghosts transcending the barriers of appearances into time
immemorial. Bloch, in effect, suggests that although it may not be within our means to
conjure up the beginning from the end (raise the dead), it is nevertheless still possible,
4 Ernst Bloch, Traces, ed. W. Hamacher, trans. Anthony A. Nassar (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 170. (Italics mine)
5 Ibid., p. 68.
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that is, within our means, to refuse the binary distinction (the convenient superstition that
the dead are gone).
About a half a decade after Benjamin and Bloch express some suspicion towards
textual finality almost in passing, the philosopher/critic Edward Said, in a comparatively
systematic book-length study of the major textual processes of modern literature,
attempts a theorization of the many shifting parameters and peregrinations of "the
beginning" - its mythology, rhetoric, reflexivity, practicality, possibility, duration, etc.
He gives it the name, too, of this widest of words, Beginnings,6 and it is near
encyclopedic in its coverage and scrutiny of reflexive representations and motifs that
writers use to call attention to the act of calling upon a "second" world through language.
The decision to begin writing fiction truthfully is described as having the effect (on
writers, writing, and the written) of a sort of epistemological break or rupture in
consciousness that is motivated, perhaps, by an urgent plea for a viable twist of
separateness from, and therefore perspective on, the surrounding continuity and confining
repetitions of the everyday (or "first" world).7 It is eloquently rigorous work, shedding
much light on the concept of the beginning through analyses of its most explicit literary
enactments, but it does not venture down the dark, uncharted path opened (though not
entered) by Bloch. In fact, I would say that Said proceeds in the opposite direction, away
from slippery concepts (and slippery unsystematic or aphoristic methodologies) such as
Benjamin's "death mask" or Deleuze's "diagram" or Barthes's "punctum" (not to
mention the brute anonymity of "contingency") to more linear explications of their
powers of determinacy over the logical conventions of narrative, the most predominant
6 Edward Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1975).7 Ibid., p. 42. '
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being the professed will to begin, to change or to die, with respect to characters and
narrators and narratives as a whole. Rather than work towards the register of literature's
pre-articulation in the act of writing itself, Said focuses on scenarios whose content
alludes to the idea of process, perhaps signifying its own process, albeit a process
mediated so often by the voice of the fictional protagonist who is typically cast as the
personification of the author. He writes about the steps, paths, prints, transitions and
transformations depicted by certain novelists at certain times and for certain historical
reasons, but without treading anywhere near those which "echo significantly" in the
novels themselves. Perhaps this avoidance comes out of the fear ofjeopardizing the
resiliency of the novel as an integral whole within a siege of cultural forces, or of
discrediting the labor and genius owed to the novelist who managed an intervention in the
culture in the form of a contribution to that culture (the very culture to which he or she
remains a product), or just as well out of too much respect (hence fear) for the grandeur
of the accomplishment (the pleasure of the text compelling all inquiry). The live trace,
however, is not reducible to a self-reflexive gesture, for that would reduce it to nothing
more than a trace of itself, that is, to a representation as opposed to the continuation of
the process of representation. The concept or hypothesis (in honor of Bloch' s "scientistic"
intuitions) is much closer to what I referred to in the first chapter on Dream ofLight as
the organic "self-consciousness" of the work of art, and which that film, I hope I have
shown, stands as exemplary, perhaps epitomizing it to the point where this particular set
of quotation marks can, in reference to it, be comfortably clipped.
Bloch's belief that the spirit of the beginning continues to echo significantly in the
great systems seems a hopeful albeit seductive conception. But I am also doubtful as to
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whether or not such "system-based" works are in need of liberation and revival or are in
any way impaired as a result of their conclusiveness and overconfidence. Indeed, like
Bloch, I long to perceive the "cracks" concealed (or filled) within the strongest, cleanest,
tightest of systems, but so far my experiences with such systematic efforts (Aristotle's
Poetics, Kant's Critique ofPure Reason, Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit, etc.) have
proven just how strongly, even necessarily, a death mask canfunction- sitting on the
face of a thinker who, beneath it, thinks himself right and needs to for the sake of
knowledge and, perhaps, his own sake. This mask, I realize, has its advantages, which are
also its remedies. It is not my interest or desire to break down, in the name of some
principle, what has been built to stand up and to endure (so as to ultimately impart).
There is no justifying turning towards a few loose bricks, or loosening bricks stable
enough to hold, at the expense of a system's meticulous and monumental engineering of
meaning, however idealistically or arrogantly it presides as definitive. Such traces, to my
mind, aren't even worth preserving, just as those that are deliberately left behind are
preserved under a false pretext and ought never to have been found under the wrong
impression, so to speak. Singling out "the flaw" as the most significant secret of "the
accomplishment" because there conviction came so suddenly to a halt or coherence flew
as suddenly out the window is to do little more than to fetishize the finitude of an
expression. And, to make matters worse, these sorts of critical approaches can serve as
occasions for the worst kind of melancholy where celebrations of life in the form of
authentic and spirited acts of creation are disregarded, if not mourned, as nothing more
than denials of death. Other traces, on the other hand, are less the exception than the rule,
particularly when enough combine into a pattern establishing the rule ofthe exception as
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a basis for textual sovereignty. Ruling the exceptional and salvaging all contingency, this
type of trace makes meaning by enlivening the medium through which meaning
circulates. Alive and enlivening, still alive, for better and for worse, they take on a great
importance, or become worthy of our contact, because when put together into the whole
of a work of art they constitute a more faithful remembrance of ourselves, our living
limitations, which assure us our ceaselessness, our eternal confirmation as beings who
can mean without meaning to (meaning more than we could ever hope to keep track of,
let alone know). So how do we know one when we see one? Where, in what kind of text,
which textual context, are these traces to be found ruled into a whole? Under what
conditions and criteria? What kind of text in the end can function as the context ofits own
conception! What, exactly, is a film like Dream ofLight!
Allow me to return to the primary prescription by which I undertook an initial
reading of the film: "It is, perhaps, a diary film, which of course does not necessarily
make it a film diary, for that would reduce it to a complex albeit random stream of
thoughts (or observations) riding, securing and resisting, simultaneously, the inexorable
current of the everyday." The distinction now seems to me more important than the
prescription, for the somewhat paradoxical prescription of "the diary" (the process
through which one communicates to oneself and by oneself) may or may not hold for a
finished film (or anything called "finished" for that matter). Nothing prevents all the
formal and structural affinities disclosed between the two forms (diary film and film
diary) from being classified as mere resemblances. Be that as it may, let us go with the
more genre-sounding expression "diary film," the one that correctly places the emphasis
of diary on film (as in "action film" or "horror film") albeit without much precedence and
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hence without a guarantee of consensus. Dream ofLight, we might recall, is constantly
reporting/recording the date even when very little - sometimes almost nothing at all - has
transpired to affect the progress of Antonio Lopez's painting of the quince tree with sun.
Victor Erice, to repeat, made a promise to himself to film each and every day, even if the
new day was little more than a repetition of the previous one. The film, obviously, is the
result of the exclusion of the great majority of its day-to-day tracking (though it is worth
mentioning in response to this fact that Erice does acknowledge most of the days with at
least a shot of the painting against a black backdrop). But what it keeps (I kept on saying)
is not at the expense of what it excludes as in honor of it: standing in for "the rest"
without ever substituting "the best" for it. That is why that which is kept - this honoring -
is not accompanied by any embellished justification or proof of worth (just as the last
bunch of leaves that remain on a tree at the onset of winter are seen as being no closer to
the tree, no less the tree itself, than those which chanced to fall during its summer prime).
I have no intention here, in the wake of all that has come after it, of launching into
another discussion ?? Dream ofLight. IfI don't know what the film is after working
through it from start to finish then perhaps I'll never know. But it's not that I don't know.
I do, at least I think I do, which is to say I'm satisfied for the time being. The knowledge
I lack seems to be of a more practical sort: Literally, what is this film? What name does it
go by? Or must we give it one? Which is to ask: What tradition does it belong to? And if
to none or if none will take it - if too anomalous or original or promiscuous to directly
fall in line with an established lineage of precursors - then where are its allies in the
world? What else, past or present, is doing similar things in different ways or different
things in similar ways without adopting one way or another? We have certain
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responsibilities, I think, to texts we champion as significant as a result of their singularity
- and no less to the cultures directly and indirectly inheriting such texts - to show that
they are not alone in what they do, that what they do is being done - deemed worth doing
or "the thing" to do - in different ways by different people in different areas of expertise
looking for different alternatives or methods for reaching very similar conclusions.
Otherwise, to allow these texts to revel too much in their own light, which would be to
render them extraordinary beyond all measure, is to put them face to face with
themselves and hence the miserable fate of being esoterically the first and last of their
kind. Meanwhile, the constellation of stars to which the one-of-a-kind invariably belongs
has yet to be drawn, perhaps because some constellations are less obvious to discern than
others, leaving this star a rogue of the night, lonely but bright, and in no apparent need of
support. And yet with a slight tilt of the head and a little imagination . . .
So what I would like to do is offer a surprising and somewhat unusual comparison
between Dream ofLight and a completely different kind of text, a text that, for all its
difference, no one would hesitate to categorize as criticism. Differences in kind between
two incongruent concepts or methods or objects is one thing, but when actual things
come to substitute mere notions it is often the case that any similarity can turn out to be a
necessary affinity, the start or sign of a shared logic, as opposed to a mere resemblance,
for resemblances are harder to dismiss or even minimize if they are perceived as being
fundamentally mutual. But I don't want to get ahead of myself by overselling what are
still affinities between anomalies. The work of criticism Fm proposing as companion
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piece to Dream ofLight, coming all the way from the field of art history, is The Sight of
Death: An Experiment in Art Writing by T.J. Clark.
The Sight ofDeath consists of radically detailed "formal analysis" criticism of
two paintings by Nicolas Poussin, Landscape with a Calm and Landscape with a Man
Killed by a Snake, but is not, due to the seemingly indiscriminate cultivation and
accumulation and reconstitution of details, in any formal way properly on or about them.
As a whole, it is more accurately described as an account of an established and well-
respected art historian who, in a negative frame of mind at the start of the new
millennium, unexpectedly crosses paths with the two aforementioned paintings together
in a small room at the Getty Museum in Los Angeles at the start of a six-month research
stint for which routine Picasso-plans were already in place. ("It was not clear what would
occupy my time in Los Angeles, but the most likely bet was Picasso between the wars.
Work on that subject had already begun. The notes and books for it were in my car." ) So
he had no designs whatsoever to write the book that is now ours to read. Day by day,
without realizing that the days were passing by so effortlessly, he responded to the two
paintings, individually and comparatively, in his own way and in his own time, probing
all that he saw as he saw it in the form of written (and passing) responses. Each response
was logged as an entry in ajournai that he only began to realize could become a book, a
8 T.J. Clark, The Sight ofDeath: An Experiment in Art Writing (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 2006). Clark is the sort of art historian so aware of the
assumptions informing his approaches to the past via the presentness of paintings that he
makes a habit of breaking with his critical, interpretive and speculative practices the
moment they start operating too smoothly (or get away from him) and turn habitual. So
much so that he sometimes seems to manage to practice what Stanley Cavell sometimes
seems merely to preach, albeit through no shortage of his own preachy reminders to
himself in The Sight ofDeath to remain morally upright as a critic, that is, steadfastly
self-critical, without weakening the hand that writes by overworking the one that erases.
9 Ibid., p. 1.
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finished work, when he saw himself as passed the point of no return and would therefore
continue to see and think and write until the end came with as little invitation as the
beginning. ("I began writing, and could not stop. All I can offer by way of an excuse is
that this happened, or seemed to happen, involuntarily. I certainly did not think, when I
made my first diary entry on Landscape with a Calm a day or so after coming across it in
these new circumstances, that what I was doing was 'working on Poussin.'" ) The book,
such as it is, is a record of a dialogue between an extremely patient and persevering
viewer and two inconspicuously challenging paintings, concentrated over many months
and petering out over a few years. The published material, if scrutinized under the lens of
a more conventional methodological practice, could just as easily be used as notes for the
writing of a book the result of which would be the systematic evaluation and processing
of them (a likely fate for the Picasso-between-the-wars book). Instead, by preserving the
chronological and multilayered development of his thought, staying true to all the
hesitations and redundancies as equally as the breakthroughs, a different kind of book
was written: the writing ofthe book. ("I have tried not to have the rewriting of the entries
dim their initial charmed life. Mistakes and obscurities I have tackled; outright
redundancies pruned; but often the writing, at least in the beginning, seems to me now
somewhat awkward or crude or glib, and part of the time I have left ill alone. I want the
whole record of repetition-compulsion, warts and cosmetics and all." )
The "result" of this "approach" (funny words here) is that Clark's writing
temporalizes the Poussin paintings at the expense of subjecting them to his own intrinsic
temporality (i.e. argument), in the same way as Erice's filming gathers in all the circles of
10 Ibid., p. 3-4.
11 Ibid., p. 9.
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time within his horizon at the expense of forcing his own singular circle (i.e. narrative)
around the immediate surroundings of his subject. Both, we could say, insofar as they
have succeeded to document their daily encounters with their respective objects of
interest (or is it now obsession?), complete those documents by delivering them raw, that
is, by editing them in a manner as not to edit out but to cherish as dramatically historical
(and dramatic on their own) all the initial wayward stumbling and occasional
disturbances of doubt that, if acknowledged every step of the way, eventually give way to
balance, insight, maturity or wisdom, and sometimes - pending a bit of good fortune -
epiphany.12 This "making" gets made (methodologically?) when the process ends at the
same place as where it began, although in a different time, hence space, which is only
possible if the beginning was completely sidestepped or slipped into (as it was for
filmmaker and critic alike). Ending then is a matter of finding out why one began as one
did, why one's intuitions were worth pursuing with such vigilance and, upon satisfactory
answers, what the price of knowledge is: Why can I no longerfeel the deep oneiric
vibrations oí those particular intuitions?
A specificity that definitely links The Sight ofDeath and Dream ofLight is that
both works, being works of their own making or working-through, acknowledge the daily
framing of the weather as an inescapable and highly influential factor in their
development and, perhaps, even their progress. What Clark is able to see in the Poussin
12 Such a process, I feel like saying, reveals the truth about how muses work their magic,
and why diligent workers in this vein might still want to appeal to superstitious
explanations of their highest moments of clarity when doubt is revealed as the muse of all
muses. A fog, it is true, can clear awfully fast, just as darkness lifts without much
warning, but for those who struggle to find their way through thick and thin the first sign
of light will always come from an adjustment to the dark. At which point, yes, fog clears
and darkness lifts and spirits lead us to safety.
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paintings, what Lopez is able to accomplish in his own painting, and what Erice is forced
to reckon with throughout his adherence to Lopez's relationship with the quince tree is, to
be sure, in the hands of the weather: the natural temperament of contingency, that
indifferent resolve of external conditions surrounding human non-indifference. Each day,
early in the morning, each of them takes back hold what is always theirs to let go and
resumes from where they left off, which, we learn, is never as they left it. The quality of
the light coming through the skylight in the Poussin room at the Getty where Clark does
all his looking and writing turns from honey hued to bleakest gloom not only between but
within days, determining to a large extent not only which details become visible but,
more importantly, how they become visible, how they project as effects, hence whether or
not they are even effective, having any effect at all on the consciousness with the most
open pair of eyes. Aiming to paint a quince tree so intricately illuminated by the golden
hues of autumn (a light so special for giving way to the steely faintness and harsh
relentlessness of winter light), Lopez contends with long bouts of rain and periods of
impenetrable overcast contagious to the season in which life and death are perfectly
indistinguishable and hence unpredictable. As for Erice, such contingencies become the
very stuff of his story, but that doesn't mean he would have told it by way of them had it
been up to him alone. Just because he could not foresee what the day would bring, and
preferred above all what he could not expect, does not mean that he did not carry with
him, inside of him, the burden of certain hopes. (Thwarted intentions, after all, do not roll
more easily off the back of someone whose primary intention is to stand back, for what is
the intention of standing back if not to withhold one's intentions for what dreams may
come?)
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All this brings up the separate but related contingent phenomenon of
unpredictable mental weather, a subject on which I find Emerson to be ironically at his
best, taking advantage of his best and brightest of moods to reflect on the fact that moods
don't last:
Our moods do not believe in each other. Today I am full of thoughts and can write
what I please. I see no reason why I should not have the same thought, the same
power of expression, tomorrow. What I write, whilst I write it, seems the most
natural thing in the world; but yesterday I saw a dreary vacuity in this direction in
which now I see so much; and a month hence, I doubt not, I shall wonder who he
was that wrote so many continuous pages. Alas for this infirm faith, this will not
strenuous, this vast ebb of a vast flow! I am God in nature; I am a weed by the
wall.13
What are great works of art if not the ideal form of their makers raised to the occasion -
the power - of art? As the very promise of art this is, I believe, as it should be, and I don't
think Dream ofLight or The Sight ofDeath fall short of it, breaking it, even though they
epitomize the sort of work that grounds its own perfection (death) by exposing it as finite
(living on). (IfI thought they suffered as a consequence of their achievement I would
hardly be giving them the benefit of every conceivable doubt.) On the contrary, they are
as realized, as fully achieved, as the best that art and criticism have to offer, and I have no
doubt in my mind that this is due to the diaristic accounts of their own coming into being
as a means of coming into their own. This fact of finding oneself a near total stranger to
13 Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Circles," in The Portable Emerson, ed. Carl Bode in
collaboration with Malcolm Cowley (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1981), p. 231.
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one's efforts upon returning to them in the morning - a weed by the wall of yesterday's
towering glory - is the existential experience of contingency that the medium of the
diary, scheduled for the quiet of the night, is meant to come to terms with: tracing,
counting and accounting for the sporadic movements (or moods) which set the stage for
the day's activities (and, on some days, those dark days of the mind, keep the curtains
shut to the public). In using this medium to keep track of the whole record of contingency
so as to resist the temptation to avoid or compensate for the inevitability or necessity of
contingency, Dream ofLight and The Sight ofDeath succeed in showing how
contingency comes to be cultivated - very gradually, one day at a time, some days better
than others, and always in the dark over persistence paying off. (One doesn't wake up to
find that spring has arrived on the exact day of the vernal equinox. Although technically
the earth's axis is completely level, unless it is unseasonable the weather that day,
including the day after, bears all the weight of a characteristically relentless winter. Then
all one can do is be patient. And patience, unlike persistence, pays off right away at least
with the common sense to persist only over what is humanly possible.)
But persistence pays off too - eventually. As soon as it no longer pays to persist,
something specific will have to be shown for all the work that went in. Both book and
film, for this reason, climax at the end with the sense of having reached an end, a rock
bottom. Intense, scrupulous and obstinate looking (at paintings, trees and time in transit)
constitutes a payment, call it a sacrifice, for what lies beyond yet out in front, and which
yields the reward - fear and ecstasy - of self-knowledge for the observer. While the
knowledge gained by Clark, Lopez and Erice is unexpected and even somewhat
undesired by them, it is not forced "out of left field" as it were, which is to say that the
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turn towards the self is not self-indulgent but self-transforming if the self turns exactly
away from itself only to find itself, upon returning to itself, reflected in a new light.
These people, for sure, go too far, all the way around to come full circle, but they do so in
full awareness of Stanley Cavell's grounds for doing so: "Going too far is a risk inherent
in the business of reading, and venial in comparison with not going far enough, not
reaching the end; indeed it may be essential to knowing what the end is."
14 Stanley Cavell, Pursuits ofHappiness: The Hollywood Comedy ofRemarriage
(Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 36-7.
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